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ABSTRACT
James Webb Throckmorton: The Life and Career 
of a Southern Frontier Politician, 1825-1894. (May 2005)
Kenneth Wayne Howell, B.S., University of Texas–Tyler;
M.A., Texas A&M University–Commerce
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Walter Buenger
Many scholars of the Reconstruction era have examined
James Webb Throckmorton’s political career between 1860 and
1867 and have revealed that his racist views helped hasten
the end of Radical Reconstruction in Texas.  However, these
scholars have not explained the motivations behind
Throckmorton’s political ideology, nor have they explained
adequately the origins of the North Texan’s racism.  This
dissertation focuses on these critical issues by examining
the development of Throckmorton’s personal and political
beliefs between 1850 and 1874.  It shows that
Throckmorton’s political ideology was influenced by four
primary factors:  his early experiences on the North Texas
frontier, his desire to create a community on the frontier
that was primarily designed to be a haven for white
settlers, his commitment to political conservatism which
evolved from his early affiliation with Whig political
ideology, and his quest to bring economic improvement to
iv
the North Texas region.  In contrast to other scholarly
works on Throckmorton which claim that the North Texan’s
political views were contradictory and inconsistent, this
study demonstrates that Throckmorton’s ideological beliefs
remained constant and changed little over time.  His
commitment to preserving the whiteness of the frontier, to
protecting the settlers of his home region, to conservative
political ideology, and to internal improvements,
especially railroads, never wavered during one of the most
turbulent periods in Texas politics.  This study also
reinforces several important conclusions about the South in
the nineteenth century:  The region was never a homogeneous
society; southern racism was multifaceted; and southern
settlers migrating westward, especially those from the
Upper South, viewed the frontier as a potential escape from
the political and social dominance of large slaveholders.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: AN ENIGMA IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY TEXAS POLITICS
James Webb Throckmorton was one of the most noted
politicians of nineteenth-century Texas.  Beginning in
1850, he orchestrated a political career which few Texas
politicians have been able to match.  By the end of life,
Throckmorton had served as a representative and senator in
the state legislature, as the governor of Texas, and as a
member of the United States Congress.  Between 1850 and
1894, Throckmorton’s political reputation and name
recognition among the Texans equaled that of other noted
individuals of the times, including Sam Houston, Elisha M.
Pease, John H. Reagan, Edmund J. Davis, and James S. Hogg. 
However, despite the notoriety that he enjoyed during his
own time, Throckmorton remains a forgotten figure in the
history of the Lone Star State.
Evidence suggests that Throckmorton’s life and
political career were significantly influenced by four
primary factors:  his experiences of living within a
frontier culture; his embrace of conservative Whig
_______________
This dissertation follows the style and format of The
Journal of Southern History.
2political ideology; his belief in white superiority; and
his desire to stimulate economic development in North
Texas.  Of these three factors, the former had the greatest
overall impact on his life and career.  The frontier
culture shaped Throckmorton’s views of the world as he
understood it, especially his concept of race, class, and
patriotism.  For example, Throckmorton’s support of white
supremacy was directly correlated to the common perception
held by white settlers that the frontier was a white man’s
world.  However, the settlers’ contempt of African-American
slaves did not derive from a pure devotion to the white
race.  Instead, it stemmed from the settlers’ fear of
planter domination in society and in politics.  
The North Texas frontier was populated with people who
left the Upper South states, like Tennessee, because of the
increasing encroachment of white planters.  Once these
planters moved into an area, they typically dominated
social, economic, and political institutions within the
region.  Thus, those small farmers who lived on the Texas
frontier sought to disassociate themselves from this elite
class, and thereby govern their own affairs.  Their racial
hatred of blacks was in part fashioned by their dislike of
the planters:  The slaves were the clearest symbols of the
3planters’ wealth.  Thus, while Throckmorton remains an
interesting subject in Texas history, his life and
political career also provide scholars insights into the
political, social, and economic views of a frontier
society.
Though twentieth century scholars have afforded
limited attention to Throckmorton, they have not completely
abandoned him as a subject of study.  The most cited
examination of Throckmorton remains Claude Elliott’s
biography Leathercoat: The Life of James W. Throckmorton. 
Elliott’s study covered many of the major events of
Throckmorton’s political career, but, like many
biographers, Elliott emphasized the Texas politician’s
accomplishments, while ignoring his subject’s failures.  In
his preface, Elliott stated that “it is true that no one
service of James W. Throckmorton to his State and nation
has great magnitude but it appears to me that the myriad of
services which he performed should place him among the
greater Texas statesmen of his time.”1  In an effort to
prove his thesis, the author examined Throckmorton’s career
with blinders on, focusing on the accomplishments of
Throckmorton more so than his personal and political
frustrations.  Yet, the author stated that he has
“attempted to set forth the factual statements, and [has]
4made little attempt to interpret either the man or his
times.  It is a factual study and not an interpretation.”2  
While Elliott’s approach to biography may have been
acceptable in the 1930s when his book was published, it
leaves readers with an incomplete understanding of
Throckmorton and his times.  Even though Elliott’s work
introduces the major events of Throckmorton’s life, readers
are still left wondering why this nineteenth-century
politician is important to the history of Texas, as well as
the history of the South and the United States.  One of the
greatest shortcomings of this work is its failure to
discuss the roles that race and class played in
Throckmorton’s political career.  Nevertheless, despite
these evident flaws, Elliott’s work remains a valuable
source of information and offers key insights into how the
frontier shaped Throckmorton’s political views.
Two other works that also focus directly on the
political career of Throckmorton are Ruby Crawford
Holbert’s “The Public Career of James Webb Throckmorton,
1851-1867" and Arlene M. Harrison’s “J. W. Throckmorton’s
Administration.”3  While both of these authors make
valuable contributions, they also fail to examine how race
and class conflict shaped the North Texan’s ideological
views.  However, these studies are problematic for reasons
5beyond the limited analysis of their subject.  
Holbert’s work, which predated Elliott’s full-length
biography, also views Throckmorton as something of a great
Texas patriot.  The author concluded that “Texas has every
reason to feel justly proud” of Throckmorton.  She stated,
“As a pure and undaunted patriot he discharged with
fidelity all of the duties of his office.  Never has Texas
had a more honest official.”  Holbert contended that
Throckmorton was “equal to any emergency, industrious,
zealous, and faithful to his constituency.”  In terms of
Throckmorton’s relationship with his constituents, Holbert
found that “when demagogues slandered him, the people, to
whose interests he ever devoted his every energy, always
came to his support.  Temporary success may be purchased by
trickery and political scheming, but such long–continued
and unchanging success can be attained only by honesty,
industry, and energy.”4  Although there is an element of
truth in her statements–Throckmorton was always popular
among many of the voters of North Central Texas–Holbert
does not give proper attention to his personal and
political shortcomings, such as his racist views and his
attempts to exclude blacks from the electorate during his
term as governor.  In refusing to acknowledge
Throckmorton’s character flaws, the author portrays the
6Texas politician as a tragic figure, a victim of
Congressional Reconstruction.  By overemphasizing his
accomplishments, Holbert offers her readers an incomplete
and often misleading interpretation of Throckmorton.
Arlene Harrison’s interpretation of Leathercoat and
his administration benefitted from the passage of the four
decades which separated her work from that of both Elliott
and Holbert.  Overall, Harrison’s interpretation of the
governor’s administration is more objective than previous
Throckmorton biographers, offering readers a fairer
assessment of her subject than earlier published works. 
Harrison’s scholarship questions whether or not the
military authorities were valid in their removal of
Throckmorton from the governorship during Reconstruction in
Texas.  Harrison correctly concluded that “the charges
against the Throckmorton administration had some validity. 
Outrages against Union men and freedmen went unpunished, in
spite of Throckmorton’s constant efforts to see justice
administered fairly.  The Texas government discriminated
against the freedmen but provided some basic rights.” 
Harrison continued, “Throckmorton tried to cooperate with
the military, but the commanders generally disregarded his
advice.  His several appeals to President [Andrew] Johnson
increased the hostility between him and the commanders. 
7Thus, Throckmorton’s removal was justified.”5  Harrison’s
study offers a very limited glimpse into Throckmorton’s
life and political career because he was governor for just
over a year before the military authorities removed him
from office.  By examining such a brief period of time,
Harrison generally fails to answer several key questions:
What events prior to his becoming governor shaped
Throckmorton’s political views?  Did these preconceived
political views affect his judgement as governor and lead
to his removal?  What role did the deposed governor play in
thwarting Reconstruction’s effect in Texas? 
Other scholars have examined Throckmorton’s role in
the broader scope of Texas history.  Beginning at the turn
of twentieth century, researchers routinely included
Throckmorton in their studies of Texas’ past, focusing
primarily on his role during Reconstruction.  Their studies
have naturally followed the general trends of American
historiography.  Many of the studies written prior to the
1960s, viewed Reconstruction in Texas from the ex-
Confederate point of view.  These works tended to blame the
Civil War on the North’s encroachment upon states’ rights. 
Likewise, these early scholars viewed whites in the South,
especially politicians, as victims of northern abuses
during the Reconstruction era.  This interpretation can be
8traced back to the late nineteenth-century arguments of
William A. Dunning, a professor of history at Columbia
University.  Dunning’s basic argument was that upstanding
southern whites were thrust from power by the maleficent
carpetbaggers and scalawags.  These scholars are typically
labeled “traditionalists.”6
Charles W. Ramsdell was one of the most noted Texas
historians to support the traditionalist view.  In his
Reconstruction in Texas, Ramsdell recounted the events of
Texas between 1865 and 1873.  Throughout the pages of this
work, Throckmorton is consistently viewed as an honest
politician who fell victim to the aggressive actions of
radical Unionists in Texas (so-called carpetbaggers and
scalawags), radical members of the U. S. Congress, and
military authorities who enforced reconstruction policies
in the state.  For example, in answer to charges made by
the military authorities that “Throckmorton encouraged the
oppression and murder of Union men and refused to do
anything toward having the criminals punished,” Ramsdell
exonerates the governor by stating “that a careful
examination and review of all the evidence accessible does
not in any way justify these accusations.”7  Clarifying his
position, Ramsdell argues that “many cases cited and
complained of [against radical Unionists and freedmen] had
9not even come to the governor’s attention until brought up
by the military, for the simple reason that the complaints
had been filed not with the civil officials but with the
military instead.”8  While there is a thread of truth in
Ramsdell’s observation, he fails to reveal the complexities
of the circumstances which eventually led to the removal of
Throckmorton from office.  Ramsdell does not mention the
Texas governor’s personal biases against giving the
freedmen the right to vote, the economic and political
motivations driving his stance against Congressional
Reconstruction, or his inability to effectively carry out
the laws of his state.  Instead, Ramsdell leaves his reader
to believe that the military authorities were blinded to
Throckmorton’s earnest attempts to properly restore Texas
to the Union because they simply “lumped all ex-
Confederates together and hastily identified anti-
radicalism with disloyalty.”9
Following Ramsdell’s lead, other scholars writing in
the early twentieth century embraced the traditional point
of view that Governor Throckmorton was something of a
faultless, helpless victim of military authorities and
radical Unionists, both in Washington, D.C., and in Texas. 
William C. Nunn in Texas Under the Carpetbaggers briefly
examined the impact of the Congressional Reconstruction Act
10
of March 2, 1867, on Governor Throckmorton and his
administration, concluding that the state’s chief executive
“attempted, with great difficulty, to administer state
government according to the wishes of military commanders
and at the same time according to his sense of duty.”  Nunn
continues, “General Sheridan removed him on July 30,
1867[,] to satisfy the constantly clamoring Radicals and
Major General Charles Griffin, head of the United States
Army in Texas, who disliked Throckmorton intensely.”10  
Ernest Wallace’s Texas in Turmoil discusses
Throckmorton’s plan for bringing Texas back into the Union
during his term as governor.  According to Wallace,
Throckmorton wanted to “minimize interference by the
military and Freedmen’s Bureau officials” by enforcing the
laws of the state justly and fairly; “to regain for the
state courts jurisdiction” over civil cases; and “to secure
the transfer of the military from the interior to the
unprotected frontier.”11  The arguments of Nunn and Wallace,
like Ramsdell before them, enjoyed widespread acceptance
among the historical community and the public-at-large at
the time of their publication; however, the merit of their
work was challenged by the emergence of revisionist
historians in the 1960s.
Concurrent with the civil rights movement of the mid-
11
1960s, American scholarship experienced meaningful changes. 
Graduate students and young professors began examining the
contributions that African Americans, as well as other
racial and ethnic groups, made in United States history. 
Throckmorton’s reputation did not fair well in the hands of
the revisionists.  John Pressley Carrier states that the
Texas politician, despite his former sentiments for the
Union in 1861, was not “far in sentiment and policy from
the secessionist Democrats.”  Carrier continues by
concluding that Throckmorton grudgingly accepted
emancipation of the slaves, but nothing else. 
“Throckmorton . . . favored a system of compulsory labor
for the freedmen, [and] the rejection of the Thirteenth
Amendment,” and he “hoped that the Texas legislature would
also disregard the congressional test oath in selecting
federal representatives under the new constitution.” 
Throughout his work, Carrier emphasizes that Throckmorton’s
motivations were based upon his racist views against
African Americans.12  Carrier clearly revealed that the
governor’s racist views influenced his decisions in office,
but his readers are still left with the question:  Why did
Throckmorton put his political career in jeopardy for the
cause of white supremacy?
Other revisionists’ accounts are similar to Carrier’s. 
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James Smallwood in his study Time of Hope, Time of Despair
contends that “Throckmorton . . . opposed the extension of
legal or political rights to freedmen.  Although considered
a moderate, he opposed the expansion of the Freedmen’s
Bureau and tried to secure its removal from the state.” 
Smallwood continues by stating that “He [Throckmorton]
lobbied for the supremacy of state or civil authorities
over federal personnel.”13  Once again, Smallwood’s study
fails to discuss why Throckmorton pursued these action, and
therefore, scholars remain puzzled over the question of the
governor’s racial motivation.  
Carl Moneyhon also believes that Throckmorton’s racial
views directed his actions during reconstruction in Texas. 
Moneyhon in Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas states
that Leathercoat “typified those Unionists who viewed any
action other than the simple recognition of the fact of
emancipation as unnecessary and dangerous.”  Moneyhon
correctly observes that it is difficult to determine the
motivations causing white hostilities directed toward the
freedmen.  However, the author concludes that
Throckmorton’s “correspondence suggests that he saw the
efforts of the administration at Austin as detrimental in
the extreme to the ability of [white] farmers to obtain
labor.”  Moneyhon explains further that Throckmorton “saw
13
allowing blacks to serve on juries as a first step toward
full citizenship and, consequently, a step toward depriving
agriculture of its necessary labor force,” and being
“unable to secure concessions from Hamilton [provisional
governor of Texas], Throckmorton set about developing a new
system that would provide coerced labor.”14  Moneyhon’s
study advanced Reconstruction scholarship by recognizing
that the governor’s actions were partly directed by
economic and racial motivations, but he does not explain
why Throckmorton was adamantly opposed to giving free
blacks civil rights, especially considering that the
governor came from a region of the state that maintained a
relatively small population of former slaves and engaged in
agricultural pursuits which did not call for forced labor
contracts.  In this regard, Moneyhon does not consider how
Throckmorton’s life experiences on the North Texas frontier
shaped the governor’s view of the world.
Barry Crouch and Dale Baum also include Throckmorton
in their broader studies of Reconstruction Texas.  Crouch’s
The Freedmen’s Bureau and Black Texans briefly alludes to
Throckmorton’s contempt for the freedmen by revealing that
the governor did nothing to help alleviate white violence
inflicted upon black Texans and their Unionist allies. 
Crouch suggests that Throckmorton’s refusal to end the
14
violence against blacks and white Unionists was racially
motivated.15  Baum’s The Shattering of Texas Unionism also
highlights how Throckmorton’s racial hatred of blacks and
ethnic groups was a significant part of his political
beliefs.  In discussing the 1866 state elections, Baum
focuses on Throckmorton’s anti-immigrant attitude as
possibly being the primary reason for the gubernatorial
candidate’s conservative views in politics.16
Furthermore, Baum succinctly defines Throckmorton’s
attitude toward immigrants from the Northeastern part of
the United States and Europe by quoting a private letter
from Throckmorton to Benjamin Epperson.  According to the
letter, Throckmorton’s opposition to immigration “prompted
him . . . to accuse ‘sour krauts’ and ‘swindling Yankees’
of being potential ‘d-m-d negro worshiping skunks’ who
would mongrelize Texas society. . . .”17  Baum also mentions
Leathercoat’s views toward the freedmen.  He states that
“Throckmorton believed that unless coerced, the ‘nigs’
would not work productively or take care of themselves in
their new freedom.”  Baum continues, “He [Throckmorton]
blamed all of the state’s difficulties on the Republicans
or, once when complaining to local military authorities,
entirely on the presence of colored troops.”18   
The revisionist historians should be commended for
15
their overall contributions to the understanding of Texas
and the larger South during Reconstruction.  Nevertheless,
their examinations of Throckmorton fall short.  Even though
they have well documented the governor’s white supremacy
attitudes, the revisionists have not effectively explained
why Throckmorton was a die-hard racist.  Additionally, in
focusing primarily on his racist views, they have turned a
blind eye to other potential factors which dictated the
governor’s behavior.  The revisionists give very little
consideration to the evolution of Throckmorton’s political
ideology, his involvement with railroad development in the
northern part of Texas, and his close affiliation with the
frontier culture.
Following the revisionist school, another group of
scholars began to reassess history from a more moderate
perspective.  Most of these historians did not abandon the
more laudable goals of the revisionists:  Like their
predecessors, they too attempted to create a more inclusive
and useable past.  However, this group of researchers began
to examine additional issues which revisionists chose not
emphasize in their works, including economic development,
migration patterns, and the impact of national events on
state and local politics.  The post-revisionist scholars
include Walter Buenger, Randolph Campbell, Gregg Cantrell,
16
Richard McCaslin, and William Richter.  
In Secession and the Union in Texas, Walter Buenger
focuses on how migration into Texas, culture, partisanship,
ideology, and self-interest of politicians played a vital
part in the secession of Texas from the Union.  Because
this study details the secession movement in Texas,
Throckmorton’s support for the Union is discussed at
length.  Buenger finds that “by 1860 Throckmorton stood
second only to Sam Houston among the unionists of Texas.” 
He continues, “Throckmorton’s Unionism sprang from Whig
ideology, partisan antipathy for leaders of secession, a
rational assessment of the events leading to secession, and
membership in a Non-Lower South cultural group.”19 
Additionally, Buenger portrays the North Texas politician
as an avid opponent of East Texas secessionists, an
argument that seems to counter revisionists contentions
that Throckmorton was closely associated with the latter
group.  Buenger’s analysis is one of the first works that
attempts to understand the events and factors which shaped
Throckmorton’s political ideology, and, as a result, he is
one of the first scholars to address the complexities
surrounding this Texas politician’s life.  
Other post-revisionist historians also attempted to
examine Throckmorton within the context of national and
17
state politics.  Randolph Campbell’s article, “The District
Judges of Texas in 1866-1867: An Episode in the Failure of
Presidential Reconstruction,” does not directly deal with
Throckmorton, but it does suggest that national politics
had a direct effect on Throckmorton’s governorship and his
eventual removal from office.20  Though he does not ignore
the Texas governor’s racial views, Campbell finds that “the
ultimate demonstration of how badly the Lincoln-Johnson
approach [to Reconstruction] had failed, many of the
officials elected on June 25, 1866, including James W.
Throckmorton, would lose their positions to military
appointees.”21  Campbell also states that “Presidential
Reconstruction in Texas failed for many reasons, not all of
which arose from within the Lone Star State.”  Clarifying
his position, Campbell argues that “the political
ineptitude of President Johnson, the determination of
Radical Republican leaders like Thaddeus Stevens, and
developments across the eleven states of the old
Confederacy all contributed.”22  However, Campbell clearly
recognizes that “many Texans themselves, voters and
officeholders alike, maintained attitudes and pursued
policies that almost guaranteed the failure of what has
been called ‘self-reconstruction’ in 1866-1867.”23  Thus,
while Campbell extends the blame to others, he still holds
18
Texans, including Throckmorton, responsible for their part
in the failure of Reconstruction in Texas.
Gregg Cantrell also attempts to reevaluate the failure
of Reconstruction in Texas between 1867-1868, primarily by
examining the period following Throckmorton’s removal from
office.  Using statistical analysis, Cantrell states that
“racial violence during the two crucial years of Texas
Reconstruction was indeed closely associated with political
developments.”  According to Cantrell, the majority of
white Texans were “embittered or upset with the course of
Reconstruction politics” and therefore much of the violence
perpetrated against the freedmen resulted from the Anglos’
“hostility to political conditions.”24  Cantrell does not
dismiss the findings of revisionists concerning the
presence of racism in Texas; rather, he questions the
patterns associated with the racial violence levied against
blacks.  Therefore, Cantrell can be considered a post-
revisionist because he emphasizes that political issues
were leading causal factors in the white hostility vented
toward the freedmen in Reconstruction Texas.  Cantrell does
not discuss Throckmorton at length, but his work suggests
that Throckmorton’s inability to curb violence against the
freedmen caused Radical Unionists to place him at the
center of the problems in his state and justified his
19
removal from office.
Richard McCaslin’s recent scholarship has provided new
insights into the Unionism of the North Texas region. 
According to McCaslin, many of the residents of Collin
County “operated independently of plantation agriculture
and slavery, the economic and social foundations of the
Confederacy.”  Instead, the majority of the county’s
farmers grew wheat or raised livestock.25  McCaslin’s
research primarily focuses on the Confederate government’s
attempts to suppresses Union sentiment in North Texas,
including the hanging of Unionist sympathizers in
Gainesville, the county seat of Cooke County. 
Nevertheless, Throckmorton, a resident of Collin County and
a prominent politician from North Texas, was a central
figure in his study.  McCaslin is one of the few historians
who attempts to explain why Throckmorton, a devoted
Unionist, condoned and accepted the Confederacy’s violent
reaction against Unionists in the North Texas region and
why Throckmorton joined the Confederate military.  McCaslin
correctly observes that the Confederate authorities’
“bloody campaign of suppression” against Unionists and the
Confederate deserters in northern Texas was based on issues
involving “communal security.”  McCaslin states that
“communal security was a principal concern of nineteenth-
20
century Southerners, and they frequently used violence
against those who threatened the established social and
political order.”  Prior to the war, abolitionists were the
primary target of violence in Texas, but “when opposition
to disunion became disloyalty to a new regime [Confederate
States of America] . . . brutal methods were used against
both dissenters and deserters,” especially those living in
the North Texas region.  Communal security dictated that
the Confederate authorities could not afford to give safe
harbor to their perceived enemies, the Unionists. 
McCaslin, finds that Throckmorton’s concern “for communal
security led him to condone these attacks, though he had
been one of the most prominent opponents of secession in
Texas.”26  
McCaslin provides important insights for understanding
the motivations behind Throckmorton’s decision to join the
ranks of the Confederate military, but like many of the
authors writing before him, he fails to capture the essence
of the Texas politician’s true character.  One has to
examine Throckmorton’s early life in entirety before
drawing any definitive conclusions about his personal or
political behavior.  
Despite being heavily influenced by traditional
scholarship, William Richter also deserves to be placed
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within the post-revisionists camp.  Richter’s work focuses
almost exclusively on the United States Army and the
Freedmen’s Bureau in Texas during Reconstruction.  Richter
contends that most Texans were hostile to military
occupation and that the military commanders and Republican
politicians were committed to securing political success
for the Republican party in the state.  Richter remains
sympathetic to conservative whites, takes Throckmorton’s
side in the controversy between the governor and the
military authorities, and agrees with traditional scholars
that the army unjustly occupied Texas.27  
Primarily, Richter faults the army for using its power
in the state to politically manipulate the Texas electorate
in an effort to ensure that the Republican party remained a
dominant force in state politics.  The author argues that
“most Texas Republicans supported the black vote for purely
political, not moral, reasons–the Negro vote offered them
power.”  He continues “Republicans relied upon the army,
and later the state police, to protect the blacks from
attacks by white terrorists.”28  However, Richter finds that
despite “political manipulation and private citizens’
criticism . . . the army generally conducted itself well in
Texas.”  He explains that the army “defended the frontier
as well as might be expected . . . suppressed hostile
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groups of brigands, held reasonably fair trials . . . and
even administered minor governmental affairs” at the local
level.29
In his analysis of Throckmorton, Richter concludes
that “although Governor Throckmorton agreed that laws were
needed to define blacks’ place in Texas society, he did not
recommend the Black Codes.  Neither did he desire the
election of rebel senators.”  Furthermore, he finds that
“the governor found himself in the same predicament [as]
President Johnson . . . he had headed the ticket that
helped elect the legislators, and he could not now
repudiate his own state government.”30  Therefore, Richter,
like the traditionalists before him, suggests that
governor’s conflict with the military authorities was
motivated less by racism and more by political pragmatism. 
In this regard, Richter seems incorrect.  Even if
Throckmorton did not directly call on the legislature to
pass the Black Codes, legislators knew his mind on the
subject.  Evidence suggest that race played a greater part
in Throckmorton’s governance of the state than Richter is
willing to admit.
The previously mentioned scholarship gives a clear
picture of how scholars have approached the study of
Throckmorton.  These studies however are somewhat limited
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in their scope as most tend to look at events within the
narrow context of Texas history.  As a result, very few
authors have attempted to place Throckmorton, or for that
matter Texas, in the broader historical context of the
South and the United States.  Therefore, many questions
about this nineteenth-century politician and his state
remain unanswered:  For example, while Throckmorton is
important to the history of Texas, what can a study of his
life reveal about the South in general?  Additionally, what
impact did the North Texans’ views of race and class have
on his political decisions?  Answers to these questions, as
well as others, can provide scholars a greater
understanding of nineteenth-century Texas.  Furthermore,
such answers have national and global implications. 
Perhaps, if scholars gain a better understand the
undercurrents of racism in the nineteenth-century Texas,
they can arrive at a clearer understanding of race
relations in the South, the United States, and throughout
the world over time.  A primary objective of this study is
to provide answers and insights to these questions and to
explore others that have yet to be asked.
In the pages that follow, the reader is introduced to
a detailed analysis of Throckmorton’s public career and an
explanation of how he fit within the major issues which
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emerged at the local, state, and national levels during the
latter half of the nineteenth century.  Study of this once
famous Texas politician allows for a better understanding
of how frontier people living on the periphery of southern
society experienced and finally came to terms with the
revolutionary changes taking place in the United States
between 1850 and 1873.  
The whiteness of the frontier is particularly
important in explaining Throckmorton’s life and career. 
Throughout this period, North Texans dedicated themselves
to creating and preserving the white society which
developed in the northern region of the state.  The story
that emerges is one of white settlers struggling to keep
blacks and Native Americans from becoming an integral part
of their society.  In this regard, the North Texas frontier
illustrates a common theme in the history of the South,
especially in Upper South states where slavery was less
significant to economic development of the region. 
Evidence seems to suggest that North Texas from its
inception to the end of Reconstruction was one of the most
racist regions in Texas, despite the relatively small
African Americans living there before or after the Civil
War.  Throughout the early development of the Texas
frontier, Throckmorton and his neighbors continuously
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endeavored to make the frontier a white man’s world.  
Throckmorton’s relationship with the frontier offers
the clearest clue as to what motivated him and it has been
the most neglected aspect of his life.  As an adolescent,
he moved to the Texas frontier with his family in the
1840s.  Settling into his new home, the future North Texas
politician witnessed first hand the brutal warfare waged
between Native Americans and Anglos, etching a permanent
image in his mind of the hazards of settling a virgin land
and instilling within him a racial hatred of non-Anglos. 
During the Civil War, he mustered into the Confederate
service, primarily to protect Texas’s northern frontier
from the increasing threats of Indian attacks and the
potential danger of Union forces crossing the Red River,
invading the northern counties of the state.  Following the
war, General Philip Sheridan, commander of the Fifth
Military District, removed Governor Throckmorton from
office, in part because of the governor’s opinion that the
military had failed to provide adequate protection for
frontier settlers.  Even his support of the railroad
industry in Texas was a result of Throckmorton’s desire to
improve economic conditions along the vast Texas frontier. 
Thus, frontier life contributed to the development of this
North Texan’s personal and political character, especially
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his views of race, class, and politics.
Attempting to reconstruct and explain the evolution of
Throckmorton’s racial biases is difficult, especially
during his early life.  The main obstacle is the limited
number of primary sources which directly address the North
Texan’s views of African Americans and Native Americans. 
Nevertheless, scholars can gain an understand of the depth
of Throckmorton’s racism when they examine the type of
society that developed in the northern part of the state. 
For example, despite befriending some of the Native
Americans in the region, Throckmorton supported the
complete removal of frontier Indians to areas beyond white
settlements.  In his mind, Native Americans were an
obstacle standing in the way of the western expansion of
Anglos.  The society that Throckmorton and other white
migrants envisioned did not include a place for Indians.  
Furthermore, Throckmorton’s concept of race was
closely associated with his disdain for the slaveowning
planter class.  Between 1850 and 1861, he stood opposed to
the encroachment of planters on the North Texas frontier. 
This is not to say that Throckmorton did not believe in the
legitimacy of the peculiar institution.  According to 1860
census records, he owned one slave.31  Nevertheless, while
accepting of the idea of living in a society with slaves,
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he did not want to live in a slave society.  Ira Berlin’s
Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in
North America explains the subtle, but distinct,
differences of these two societies.  Societies with slaves
were distinguished by the fact “that slaves were marginal
to the central productive processes; slavery was just one
form of labor among many.”  Conversely, in slave societies,
“slavery stood at the center of economic production, and
the master-slave relationship provided the model for all
social relations.”  Berlin continues, “From the most
intimate connections between men and women to the most
public ones between ruler and ruled, all relationships
mimicked those of slavery.”32  Evidence clearly suggests
that Throckmorton as well as other North Texans who
migrated from the Upper South did not want to be
politically or socially dominated by the slaveholding
class.  The disdain that Throckmorton felt toward the
planters was transferred to their slaves.  In the minds of
the small farmers and non-slaveholding professionals, such
as doctors and lawyers, the slaves represented the most
visible sign of the planters’ wealth and was the vehicle
that allowed planters to invade and dominate regions
throughout the South.  At most, the people of North Texas,
including Throckmorton, were willing to accept the presence
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of domestic slaves and slaveowners who owned a limited
number of slaves.
Party politics was equally important to the
frontiersmen of North Texas.  Generally speaking, these
settlers gravitated toward the Whig party during the late
1840s and early 1850s, because the party offered them an
alternative to the southern Democratic party which was
dominated by the planter class.  The Whig party also
supported many of the issues that were essential to the
continued existence of their societies.  For example, the
Whigs tended to support government subsidized internal
improvements, a proposition that promised to connect
frontier areas removed from navigable rivers with distant
markets.  Because North Texas was void of navigable rivers,
the settlers in this region knew that railroad development
was paramount to their future economic prosperity. 
Additionally, Whigs tended to be strong advocates of the
Union.  This was particularly important to the people of
the frontier who were more nationalistic in their
ideological beliefs than their slaveholding counterparts. 
For the frontiersmen, the Union represented a safe harbor
from planter dominance.  Even after the Whig party ceased
to exist in the 1850s, the settlers continued to exhibit an
affinity for the Union.  For example, during the secession
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crisis in 1861, many voters in North Texas cast ballots
against secession.  For them secession promised to ensure
planter dominance in both the state and national
governments of the Confederacy, a proposition they had
struggled against since first moving to Texas.
In an effort to test the continuity of major issues
and themes in Texas’ past, this study will examine a broad
spectrum of Texas history.  It will attempt to traverse
three major periods in the state’s past–the antebellum,
Civil War, and Reconstruction eras–and explain
Throckmorton’s evolution as a frontier politician.  Because
race is an integral part of Throckmorton’s life, it will be
discussed in detail here.  However, the discussion of race
that follows will differ from the revisionist scholarship
that has tended to focus on the problems confronting
minority groups in southern society.  This study will not
directly focus on how racism impacted the lives of African
Americans or Native Americans.  Rather, racism will be
explained from the perspective of the white settlers.  That
is to say, this study will attempt to explain how whites
living in North Texas constructed their concept of race and
used it to protect the whiteness of their frontier society. 
In this manner, the study will follow the trends
established by scholars who study race and ethnic relations
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from the perspective of whiteness.  The study of whiteness
offers a new and unique approach to this topic, because it
reverses the traditional focus of research on race
relations by concentrating attention upon the socially
constructed nature of white identity and the impact of
whiteness upon intergroup relations.  While studying the
problems that minorities faced remains important to the
understanding of race relations, it is also necessary to
understand how whites formed their opinions of race and why
they embraced the concept of white supremacy.  As this
study reveals, racism in the frontier stemmed from whites’
fear of losing control of their social, economic, and
political institutions.  Though focusing on whiteness, this
study is not a defense of white attacks on minority groups,
nor is it intended to be a justification for white
supremacy.  Instead, this study is an attempt to understand
the roots of an age-old problem that traverses space and
time and still plagues society today.  Perhaps, a clearer
understand of the origins of frontier racism and white
supremacy in the mid-nineteenth century will provide new
insights into solving racial conflicts in modern America.33 
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 CHAPTER II
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A FRONTIER POLITICIAN, 1825-1850
James Webb Throckmorton and his family crossed the Red
River into Texas in April 1841.  James was sixteen years
old at the time, and like most young men his age, he
probably fantasied about life on the rugged Texas frontier. 
As the Throckmorton family entered Fannin County, James’
mind surely raced with thoughts of bloody encounters with
Indian warriors, the thrill of hunting and exploring in
virgin woods, the pleasure of fishing in gentle flowing
streams full of large fish, and perhaps even the endless
possibilities that were afforded to young men living in a
republic where unbridled economic opportunities abounded. 
Regardless of what young Throckmorton pondered as he
crossed the border, he could not have envisioned the path
that his life would take over the course of the next fifty
years.  He was destined to become a veteran of two major
wars, a frontier ranger involved in several Indian battles,
a successful doctor and lawyer, a prominent state
politician, and a member of the United States Congress.1  
James’s father, William E. Throckmorton, began his
westward journey from Virginia after graduating from
medical school in 1817.  Having briefly practicing medicine
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in his home state for less than a year, Throckmorton
migrated to Kentucky where he married Susan Jane Rotan on
December 10, 1818.  In 1821, the couple moved from Kentucky
to Sparta, Tennessee, where they lived for several years
before moving twice more, first to Illinois and then to
Fayetteville, Arkansas.2  The historical record does not
reveal why Dr. Throckmorton moved westward, but it is
reasonable to assume that his journey was sparked by the
same motivating factors that caused other settlers to make
similar treks across the Midwest.  The majority of these
early pioneers went west seeking opportunities to settle
and own virgin farmlands.  Others moved to escape areas
which were heavily populated with slaves.  A minority of
migrants, especially doctors and lawyers, hoped to profit
by providing professional services to the people living in
the western frontiers of the United States.  Given that
William was a practicing physician, it is likely that he
believed the western states were ideal for establishing his
medical practice.3
While Dr. Throckmorton probably left the Upper South
for economic reasons, it was just as likely that he
continued to migrate westward to escape the political and
social dominance of slaveholding planters.  His move from
Tennessee seems to correspond with the growth of slavery in
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the Upper South between 1820 and 1840.  During this period,
slavery became increasingly important to the economy of
Tennessee, especially in the middle and western portions of
the state.  With the growth of slavery in the state,
farmers and non-slaveholding professionals, such as lawyers
and physicians, believed that the planters would soon
transform Tennessee from a society with slaves to a slave
society.  The difference was significant for the non-
slaveholding population.  Though most Tennesseans believed
in white superiority and accepted the practice of slavery
as a result of black inferiority, they were not willing to
give up political and social control of their society to
the planters who owned the bondsmen.  As a result, many of
the non-slaveholding elite and farmers left the state and
continued to move westward seeking a place where they could
forge a society free of planters and their chattel.4
Throckmorton and his wife had a total of eight
children, five of which survived to adulthood.  The three
children who did not survive, punctuating the difficulties
and harsh realities associated with childbearing in the
nineteenth century.  The couple’s fourth child, James Webb,
was born on February 1, 1825, in Sparta, a small town
located along the Calf Killer River.5  
William and Susan Jane moved to Illinois for a brief
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time and then relocated in Arkansas sometime after the
birth of the their fifth child, Robert Middleton, in 1836. 
Unfortunately, the move to Arkansas ended in tragedy for
the family.  Susan died on December 28, 1838, just a little
over a year after giving birth to her eighth child, Nancy
Hampton.  While the frontier doctor and his children were
no strangers to the loss of loved ones, Susan’s death
proved to have dire consequences for William’s family,
especially young James.6 
Following his wife’s death, Dr. Throckmorton concluded
that he could not properly care for his three youngest
children and sent them to live with friends of the family
in Carthage, Tennessee.  Between 1836 and 1841, James, his
brother Robert, and his sister Nancy lived with William
Bowman Campbell and his wife, Francis, who raised the
children as if they were their own.  In fact, William and
Francis offered to adopt them, but the Arkansas doctor was
unwilling to give up his sons and daughter and called for
his children to rejoin him in 1841 as he prepared to
relocate in Texas.7  
William B. Campbell was a noted Tennessee politician
by the time that the Throckmorton children came to live
with him.  His path to notoriety was similar to that of
other frontier political leaders in the Upper South.  Like
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many of his Tennessee colleagues, Campbell was a lawyer. 
For nearly two years after being admitted to the state bar
in 1829, he had maintained a thriving law practice in
Carthage, Smith County.  Beginning in 1831, the Tennessean
also served as the state’s district attorney until the
people of Smith County elected him to the state legislature
in 1835.  Campbell remained a member of that body until
1836.  His constituents must have been impressed with his
record at the state level because in 1837 they sent him to
the United States Congress, where he served as a
representative until 1843.8  Even though evidence of their
relationship is limited, it is certain that the Tennessee
sage introduced J. W. Throckmorton to the Whig party and
provided the youth with a political foundation which
remained with him for the rest of his life.
The Whig party was still in its developmental stages
at the time when Throckmorton fell under its influence. 
The party could trace its beginnings to the early 1830s
when the opponents of President Andrew Jackson’s style of
leadership in the White House created a strong political
alliance to challenge Jacksonian Democrats in local, state,
and national elections.  In conjunction with their initial
organizing efforts, members of this opposition party began
to call themselves Whigs, a moniker which was associated
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with the anti-monarchists in eighteenth-century English
politics.  The name was well suited for the party
considering that the Whigs often referred to President
Jackson as “King Andrew” because of his alleged usurpation
of power in the federal government.  According to the
Whigs, the threats posed by the Jackson administration were
personified in the president’s declared war on the Bank of
the United States, his apparent disregard for Supreme Court
decisions and the Constitution, his frequent use of the
veto, and his aggressive stance toward South Carolina
during the nullification crisis of 1832-1833.  Thus, the
Whigs embraced an ideological mission of saving traditional
American liberties and the Founding Fathers’ experiment in
a republican self-government.9  
However noble their cause, the Whigs often found it
difficult to convince the American public of the merits of
their ideological mission.  As a national phenomenon, Whigs
remained relatively weak until the late 1830s at which time
party members were successful in blaming the depression
following the Panic of 1837 on their Democratic
adversaries.  The 1840s proved to be the heyday of the Whig
party.  While remaining committed to the principles of
republicanism, Whigs began to challenge the Democrats over
controversial partisan issues, such as economic policies,
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territorial expansion, the Mexican War, and the extension
of slavery in the western territories.  When events in the
1850s, such as the Compromise of 1850, reduced or even
ended partisan conflict over these issues, the Whigs
resorted back to their ideological roots and positioned
themselves once again as the defenders of the republican
form of government and American liberties.  However, Whigs
were no longer concerned with executive tyranny as they had
been when Andrew Jackson and his hand-picked successor
Martin Van Buren occupied the White House.  The new threats
that they confronted were multifaceted, but primarily
rested upon the division in the country over slavery and
its expansion westward.10  Beginning in the early 1850s,
slavery not only divided party membership along the Mason-
Dixon Line, but it also drove a wedge between southern
Whigs as well.  Southern Whigs included prosperous
slaveowners, merchants, and professional men.  Though most
Whigs in the South agreed that slavery was a legitimate
labor system, the faction of professional men who did not
own slaves believed that slaveowners would eventual
dominate the political and social institutions of their
section if left unchallenged:  Non-slaveholding southerners
feared becoming “white slaves” of the planters.  In other
words, they feared that the planter class would control the
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political affairs of the southern states and would pass
legislation favorable to slaveholders and derogatory to
those individuals who did not own slaves.  This was
unacceptable to Whigs who embraced the traditional concept
of republicanism.  As a result of the divisions caused by
the slavery issue, the Whig party slowly withered until it
ultimately died in the mid-1850s.11
Nevertheless, during the time when James Throckmorton
lived in the Campbell household, the Whig party enjoyed a
large measure of success in the Upper South, especially in
Tennessee and Kentucky.  Whig politicians and voters in
this region of the South seemed to embrace the principles
that Henry Clay espoused in his American System.  Like
Clay, party members contended that commercial progress and
economic interdependence between the various sections of
the country benefitted the country as a whole.  Generally
speaking, Upper South Whigs were businessmen and
professionals who supported economic growth through the
nationally chartered banks, federal funding of internal
improvements (especially railroad development), and the
Congressional tariffs which Whigs deemed necessary for
raising sufficient capital and generating industrial
growth.  Because they supported Clay’s American System and
their devotion to the republican form of government, Whigs
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tended to be staunch conservatives and steadfast advocates
of the Union.  As a result, Upper South Whig supporters
frowned upon radical political movements which threatened
to divide the United States along sectional lines. 
Therefore, Upper South Whigs were often critical of the
abolitionists in the North as well as pro-slavery
extremists in the South.12  William B. Campbell was a Whig
of the Upper South stripe, and young James Throckmorton
followed closely in his mentor’s footsteps.
William E. Throckmorton, who remained in Arkansas
after sending his children to Tennessee, recovered from the
death of his first wife and began to court Malinda
Clements.  Though Malinda was 28 years younger than her
suitor, the couple were married on January 24, 1841.13 
Being more secure in his ability to take care of a family,
William sent for his children to join him and his new
bride.  With his family reunited, Throckmorton decided to
relocate once again, moving this time to the Republic of
Texas.  The Lone Star Republic had won its independence
from Mexico in 1836 and now held endless economic
opportunities for men who were willing to brave the
elements of a wild frontier.  William immediately
recognized the potential gains that could be made by
migrating to Texas:  First, he realizing that doctors would
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be in great demand in frontier settlements.  Second, he
knew that earlier pioneers could make substantial financial
gains from land speculation, especially buying and selling
town lots.  Thus, William left word with friends and family
that he was GTT: Gone To Texas.
The Throckmorton family crossed the Red River and
entered the northern part of Fannin County in April 1841. 
They remained in the small community of Warren for several
months while waiting to secure headright grants for lands
further in the interior of the Republic.  Once these grants
were secured, William and eight other men moved in a
southwestern direction to an unsettled area along the
eastern banks of the Trinity River.  Throckmorton proposed
creating a settlement near the present-day town of
McKinney, but his companions disagreed with him and decided
that they should settle a section of land along Rowlett
Creek.  
Dissatisfied with the group’s plan, Throckmorton
returned to Warren where his family was waiting for him. 
In December 1841 he secured a conditional headright
certificate for lands on the banks of the Trinity River
from the Board of Land Commissioners of Fannin County. 
With his new grant in hand, William and another small group
of settlers, including the families of Thomas Rattan, Hogan
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Witt, and John M. Kincade, set out to settle their new
claims.  However, after arriving at the locale, they
discovered that other pioneers had already settled on their
lands.  Pleasant Wilson, who was serving as a guide to
Throckmorton and the others, suggested that the group
retreat to the eastern fork of the Trinity River and build
their homes near its banks.  Following Wilson’s advice, the
families decided to settle an area northeast of the
present-day town of McKinney along a creek which was named
Throckmorton Creek in honor of their leader.  Their
settlement constituted one of the earliest Anglo
communities in present-day Collin County.14
The families who moved into North Texas faced many
hardships in their new frontier surroundings.  They had to
overcome the daunting task of preparing their lands for
farming, building new homes, and defending themselves from
Indian raids.  The first two tasks were made easier by the
fact that the soil was fertile and well suited for
agriculture.15   The land also provided the settlers with an
ample supply of timbers for building new homes and barns. 
Additionally, the surrounding forests were teeming with an
abundance of wild game which offered an endless source of
sustenance for the new inhabitants of the region.16 
However, the threats of raiding Indians proved more
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troubling for the new settlers.  
One of the most devastating Indian attacks in the
region occurred in 1842.  The families of Wesley Clement
and Peg Whistler built a small settlement approximately
eight miles north of Throckmorton’s home, known as Fort
Throckmorton because surrounding settlers tended to
congregate there when threats of Indian raids seemed
eminent.  As Clement and his companions were cutting logs
to finish work on their cabins, an unidentified group of
Indians attacked and killed them.  The wives and children
of the men watched the brutal attack from the Clements’
cabin.  One of the women had attempted to take a gun to her
husband, but the attackers forced her to retreat back to
safety of her home.  The natives moved toward the settlers’
house but were turned away when the women fired several
shots in their direction.  The female defenders remained in
the cabin until nightfall, and then they went to the side
of their fallen men.  After assessing their circumstances,
the women decided that Catherine Clements and her children
would remain with the slain bodies during the night to keep
them from being devoured by wild animals while Mrs. Whisler
walked to Ft. Throckmorton to seek help from other white
inhabitants in the area.  The following day, Dr.
Throckmorton with the aid of other settlers rescued Mrs.
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Clements and recovered Wesley and Peg’s bodies.  The slain
men were interned in a cemetery near Dr. Throckmorton’s
home.17  
The Indian raid undoubtedly was etched into James Webb
Throckmorton’s mind, especially considering that Wesley
Clements was his step-mother’s brother.  Also, the attack
served to strengthened young Throckmorton’s resolve to
protect the settlers in the region from future raids. 
Between 1842 and 1843, he served as a member of Captain
Jesse Stiff’s ranger company which patrolled the North
Texas region guarding against future Indian depredations. 
Despite his age, James eventually became a sergeant of a
company of sixteen men from Fannin County.  Perhaps because
of his family’s personal loss or maybe as a result of his
experiences as a frontier ranger, J. W. Throckmorton
dedicated the remainder of his life to protecting the
settlers living on the frontier.18
Within a year of the attack on Wesley Clements home,
Throckmorton suffered another personal loss which would
eventually lead the young frontiersman to leave the wilds
of Texas for the more civilized streets of Princeton,
Kentucky.  His father died on October 2, 1843, and was
buried near the bodies of Wesley Clements and Peg Whisler. 
For a brief time the responsibility of taking care of his
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family fell on Throckmorton’s shoulders, but he was soon
relieved of this familial burden when his step-mother
remarried in 1844.  
Free of his obligations, the youthful adventurer left
the harsh environment of North Texas and went to Kentucky
to study medicine with his uncle, Dr. James E.
Throckmorton.  He stayed with his father’s older brother
for approximately two years during which time he studied
medicine at Cumberland College in Princeton. 
Throckmorton’s decision to become a physician was not a
result of a personal affinity for the profession, but
rather from the great admiration he had for his father and
from the constant prodding of his uncle.  
Throckmorton learned more than the medical profession
while living in the Bluegrass State.  His conservative
political, social, and economic views were forged by the
culture of the Upper South.19  Until his return to Texas in
1846, the young frontiersman had spent all his life in the
Upper South states of Tennessee or Kentucky with the
exception of the two years that he had lived in North
Texas.20  
While Throckmorton was studying medicine in Kentucky,
Texas came to a diplomatic crossroads.  Immediately after
winning their independence from Mexico in 1836, a majority
48
of Texans called for the annexation of their newly formed
republic to the United States.  They realized the economic
potential that annexation held for their fledgling country: 
The United States would provide them with military
protection from the threats of an invading Mexican army on
their southern border and marauding Indian tribes along the
western frontier.  Annexation also held the promise of
greater economic security and development which would
ultimately result from increased migration into Texas from
the United States.21
Even though the majority of white Texans agreed that
annexation was in the best interests of their homeland,
American sentiments were divided over the issue.  Generally
speaking, the divisions in the United States followed
sectional lines.  Southern slaveholders and land
speculators hoped to profit from the fertile lands of East
Texas, especially along the numerous navigable rivers
inside the borders of the republic.  Southern planters also
welcomed the idea that Texas could potentially increase the
South’s influence in the federal government, thus aiding in
their efforts to secure slavery where it already existed
and to extend the peculiar institution in the western
territories where its propagation was in question.  John C.
Calhoun, senator from South Carolina and a prominent
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spokesman of the South, clearly defined the motivations of
most southern planters in his public pronouncement that the
annexation of Texas was necessary for the continued
expansion of slavery.22
People in the North did not harbor the same views as
their brethren in the South.  Annexation of Texas provoked
staunch resistence primarily from three groups: northern
abolitionists, Free Soilers, and northern Whigs. 
Countering the arguments of men like John C. Calhoun, both
the abolitionists and the Free Soilers strongly opposed
adding the republic to the Union.  They could not
consciously justify the extension of slavery or its
continued existence in their nation.  In this regard the
abolitionists and Free Soilers seem to have been socially
and politically in step with antislavery movements outside
the United States, especially in the British Empire where
slaves were emancipated in the early 1830s.  Thus, the
annexation of Texas reopened debate over the institution of
slavery, an issue which had plagued the country from its
inception.23 
Politicians in the Upper South, tended to be more
temperate in their opposition to the annexation of Texas,
especially members of the Whig party.  Attempting to avoid
the controversial sectional issue of slavery, the Whigs and
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moderate Democrats opposed annexation on the basis that it
would ultimately lead to war with Mexico, which still had
not formally recognized the independence of Texas.  The
Whigs understood that a rift between its southern and
northern party members would develop if slavery became an
issue in future elections and that such divisions could
potentially destroy their party.24  
Even though the opponents of annexation were
successful in defeating an annexation treaty in the U.S.
Senate in April 1844, they failed to prevent the Republic
of Texas from joining the Union the following year.  After
the Democratic candidate for U.S. President, James K. Polk,
won his presidential bid on an expansionist platform in
November 1844, the question of annexation was squarely
placed before the United States Congress once again. 
Riding the tide of expansionism, John Tyler, the outgoing
president, proposed that annexation of Texas should be
placed before Congress as a joint resolution, thus
requiring only a majority vote in both houses of Congress
rather than the two-thirds vote needed in the Senate for
approval of a treaty which annexationists had failed to win
in previous attempts.  The joint resolution quickly gained
a favorable vote in both houses, and President Tyler signed
the bill on March 1, 1845.25  The spirit of manifest destiny
51
proved too strong for its opponents to overcome and the
United States moved to officially annex the Lone Star
Republic. 
Congress’s resolutions for annexation were extremely
favorable to the people of Texas.  Congress offered to
admit the republic as a single state in the Union but with
the option of dividing its vast lands into as many as four
additional states in the future.  The state would also be
allowed to retain possession of its public lands which
could be sold to help pay off its existing public debt. 
Additionally, the United States government agreed to assume
responsibility for resolving the outstanding boundary
disputes between Texas and Mexico regarding the southern
and western borders of the state.26
Anson Jones, the newly elected President of the
Republic of Texas, called for a special session of the
Texas congress in June 1845 to consider the United States’
annexation offer.  At the same time, a constitutional
convention convened and produced a state constitution which
along with the issue of annexation was placed before the
citizens of Texas in a referendum.  Voters overwhelmingly
supported the new constitution and annexation.  After
reviewing the Texas constitution, the U.S. Congress
accepted it, and President Polk signed the Texas Admission
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Act on December 29, 1845, officially making Texas the
twenty-eighth state of the Union.27
Just as Whig politicians had warned, many Mexican
leaders were enraged that the United States had annexed
territory that the Mexican officials believed still
belonged to their country.  While diplomatic relations
between the two countries deteriorated, President Polk
continued to pressure Mexico to recognize the Rio Grande
River as the southern border of Texas.  Polk ordered
American soldiers under the command of General Zachary
Taylor to assume a defensive position near the Rio Grande;
but, because northern politicians did not favor a war, the
president attempted one final effort to reach a diplomatic
solution with Mexican authorities.  
The primary conflict between the two counties was over
the disputed territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande
rivers.  The Mexican government considered the Nueces River
as the southern most boundary of Texas, while the United
States argued that the Treaty of Velasco established the
Rio Grande as the legitimate border between Mexico and
Texas.  In an effort to resolve the issue diplomatically
and to gain additional territory in Northern Mexico,
President Polk sent John Slidell to Mexico City with
authorization to offer the Mexican government thirty
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million dollars for the New Mexico and California
territories and to push for formal recognition of the Rio
Grande as the official border between the two countries. 
Mexico promptly rejected the offer, and Slidell returned to
the United States in March 1846.28
With many northerners opposed to a war with Mexico,
Polk’s hands seemed to be tied, however, on May 9, 1846,
the president received word from Texas which proved to be
politically advantageous to his cause.  A Mexican cavalry
unit in late April engaged General Taylor’s men in a brief
skirmish along the Rio Grande border.  Despite the fact
that this skirmish had taken place in disputed territory,
Polk addressed the U. S. Congress and asked them for a
formal declaration of war.  The president in dramatic
fashion stated, “Mexico has passed the boundary of the
United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American
blood on American soil.  She has proclaimed that
hostilities exist and that the two nations are now at
war.”29  After a few days of deliberation, Congress agreed
with Polk’s assessment of the events in Texas and issued a
war resolution against Mexico.30
James W. Throckmorton had returned to Texas by the
time the Mexican War erupted.  Possessing the same
adventurous spirit that had prompted his father to move
54
westward, he joined a company of volunteers from Collin
County on February 2, 1847.  The company was mustered into
Captain Robert H. Taylor’s Company B, Texas Mounted
Volunteers, at San Antonio later the same month.  Along
with two other companies of Texas Rangers, Captain Taylor’s
company remained in San Antonio until Antonio Canales, a
Mexican rancher turned freedom fighter, declared all-out
guerilla war against American troops stationed in northern
Mexico on April 4, 1847.  Following Canales pronouncement,
Texas Ranger Mike Chevallie, a close friend of Captain Jack
Hays, gathered up the Ranger companies stationed at San
Antonio with the intention of moving south to engage the
enemy.  As was customary with the volunteer units, an
election was held, and the men elected Chevallie as their
commander.  Chevallie and his men rode to the garrison at
Camargo, Mexico, reaching their destination on April 23. 
Two days later the group proceeded to Monterey where the
men were officially designated as Chevallie’s Battalion and
placed under the command of General Wool at Saltillo. 
During these early months the men saw only sporadic action
primarily defending themselves from Mexican bandits and
Indians along their way to join Wool’s command.31
The trip between San Antonio and Mexico proved
difficult for many of Captain Taylor’s troops.  A number of
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the men became too sick and tired to continue the march to
Mexico and were left behind in the desert to fend for
themselves.  Relying on his medical skills, Throckmorton
requested to stay behind with these men in an effort to
keep them alive.  The volunteers’ condition slowly
deteriorated as they ran out of water and food.  Just when
all seemed lost, George Wilson, another volunteer from
Collin County, ran across the ragged group.  Many years
after the incident, Wilson recalled finding these men in
the desert.  He stated “I carried a large can of water in
my wagon.  It was a great ten-gallon can.  Well, sir, one
day I was driving across the sandy waste, southwest of San
Antonio, when I came across a lot of sick men.”  Wilson
continued, “As soon as I yelled I saw Jim Throckmorton
coming toward me.  Throckmorton carried the water to the
men, never touching a drop for himself until all the others
had gotten enough.”  Wilson also recalled that “the men
told me that Throckmorton had given every drop of water out
of his can to the sick . . . and had gone days without any
food.”32  Throckmorton had treated his fellow soldiers
honorably, but this incident took a toll on the young
physician’s health.  While evidence is thin, it appears
that Throckmorton never rejoined his battalion as failing
health forced him to accept an medical discharge at Camargo
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on June 8, on a surgeon’s certificate of disability.33 
After just five months of military service, Throckmorton
began the long journey home.
The North Texan returned to Collin County after
receiving his discharge from Chavellie’s Battalion,
apparently he was still well enough to travel.34 
Throckmorton established a medical practice near the town
of McKinney and soon after began to court Ann Rattan, the
daughter of Thomas and Gilean Rattan of Carrollton,
Illinois.  The Rattan and Throckmorton families moved to
the Texas frontier at about the same time, and it is
probable that James became smitten with Annie before moving
to Kentucky to study medicine with his uncle.  Regardless
of when they met, the couple along with other members of
the Rattan family traveled to Greene County, Illinois,
where the two exchanged wedding vows on January 20, 1848. 
Following their wedding, the newlyweds returned to Collin
County where Throckmorton continued his medical practice. 
The couple resided in the county the rest of their lives.35  
Annie Throckmorton was the epitome of frontier women. 
One twentieth-century journalist stated that her
“disposition was even and lovely–if anything, too utterly
unselfish and self-sacrificing.  She was religious without
being fanatical, living rather than talking her religion.”36 
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The early years of her life on the frontier must have been
difficult for Ann; she not only gave birth to ten children
in the isolation of North Texas wilderness, but her husband
who was one of the only doctors in the Collin County area
was often away from home for several days at a time on
professional calls.  Not only did Mrs. Throckmorton have to
take care of her family during her husband’s absence, but
she had to cope with unanticipated dangers commonly
experienced on the frontier.  
One incident in Annie’s life reveals both her personal
courage and the unusual circumstances of life on the
periphery of Anglo civilization.  Early one morning as dawn
broke, Annie noticed in the distance an approaching group
of Indians.  While she knew that her husband had developed
friendly relationships with nearby tribes, she was chilled
to the bone when the chief of the tribe bent over and
lifted her baby from the cradle and gently held him in his
arms.  Years afterwards Ann was reported to have said of
the episode, “I thought I should die of fear and loathing,
yet for peace’s sake it must be endured.”37
  Annie also helped her husband care for his patients. 
If one of the doctor’s patients required long term
treatment, he brought the individual to his house.  The
Throckmorton home was frequently used as a make-shift
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hospital, especially when great distances made it
impossible for Dr. Throckmorton to care for his patient on
a daily basis.  Mrs. Throckmorton recalled one case which
involved a little girl who was almost blind.  The young
patient was brought to the doctor’s home for treatment. 
Because light seemed to irritate her eyes, the little girl
was confined to a bed in a dark room for more than a month. 
The entire time, Annie nursed and cared for the girl’s
every need.  After about two months, her husband decided
that the child was well enough to go back home, but when
her parents arrived to pick her up, she grabbed Mrs.
Throckmorton by the neck and began screaming that she did
not want to leave.  Despite her heartfelt pleas, the
parents took their daughter home with them.  However, the
girl continued to grieve and cry so much that she once
again developed problems with her vision.  As a result, her
parents brought their daughter back to the Throckmorton
residence where she remained for almost a year before Annie
could persuade her to return home.38  This was the life of a
frontier doctor’s wife.  
Throckmorton continued to work as a physician for more
than a year, but the strain of taking care of patients
throughout the county began to take its toll on his health. 
Also, he did not possess his father’s ardor for the medical
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profession.  Thus, the young frontier doctor made a fateful
decision to pursue a career in politics.  While many men
changed their occupations in the fluid society of
nineteenth-century America, this decision must have been
extremely difficult for the North Texan, because it meant
abandoning the path that his father and uncle had prepared
for him.  Not only did Throckmorton have to overcome
emotional ties to the profession, but he was also worried
whether or not he could take care of his family on a
politician’s salary.  As a result, the North Texan decided
to engage in an occupation that was typically seen as a
stepping stone to a viable political career:  He became a
lawyer.  While continuing to practice medicine on a limited
scale, Throckmorton studied law in 1849 and was admitted to
the Texas bar the following year.  During this time, he
also became involved in local politics.39  
One of the most controversial political issues
affecting Collin County in the late 1840s and early 1850s
was centered on conflicting land claims between settlers
and the colonizing company of the ill-fated Peters Colony. 
The history of the Peters Colony began when Texas was still
a republic.  About the same time the Throckmorton family
arrived in Texas in 1841, the Fifth Congress of the
Republic of Texas began rethinking their nation’s land
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policies.  Just as in previous congressional meetings, the
Fifth Congress realized that land donations were necessary
to entice settlers to migrate to their country.  These
settlers were deemed vital to the future stability and
prosperity of the republic.  However, unlike earlier
congresses, the Texas government believed that granting
headrights to settlers was not sufficient enough to bring
new immigrants into the country.  Therefore, the Fifth
Congress turned to the old Mexican empresario system in an
effort to promote a greater migration to Texas.  The
congressmen considered three immigration bills in 1841: the
Franco-Texienne bill, the Ben Fort Smith bill, and the
Peters Colony bill.  Of the bills proposed, only the Peters
Colony bill passed both houses of Congress on February 4,
1841.40  
The promoters of the Peters Colony consisted of twenty
men, eleven from England and nine from Louisville,
Kentucky.  None of them had been to Texas or were qualified
to fulfill the state’s directives for settling the colony. 
The primary leader of the colonizing effort was William S.
Peters, a music teacher who had migrated to Louisville from
England.  Peters, along with his three sons who were also
musicians, and a group of friends in England proposed the
colonizing venture on a whim:  The plan of idle dreamers
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unsuited for the task of settling the frontier.41 
The law of February 4, 1841, authorized the
administrators of the colony to settle 600 families in an
area between the Trinity and Red rivers.  Each family
moving into the colony was to receive a free grant of 640
acres of land.  As payment for their administrative duties,
the company received 60 sections of premium land for each
family that moved into the colony.42  The Kentuckians
eventually organized themselves into the Texas
Agricultural, Commercial and Manufacturing Company and sold
a few shares of stock, but they failed to attract any
measurable number of settlers to their colony during their
first year of operation.  Despite the company’s uneventful
beginnings, W. S. Peters and his business partners
eventually brought some 10,000 to 12,000 people into the
North Texas region before 1850.  Many of these settlers
came from states of the Ohio Valley, the northeastern part
of the United States, and the Upper South.43  Unfortunately
for the Peters Colony, the administrators of the colony
never effectively lived up to their responsibilities, and
the colony continued to be plagued with controversy until
the time it was dissolved in 1852.
In May 1849, James W. Throckmorton became actively
involved with a movement to protect the rights of settlers
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against the owners of the Peters Colony grant.  Primarily
due to its inept leadership, the company had failed to
provide the settlers with free and clear titles to their
lands.  The people of Collin County chose Throckmorton as
one of their delegates to a meeting in Dallas which was
called by the people living in the Peters and the Mercer
colonies for the expressed purpose of writing a memorial to
the state legislature.44  The settlers hoped that their
memorial would convince the legislators to recognize the
legitimacy of their claims, something that the companies’
agents were unable or unwilling to do.45  
Two aspects of this meeting were important to
Throckmorton’s future political career:  First, the North
Texan had the opportunity to associate with men who were
quickly rising to political prominence in the state, such
as the noted lawyer and politician from Henderson County,
John H. Reagan.  Second, this meeting was one of the first
times that the Collin County doctor had an opportunity to
formulate and express his political views.  It is clear
from printed proceedings of the convention that
Throckmorton, like other frontier politicians of his day,
positioned himself as the defender of the people’s rights. 
This event marked the beginning of James Webb
Throckmorton’s political career.  
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Once the convention settled, the delegates elected
officers.  Throckmorton was chosen to serve as the
secretary for the convention.  He was also appointed to a
committee which was charged with the duty of writing a
memorial that expressed the objectives and wishes of those
assembled at Dallas.  The committee called on the state
legislators to give the settlers full title to the lands
that they claimed.  They also explained that the delegates
were “fully satisfied in [their] own minds that both of the
colonial contracts [had] been forfeited,” and therefore
there was no other way for them to obtain their lands
except through legislative action.46  Furthermore, the
delegates emphasized that a “numbers of citizens [had] been
justly entitled to patents to their lands for three and
four years, and the withholding of which . . . [had
paralyzed] the energies of our citizens.”47  Finally, the
committee argued that “it [was] the bounden duty of all
good governments to foster the interests of her citizens.”48 
Throckmorton barely made it home from the Dallas
convention when he was afforded another opportunity to
serve the people of Collin County.  On June 12, 1849, the
leading citizens of the county convened a meeting at the
county courthouse in McKinney for the purpose of electing
delegates to a convention which was to convene on July 4 in
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Palestine, Anderson County, Texas.  The Palestine
convention was scheduled to consider the selection of a
suitable place to locate the state capital.  According to
the 1845 state constitution, the state had to designate a
permanent location for its capital, opening the way for its
possible relocation.49
Throckmorton was once again appointed to a committee
charged with the task of drafting a preamble and resolution
which would be read at the Palestine meeting.  Also, he had
the opportunity to become further acquainted with John H.
Reagan, who had attended the gathering in McKinney to give
a speech concerning the importance of relocating the
capital closer to the densely populated areas of East
Texas.  It seems likely that Reagan privately began to seek
support for relocating the capital in Palestine, especially
considering that the Henderson County lawyer was making
plans to move there himself.50   
The resolution committee completed their task after a
few hours of deliberation and returned to the meeting to
read their resolutions aloud to the gathered crowd.  The
committee recommended that “the Seat of Government should
be located with a view to the convenience of a majority of
the people” and “that object could best be obtained by the
location of the Capital at some eligible place East of the
65
Brazos River.”51  The committee further deemed “it desirable
to bring some one place permanently before the public and
whereas we believe the best means of obtaining that end
would be through the instrumentality of a convention.”52 
The committee concluded that “Palestine [was] a suitable
place for holding said convention.”53  The representatives
who were later sent to Palestine from Collin County
supported placing the new capital along the banks of the
Trinity River in the town that served as the host of the
convention.  
At the same time that Throckmorton was becoming more
actively involved in local politics, Collin County was
going through economic, social, and political changes. 
Economically, the county was still heavily populated with
yeoman farmers.  These small farmers primarily grew wheat,
maize, and a variety of vegetables.  They also raised
domesticated animals, especially pigs which were the
mainstay of the southern diet.  Additionally, farmers
supplemented their diet with the plentiful supply of wild
animals and fowls which abounded in the surrounding forest. 
Despite the region’s rural conditions, several of the
frontier hamlets were beginning to evolve into fledgling
towns, including Buckner, McKinney, Farmersville, Plano,
Millwood, Rock Hill, Roseland, Mantua, Lone Tree, Highland,
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Rowlett Creek, and Weston.54
  As the county became more populated, these budding
towns began to establish small general stores and grist
mills, some of the larger communities even had livery
stables and saloons.  As trade becoming increasingly
important in the late 1840s and early 1850s, the people of
Collin County became more interested in internal
improvements.  Goods such as tea, sugar, coffee, and
finished cloth were often freighted into the county by
wagons from other areas.  For example, Collin County
residents carried on an extensive trade with merchants
located in the town of Jefferson, Marion County, which was
located approximately one hundred and forty miles to the
east of the North Texas county.55  
Throckmorton took note of the economic circumstances
facing the inhabitants of North Texas and realized that
conditions of the region would not improve unless a viable
mode of transportation was constructed in the area.  Mass
transportation in the mid-nineteenth century was itself
going through evolutionary changes.  In the first half of
the century improvements in transportation were primarily
limited to the construction of roads and canals.  However,
by the 1850s, railroads were spreading across the American
landscape and were seen as the most efficient method of
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transportation then known to man.  Thus, at an early stage
in his political career, the North Texas politician
supported the idea of constructing railroads in the North
Texas region as a viable means of improving the economy of
all the Red River counties.
Throckmorton was not the only one that understood the
importance of railroad development.  Following the Mexican
War, Americans began to contemplate building a
transcontinental railroad, connecting California to the
eastern reaches of the United States.  Texans took great
interest in the idea of connecting East with West by rail,
and their representatives in the state capital pressed the
national government to build the road west through their
state.  During the late 1840s, the Texas legislators
offered the federal government vast tracts of its public
lands in exchange for the railroad.  However, the U. S.
Congress did not see the immediate potential in the
undeveloped lands of Texas and declined the state’s offer.56
Despite their early setbacks, railroad development
remained on the minds of Texans throughout the 1850s. 
Citizens of the Lone Star State realized that a rail line
through their state would provide them with new markets,
would increase immigration into the state, and would
potentially inflate the price of land.  Many East Texas
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cotton producers also knew that railroad development held
political and economic advantages.  The people in the
eastern part of the state had a substantial investment in
slaves and were eager to advance the peculiar institution
further west.  In the planters’ minds, railroads were going
to making it profitable to grow cotton instead of wheat in
North Texas, considering that the rails would afford North
Texas planters a profitable way to ship their goods to
established markets to the east, such as in Jefferson,
Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana.  Thus, planters in East
Texas were certain that slavery would move westward as
cotton became “King” in North Texas.  
Irrespective of the dreams of East Texas planters,
many people in the northern part of the state did not want
to grow cotton or bring a large number of slaves into their
region.  This section of the state in the late 1840s and
1850s primarily was made up of wheat farmers and stock
raisers.  For these individuals, the rails promised to
provide a feasible way to sell their wheat and livestock to
markets outside their geographical region.  Throckmorton
sympathized with this group of settlers during the 1850s,
and consequently, his political views were shaped by the
needs of these frontier families.  Nevertheless, the young
politician was astute enough to realize that if North Texas
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was to benefit from railroad construction, he would have to
work with pro-slavery advocates, who were primarily members
of the Democratic party.57
Throckmorton entered state politics in the early 1850s
as a die-hard member of the Whig party, following the
political philosophies that he had learned from William
Campbell in Tennessee and James E. Throckmorton in
Kentucky.  If presidential elections were an indication, he
was not alone in his support of the Whig party in North
Texas.  In the elections of 1848, 1852, and 1856, Whig
presidential candidates garnered more than 30 percent of
the vote in the North Texas region despite the fact that
Whigs were often perceived by Texans as being anti-Texas
politicians.  For example, General Zachary Taylor received
favorable support in the northern part of the state during
his 1848 bid for the presidency even though the Whig
candidate had made unsavory comments about the character of
Texas volunteers in the Mexican War and despite the fact
that his party had been divided over the issue of
annexation and support for the Mexican War.  In 1852
General Winfield Scott, who reportedly had ties with
northern abolitionists and was unpopular in many parts of
the state, still received a sizable vote in North Texas,
especially in Collin County.  If the Whigs had put forth
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candidates more friendly to the state in these elections,
it is likely that they would have received an even larger
proportion of votes.58  Throckmorton’s election to state
office in 1851 proved that favorable Whig candidates could
win elections in North Texas.
James Webb Throckmorton was forced to cope with
numerous emotional and physical obstacles on his way to
Texas:  None more tragic than witnessing the deaths of his
mother, father, and three siblings.  However, fate seemed
to be on his side as each loss brought new opportunities. 
The loss of his mother forced him to move in with the
Campbell family where he was introduced to Whig political
ideology and learned core values and principles which later
would forge his own career as a frontier politician.  The
death of his father caused him to move in with his uncle in
Tennessee where he learned the medical profession, a
profession that earned him a living once he moved back to
Texas.  This job gave him a measure of respectability
within his North Texas community and explains in part why
the people of Collin County trusted him to represent them
in the state legislature.  The medical profession also
endeared Throckmorton to the people of his region.  While
treating his patients, he was able to develop close
personal relationships with many of the people of Collin
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County.  It seems certain that Throckmorton’s compassion
for his fellow citizen led him to protect their interest in
the halls of the state legislature throughout the 1850s. 
Having married and settled along the South’s western most
frontier, Throckmorton probably thought his wild escapades
were behind him:  He did not realize that his adventures
were only beginning.
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CHAPTER III
GUARDIAN OF THE FRONTIER, 1851-1857
The 1850s promised to be years of hope and optimism
for many Texans.  During the previous decade, the United
States had annexed the Lone Star Republic and the state’s
citizens were consumed by the spirit of Manifest Destiny
which was pervasive among most southern Anglos.  Shortly
after the annexation of Texas, miners found gold in
California in 1848 which further expedited America’s push
westward.  For American expansionists all seemed to be
progressing well; however, the gold strike in California
also held grave political consequences for the United
States.1  The primary question concerning expansion of the
country was whether or not slavery would be allowed in the
western territories.  While no record exist that reveals
Throckmorton’s feeling on this manner, it seems certain
that he was worried about the pending consequences
expansion might hold for the frontier settlers.  He had
moved to the frontier with his family to escape the
political dominance of southern slaveholders and now it
appeared that they would once again threaten the
independence of the yeoman farmers living in Texas.  His
concerns were undoubtedly heightened once California began
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to seek admission to the Union in 1849.
California’s population exploded following the gold
strikes of 1849.  With this excessive growth, the western
state quickly became eligible to apply for statehood.  As a
result, the debates over slavery in the western territories
reached a feverish pitch.  Many northern politicians,
especially members of the Free-Soil party, became concerned
that the South’s undemocratic practice of slavery would
spread westward.  Conversely, Dixie’s people believed that
they had a right to carry their “human property” into the
western territories.  Thus, the primary question
confronting both northern and southern politicians was
whether California would enter the Union as a free or slave
state.2 
As sectional politicians positioned themselves for a
battle over the future status of the western territories,
the Great Compromiser, Senator Henry Clay, worked to create
a viable compromise between the opposing sides.  In January
1850 he proposed a compromise bill before Congress which
promised an immediate solution to the slavery issue in the
western territories and in the broader United States. 
Clay’s compromise was multifaceted and made concessions to
both the northern and southern states:  It called for an
end to the slave trade in Washington, D.C.; for a more
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stringent fugitive slave law; for popular sovereignty in
Utah and New Mexico territories; and for California to
enter the Union as a free state.  Additionally, and of
greater interest to Texans, the proposed bill provided a
settlement of the Texas and New Mexico boundary dispute
which had festered since the end of the Mexican War.  The
boundary dispute centered upon the legitimate boundary
between Texas and New Mexico.  Texas claimed the Rio Grande
as its western boundary which included a large segment of
present-day eastern New Mexico.  Senator Clay’s omnibus
bill stipulated that Texas would relinquish its claims in
today’s New Mexico and proposed the present-day boundary. 
In an effort to compensate Texas for its territorial
losses, Clay offered the Lone Star State a ten million
dollar indemnity payment.  Clay’s compromise, however, was
opposed by both northern and southern politicians:  Neither
side could accept the portions of the proposal which
benefitted their rival section.  Exhausted from his
efforts, Clay turned over leadership of his resolution to
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, an able parliamentarian who
supported the Kentuckian’s compromise proposal.  Douglas
broke the resolution apart from the omnibus format and
began to cajole the separate parts of compromise through
Congress by creating a series of shifting coalitions for
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each part of Clay’s original bill.3  As a result, Senator
Douglas succeeded in effecting a viable compromise in
September 1850.  It appeared that the sectional debate over
slavery was solved forever. 
While Texans bristled at the enormous loss of land on
their western border, they understood value of the U. S.
indemnity clause.  The money received from the United
States would allow the state to pay off the public debt
which it had incurred during the period of the republic and
early statehood.  Thus after the U. S. Congress passed the
bill and President Millard Fillmore signed it into law on
November in 1850, Texans voted overwhelmingly to accept the
Compromise of 1850.4
By the time that Texans accepted the compromise, James
Webb Throckmorton had grown weary of the demands of the
medical profession and believed that practicing law was
more suited to his personal demeanor and physical health. 
Thus, he made the fateful decision to pursue a career in
law and politics.  Already familiar with nineteenth-century
politics, Throckmorton recognized that most state and
national politicians were also members of the bar or were
wealthy planters.  Apparently, Throckmorton was not
interested in agricultural pursuits, and he took the
necessary steps to become a lawyer. 
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While Throckmorton had previously served as a delegate
to various local conventions in the late 1840s, his
political career did not actually begin until 1851.  With
the Compromise of 1850 temporarily settling the sectional
divide over slavery, Throckmorton entered politics during a
period of relative political calm.  Unfortunately, there is
no record of his views regarding the compromise.  However,
it seems certain that he would have been concerned about
the aspects of the compromise which favored the planter
class.  Because the western territories of New Mexico and
Utah would decide the future status of slavery inside their
borders according to the principle of popular sovereignty,
Throckmorton undoubtedly feared that planters from the
Lower South would begin to migrate westward to influence
the future of status of those regions.  The North Texas
frontier was located directly in the path of the Lower
South and the western territories and therefore logic
dictated that the planters would attempt to invade the
refuge which white yeoman farmers had forged out of the
wilderness.  Thus, Throckmorton and his fellow settlers
believed that their communities would soon fall under the
threat of the planters and their slaves.
In 1851 the young Collin County lawyer campaigned for
a seat in the Fourth Texas Legislature as a representative
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from the Twenty-fifth District which included both Collin
and Denton counties.  Running as a Whig candidate,
Throckmorton easily defeated his opponents A. Johnson and
Jacob Baccus.  In his home county, Throckmorton received
157 votes; Johnson garnered 132; Baccus gathered 25.  Jacob
Baccus faired better in Denton County, receiving 63 votes
to his opponents combined total of 44.  The total vote
count in the district was 421 with 221 ballots going to
Throckmorton, sending the former frontier doctor to Austin
to serve in the Texas House of Representatives.5
Once he arrived in Austin, Throckmorton’s attention
was devoted to three primary local issues: the settlement
of land claims in the Peters Colony, the development of
railroads in the North Texas region, and the defense of the
northern frontier against Indian depredations.  These
issues were paramount to preserving the yeoman farmers’
political and social control of their communities. 
Conflicting land claims in the Peters Colony of North Texas
produced violent reactions and threatened public safety in
the region.  By 1850 settlers in the colony turned to the
state legislature for relief from the unscrupulous
activities of the Texas Land and Emigration Company.  North
Texans also viewed internal improvements as a vital issue
of concern.  Almost everyone in the northern reaches of the
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state agreed that internal improvements were needed if
their region was to prosper economically.  The farmers of
North Texas primarily grew wheat, but they did not have an
efficient transportation system to send their crops to
market.  Thus, the people of North Texas readily supported
Throckmorton’s promotion of railroad development in their
region of the state.  
Finally, the citizens of North Texas pushed the
legislature to provide them with adequate protection from
Indian raids.  White settlers had continually moved onto
the Native Americans’ lands since the earliest Anglo
settlements in Texas, and the tribes of the Lone Star State
struck back at their encroaching enemies with fury.  Once
Texas was annexed to the United States in 1846, the federal
government in Washington, D.C., had attempted to defend the
frontier regions of Texas, but according to Texas
frontiersmen, the U. S. soldiers posted on the fringes of
civilization had offered little protection.  Consequently,
at the wishes of his constituents, Throckmorton called on
the state to provide ranger companies to protect the people
of North Texas.6
In January 1852, legislators sought to resolve the
Peters Colony controversy.  Leaders in the legislature
appointed a joint committee to investigate charges that the
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settlers had made against the promoters of the Peters
Colony and to determine the validity of the colonists’
accusations.  Representative R. P. Crump and Senator G. W.
Hill, who served as chairmen of the committee, reviewed the
arguments presented by the settlers’ hired counselor, John
H. Reagan.  The colonists primarily complained that the
agents of the Texas Land and Emigration Company had not
properly surveyed their property and had failed to provide
them with clear title to the lands that they had settled. 
The settlers further claimed that the company had told them
to settle any sections within the colony that they found
convenient but that later the company’s officials forced
those individuals who had settled on the even-numbered
sections to move off their lands.  Also, the company had
not lived up to its contractual agreement to build cabins
for the settlers and to provide them with guns and
ammunition.  However, after carefully considering all the
colonists’ claims and investigating records from the
Secretary of State and Commissioner of the General Land
Office, the joint committee reported that the promoters had
made every effort possible to comply with the terms of
their contractual agreements.7  The committee’s findings
did little to alleviate the problems between the settlers
and the promoters, and as a result, Representative
87
Throckmorton and Senator James H. Armstrong proposed a
compromise measure.8
The Throckmorton compromise, as it was known,
stipulated that if the promoters withdrew their suit
against the General Land Office and relinquish their rights
in the colony within twenty days, the state would dismiss
any legal actions the government was considering against
their company.9  The compromise measure also required the
settlers to claim their land before August 4, 1852. 
Because the company would potentially lose its best lands
to the settlers’ claims, Throckmorton proposed that the
state grant the promoters an additional 2,000 sections of
land from the state.  After being formally submitted to the
legislature in the form of a bill, the compromise passed
both houses on February 3, 1852, and Governor Bell signed
it into law seven days later.10
The settlers found little to celebrate in the
compromise.  They felt that the new law favored the Texas
Emigration and Land Company and objected to the
reinstatement of H. O. Hedgcoxe as the company agent.  The
colonists had forced Hedgcoxe from his office in the late
1840s because they felt that he cheated them out of their
land titles.  After the legislature reinstated him to his
former position, the recalcitrant Hedgcoxe continued to
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endure the wrath of the settlers by denying approximately
four hundred of them claim to their lands, stipulating that
he was acting under the dictates of the 1852 legislation. 
Actually, Hedgcoxe’s interpretation of the law was
inaccurate because the legislators had specifically said
that the Texas Emigration and Land Company could not act
against the interest of the settlers.11
Discontent soon matured into rebellious activity.  A
group of settlers met in Springfield, Limestone County, on
April 28, 1852, and penned a list of grievances against the
company.  The delegates’ complaints paralleled the
arguments that the settlers had presented to the state
legislature earlier.  However, the Springfield delegates
also found the law of 1852 to be unconstitutional and in
violation of an ordinance passed during the constitutional
convention of 1845.  The ordinance had declared that the
state’s Attorney General should institute legal proceedings
against the company and that the original contracts between
the Texas Emigration and Land Company were voided if the
settlers’ charges against the company proved valid.  More
important to the Springfield delegates’ argument, the
members of the constitutional convention stated that the
legislature did not have the authority to extend further
time limits for the settlement of the necessary number of
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families or relieve the company from forfeiture resulting
from noncompliance with the requirements of the contract. 
The members of the Springfield meeting contended that the
ordinance was ratified by the people of Texas when they
voted on the new state constitution.  However, the
delegates seem to have been mistaken in their assessment of
the ordinance because it never was a part of the Texas
Constitution since it was not presented to the United
States government for its approval at the time of
annexation.  Before adjourning, the Springfield convention
agreed to petition Governor Bell to call a special session
of the Texas legislature to nullify the 1852 compromise law
and encouraged the delegates present at the meeting to
organize additional conferences in other areas of the
colony.12
In response to the Springfield delegates’ call for
further conventions, the Peters Colony settlers organized
another meeting in Dallas on July 10 with the intention of
discussing possible solutions to the problems between the
colonists and the Texas Emigration and Land Company.  At
the meeting, delegates formed a committee to conference
with Hedgcoxe at the company’s office near McKinney and to
invite him to submit the company’s records for
investigation.  Through their actions, the delegates hoped
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to reach a compromise between the colonists and the
company.  The members at the Dallas meeting then adjourned
agreeing to reconvene on July 15 to hear the committee’s
report.  When the convention resumed, the attendees
discovered that the committee had failed to complete its
task.  The disgruntled members grew impatient and decided
more radical measures were needed to protect the settlers’
claims.  By resolution, they voted to censure Sam Bogart,
the state senator for the Dallas district, and called for
his resignation on the grounds that he had not properly
represented the interest of the people living in the Peters
Colony.  Senator Bogart’s most damning action had been his
support of the 1852 compromise law.13
Inflamed by the spirit of the Dallas meeting, John J.
Good led a group of approximately forty colonists in a raid
of Hedgcoxe’s office on July 16:  They intended to force
the company’s agent to turn over the records in question. 
Having returned to Collin County at the conclusion of the
regular session of the Fourth Legislature, Throckmorton
learned of Good’s intentions.  Because he was opposed to
solving the colonists’ problems through violent means,
Representative Throckmorton notified Hedgcoxe that Good and
his followers were on their way to his office and that his
life was in probable danger.  By the time that the
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disgruntled settlers arrived, Hedgcoxe had hidden some of
the company’s records in a nearby cornfield and had sought
refuge there himself.  However, the mob was able to
confiscate most of the company’s files and many of
Hedgcoxe’s personal papers.  The rowdy crowd eventually
dispersed but not until they had verbally threatened
Hedgcoxe’s life, forcing the frightened agent to load the
company records in the cornfield into a wagon and carry
them to a safe location in Bonham, Fannin County.  From
there, the records were forwarded to the Texas Emigration
and Land Company’s headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky.14
The result of the mob’s actions was to slow down the
process of issuing land certificates to the settlers.  In
an effort to formulate a new strategy, representatives of
the colonists agreed that delegates from each county in the
Peters Colony would meet in McKinney on July 29, 1852, but
before the meeting convened, a group of settlers who sought
a peaceful solution to the colonists’ problems met on July
20.  Throckmorton was present at this meeting, but he was
not an outspoken leader among the attendees.  Instead, the
leaders of the movement were J. C. Easton, Sam Bogart, S.
R. Campbell, Alex Berry, of Ellis County, and a man by the
last name of Martin of Dallas County.  Though Throckmorton
did not assume a primary leadership role, his influence and
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attempt to aid the settlers was noted at the convention. 
In the Northern Standard on August 7, delegates noted that
Bogart and Throckmorton’s efforts in the passage of the
compromise law of 1852 was “commendable to them, and in
[their] opinion, was the best arrangement that could be
made under all the circumstances, to secure [the colonists]
rights, and that the assaults upon their character and
conduct in this behalf, are erroneous and unjust.”15  
On July 24, another group of disgruntled colonists met
at Denton.  The members of this group found no fault with
the 1852 compromise law, but rather they blamed their
problems on Hedgcoxe’s interpretation of the law.  They
justified the earlier actions by stating that the company’s
agent had attempted to force the settlers from their lands
which they had made improvements upon.  The Denton
delegates also requested that Throckmorton resign his
position in the legislature, not because he was the sponsor
of the 1852 compromise law, but because he thwarted John
Good’s raid on Hedgcoxe’s office, preventing the settlers
from obtaining all the company’s records.  Thus, the Denton
delegates accused Throckmorton of being sympathetic to the
Texas Emigration and Land Company’s and siding with the
company’s agent in the ongoing dispute.16
As planned, the meeting at McKinney convened in late
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July.  The first order of business was the organization of
the conference.  The attendees elected Reverend Azariah
Bone of Grayson County as president of the meeting, B. P.
Smith also of Grayson County as vice-president, and J. W.
Latimer of Dallas County as secretary.  The president’s
first official act was to appoint a committee on address
and resolution.  Reverend Bone then adjourned the meeting
until the following morning.  When the McKinney meeting
reconvened the following day, the members of the committee
suggested that the convention adopted resolutions similar
to those of the earlier Denton meeting.  They also
suggested that the convention leaders should keep the
company records which were taken from Hedgcoxe’s office,
unless the legislature revoked the 1852 compromise law. 
Finally, the committee put forth a plan of action which
called for a special session of the legislature and for the
appointment of vigilant committees run by citizens with the
instructions of keeping the land company under
surveillance.17
The delegates were unanimous in their vote on the
resolutions, except on two accounts:  Throckmorton, Bogart,
and Wilcox of Collin County, and Stone of Dallas voted
against holding the stolen company records at Dallas, and
Throckmorton and Bogart voted against the resolution which
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called for the censorship of the state legislature’s
committee that was in charge of investigating the Peters
Colony controversy.  The McKinney convention called on
Governor Bell to convene the legislature in special session
in order to give the settlers in the colony relief.  In an
effort to sway the legislature to their point of view, the
colonists’ resolutions absolved those who had sponsored the
1852 compromise law and stated that the representatives and
senators had passed the law with good intentions.  Despite
these good intentions, however, the delegates claimed that
the law had caused greater confusion in the colony and had
not solved the problems confronting the colonists.  In
response to the McKinney resolutions and other matters
affecting the state, Governor Bell called the legislature
into a special session on January 1853.18
In compliance with the Denton resolution,
Representative Throckmorton resigned from the Texas House
of Representative.  In a letter to Governor Bell on
September 15, 1852, he stated, “Sir, I here within tender
you my resignation as representative of the Twenty fifth
Representation District of this State.”19  Subsequently, he
made plans to run for reelection in the special election
which was to be held in November.  In this election,
Throckmorton was pitted against S. R. Campbell, who made an
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issue of the former representative’s support of the
compromise law of 1852.  Campbell campaigned for the repeal
of the controversial legislation, while Throckmorton
defended the compromise measure as sound but suggested that
the legislative act might be amended to prevent company
agents from further misinterpreting the original intent of
the law.  Throckmorton was successful in his bid for
reelection, perhaps proving that widespread dissatisfaction
in the Peters’ Colony was not as prevalent as agitators had
suggested, or perhaps that many voters believed
Throckmorton had acted favorably on the behalf of the
settlers.20
  When the extra session of the state legislature met in
January 1853, there was an obvious divide among the
representatives over the issues concerning the Peters
Colony.  One group of legislators supported the position
taken by the committee on land claims, stating that all
legislation affecting the colony was contrary to an
ordinance of the constitutional convention in 1845 and that
all laws passed since the adoption of Texas Constitution
were unconstitutional and therefore null and void.  A
second group of legislators, including Throckmorton,
Bogart, and John M. Crockett, believed that the suspension
of all the legislation pertaining to the colony since 1845
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would only cause additional confusion in the North Texas
region.  The matter was submitted to a special committee by
the speaker of the House.
  After studying all the gathered evidence made
available to them, the members of the special committee
proposed a bill that they thought would solve the Peters
Colony controversy, but Throckmorton and his political
allies felt that the proposed bill was unfavorable to the
colonists:  A sufficient number of legislators agree with
them and the bill was amended to meet their satisfaction. 
The amendments required the Texas Land and Emigration
Company to surrender to the state all of its interests or
claims to all sections, half sections, fractional sections,
or alternate sections that it owned, located, claimed, or
settled upon by any settler of the colony, or certificates
issued by the county courts.  Furthermore, the amendments
provided that once the colonists had secured their claims
that the company could then take charge of lands that the
state had originally promised it.  The proposed amendments
were then sent to the Committee on the Judiciary of which
Throckmorton was a member.  After careful consideration,
the Judiciary Committee recommended the passage of a new
bill which included the proposed amendments.  After several
motions against the new legislation proved unsuccessful,
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the House adopted it by a vote of thirty-six to twenty. 
Following the Senate’s approval, Governor Bell signed the
proposed bill on February 4, 1853.21
The new law contained many of the provisions
Throckmorton called for prior to the passage of the 1852
compromise law.  It stated that the settlers were “confined
to a country they love but cannot improve” and that the
only solution was for the company to suspend its claims
until the colonists’ lands were registered.22  The law
attempted to solve the problem facing the settlers by
placing the colonists’ interest before that of the Texas
Emigration and Land Company.  With their land claims
solidified, the settlers were now in control of the
economic, political, and social future of the frontier. 
Another important issue which attracted the attention
of James Webb Throckmorton was internal improvements,
especially the development of railroads.  By the 1850s,
railroad construction became more pronounced in the South,
especially in areas east of the Mississippi River.  During
this decade railroad mileage in the southern states
increased some five-fold, providing approximately 10,000
miles of rails in the South by 1860.  While southern rail
lines were limited in comparison to those stretching across
northern states, the massive growth in railroads
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demonstrated the South’s interest in improving its
transportation infrastructure.  The growth of southern
railroads was directly linked to investments made by state
and local governments.  For example, the state of Virginia
spent approximately $24 million dollars and Tennessee $17
million on railroad development.  While friendly to private
rail lines during the antebellum period, Georgia actually
operated a state-owned railroad, the Western and Atlantic
line which connected Atlanta and Chattanooga.  Throughout
the 1850s, southern states provided more than $81 million
dollars for the development of railroads, and local
governments supplemented the states’ investments with an
additional $55 million.  Obviously, southerners viewed
railroads as essential for improving their region’s
economic future.23  
Like their southern brethren, Texans also sought to
build railroads in their state.  By 1861, the Lone Star
State had set aside five million acres of public lands and
appropriated $1.8 million in state bonds for the
development of railways.24  Like the people of other states
in the Trans-Mississippi region, Texans understood that the
building of railroads would prove vital to the development
of their state.  A well-planned rail system held the
promise of settling vacant lands, of increasing taxable
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wealth, and of building existing communities into thriving
cities.  Thus, a community could possibly ensure its
economic greatness if it were located along the path of
future rail lines.  Therefore, the location of railroads
became a source of heated competition among the fledgling
towns of Texas.25 
Farming communities, for example, realized that the
location of the rails would be important to their future
prosperity.  For East Texas planters, the iron horse
represented a potential way to spread the cotton culture
and slavery into the interior of Texas.  The interior
regions of the state were not accessible by navigable
rivers and thus freight transportation from these areas was
conducted by ox-wagons, an extremely expensive and
inefficient method of carrying on commercial trade. 
Railroads seemed to be the only solution to opening up the
fertile black lands of central and northern Texas for
cotton production.26  While some individuals in the northern
part of the state in the 1850s might have envisioned
reshaping their economy so it more closely resembled their
East Texas counterparts, it is more likely that North Texas
farmers viewed the railways as a way to market crops which
they were already producing in large quantities, especially
wheat.  Like the settlers in the Upper South states, North
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Texans understood that if they could economically sustain
themselves, they might be able to thwart the migration of
planters to the frontier.27  As long as wheat crops proved
profitable, small farmers could maintain themselves on the
land and would be less likely to sell their property to the
members of the planter class.  Finally, the people of North
Texas understood that internal improvements would improve
the overall value of the land holdings.  Thus, if they
chose to sell their lands in the future, they could count
on making a sizable profit from the transaction.
Regardless of the motives of railroad promoters in
Texas, any extensive plans for the development of lines
were not feasible as long as the Texas treasury was empty. 
However, in 1850 the economic fortunes of the Lone Star
State changed with the passage of the Compromise of 1850. 
With the $10 million indemnity bonds that the state
received in compensation for realigning its western
boundaries, the state was able to retire its debts as well
as set aside funding for internal improvements.  The state
would now seemingly have its railroads, but the questions
of where the lines would run and how the roads would be
constructed became the topic of legislative debate.28  
By 1852 the state legislature was beginning to issue
special grants of lands to various railroad enterprises. 
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Two years later, legislators granted sixteen sections of
land to railroad companies for every mile of track they
completed.  To ensure that the railway promoters did not
take advantage of the state’s generous offer, the
legislators required companies to build twenty-five miles
of track before receiving title to their claims.  In 1856
the Texas legislature authorized loans of $6,000 per mile
once the rail companies had laid the required twenty-five
miles of track.  The state incentives sparked the immediate
interest of several railroad companies, almost all of which
obtained charters from the state.  However, most of the
antebellum companies failed to produce a single mile of
track, and as a result Texas remained a railroad-poor
region at the end of the decade.  By 1860 the Lone Star
State could boost of having 400 miles of track located
inside its borders, a paltry sum given that the state had
granted thousands of acres of land and had loaned nearly $2
million to various railroad companies.29
Like other citizens from his region of the state,
Throckmorton viewed railroad development as vital to the
economic prosperity of North Texas.  However, before the
people in the region could enjoy the full benefit of
internal improvements, the state legislature had to settle
another heated conflict over land claims in North Texas. 
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On February 10, 1852, the legislature reserved a large
portion of the northern part of the State for colonial
purposes until August 10, 1854.  At the special session of
the Fourth Legislature, the members passed a 320-acre
preemption law on February 3, 1853.  The Fifth Legislature
passed a 160-acre preemption law which was approved
February 13, 1854.  Many settlers made claims to lands
within the colonial reserve after the passage of the 320-
acre law but before the passage of the 1854 law which
limited preemption to 160 acres.  These squatters received
no objection from other colonists, the Peters’ Company, or
the state, and therefore they saw no reason why they could
not improve the land and apply for title to the land after
the August 1854 deadline.  If the reservation had been
allowed to expire as planned, the area would have opened
for settlement and the settlers would have won legal rights
to the lands, leaving the matter problem free.  However, on
December 21, 1853, the Fifth Legislature created the
Pacific Railroad Reserve.  The new reserve included public
lands that the squatters claimed as their own.  Obviously,
land titles became blurred and confused.  As a result, some
settlers would receive 320 acres, some would receive 160
acres, and some would receive nothing depending upon when
and where they claimed their lands.30
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The issue of conflicting land claims in the railroad
reserve became a major issue in the mid-1850s.  In the
August 1855 elections, the people of Collin, Cooke, and
Denton counties reelected Throckmorton to the state
legislature.  Representing the interest of his North Texas
constituents, he pledged to help the settlers who made land
claims in the Pacific Railroad Reserve.  Having been an
outspoken proponent of internal improvements, Throckmorton
was made chairman of the Internal Improvement Committee
which was expected to solve the problems associated with
the squatters living on the newly created railroad reserve. 
In November 1855, the House considered a bill that promised
relief to the illegal settlers.  The bill required that the
state give three hundred acres of land to the squatters
regardless of when they made their claims.  The only cost
to the settlers would be a fee of fifty cents per acre for
surveying and patenting their lands.  Representative
Throckmorton opposed the bill for three reasons:  First, he
did not believe that it provided proper relief to the
squatters.  Second, he thought that the law was too limited
because it only applied to a small group of people who
purchased land in the reserve and did not extend the same
privilege to all citizens.  Finally, he claimed that the
law should apply equally to all public lands and not just
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those within the railroad reserve.31
Throckmorton proposed his own bill on the subject.  He
called for those settling the region prior to the 160-acre
law should receive 320 acres of land.  Throckmorton further
suggested that the pioneers who settled in the region after
the 160-acre law should receive their 160 acres. 
Throckmorton arrived at this conclusion based on the
following logic:  First, many of the settlers came to the
area prior to the last session of the legislature which
designated the region as part of the Pacific Railroad
Reserve.  As a result, the people did not move onto the
land in violation of the law.  Second, many settlers moved
to the region during the winter that the reserve was being
created and therefore had no knowledge of its existence. 
Finally, Throckmorton argued that the lands granted to the
settlers would greatly benefit the cause for which the law
was originally created.  He made this conclusion because he
knew that land speculators who owned thousands of acres of
certificates would keep the region from being settled until
it became economically feasible to do so.  The actions of
speculators would prevent the lands from developing and
consequently from increasing in value.  Throckmorton stated
that “these people are industrious and comprise a most
valuable class of citizens.  The country where they have
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settled was a few years ago a vast wilderness, an
uncultivated waste; but now it is covered with fine farms
and is indeed one of the most flourishing parts of the
state.”32  It is likely that Throckmorton was also concerned
that speculators would sell their land certificates to
members of the planter class, resulting in the development
of a plantation society on the Texas frontier, a
proposition that North Texas settlers hoped to avoid.
Throckmorton attempted to gain favor with those
individuals who supported internal improvements by arguing
that the settlers would improve the value of the land and
that the presence of pioneers would speed up the process of
railroad development.  According to Throckmorton, the
farmers would use the railway to ship their goods to
distant markets, and at the same time, the developing
frontier communities would serve as a source of new markets
for distant manufactures.  Therefore, Throckmorton argued
that the economic circumstances which existed in the
railroad reserve would blend the interests of the railroad
with the interests of the frontier agricultural
communities, producing positive results for both.33  
Throckmorton’s opponents argued that the settlers were
in violation of the law:  Settlement within the reserve was
prohibited by law, and the opposition did not feel that the
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settlers’ ignorance of the law was any reason to allow them
to stay on the land.34  On December 5, 1855, Representative
James Hooker proposed an amendment to Throckmorton’s bill
which voided the land claims of those settlers who moved
onto the reserve following the passage of the Mississippi
and Pacific Railroad law, December 21, 1853.  After
refusing to table the amendment, the representatives moved
to take an up or down vote on the issue, Throckmorton
attempted again to aid the settlers’ circumstances.  He
stated, “Again, sir, there have never been any boundary
lines run showing just where the boundary line is.  How is
a man who wants a home to take the exact longitude and
latitude of his little claim of one hundred sixty acres of
land and determine for himself whether he is in the reserve
or not?”35  Throckmorton also reminded his colleagues that
Texas had always maintained a liberal policy in granting
land to pioneers and to do otherwise in this case would go
against well-established precedents.  Nevertheless,
Throckmorton’s appeal to logic and reason proved
unsuccessful.  The House passed the Hooker amendment and
sent it to the internal improvement committee.  Since
Throckmorton was the chairman of this committee, he had a
final opportunity to enact changes to the proposed
legislation which would be more favorable to the settlers. 
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On January 2, 1856, he offered a compromise measure to the
bill which suggested that the settlers moving in the
reserve after December 21, 1853, should receive titles to
their lands.  Additionally, Throckmorton’s measure provided
that the state would not issue any further preemptions in
the region in question.  Unfortunately for the squatters,
this compromise was rejected by a majority of the House
members and the bill granting preemption only to those
individuals who had settled in the reserve before December
21, 1853, was passed.  The governor signed the bill into
law on January 26, 1856.36
This had been a fight between two opposing groups: 
The settlers residing in the Pacific Reserve and those
individuals who wanted to advance the cause of internal
improvements.  Though Throckmorton was an outspoken
proponent of internal improvements, he allied himself with
the former group.  He had lived among these people and
could hardly refuse to defend their claims.  They were also
his constituents, and unlike some elected officials he felt
obligated to represent their interests.  Futhermore,
Throckmorton believed the settlement of the reserve would
aid the cause of internal improvements rather than hinder
them.  In 1856, he was able to make some concessions to the
settlers living on the reserve.
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On August 18, 1856, Throckmorton reported that the
Internal Improvements Committee was proposing a bill which
“authorized the location, sale, and settlement of the
Mississippi and Pacific Railroad Reserve.”37  This bill
recommended that concessions should be made to the
colonists similar to that recommended on January 2. 
Throckmorton stated that “all persons who were settled upon
any portion of the reserve could have claim, not to exceed
one hundred sixty acres, upon the payment of fifty cents
per acre to the special school fund.”38  The law passed on
August 26, 1856, bringing the preemption troubles to an
end.  In the eyes of his constituents, Throckmorton was
deemed a lasting friend.39
Throckmorton’s involvement with railroad development
extended beyond just the settlement of land claims in the
Pacific Railroad Reserve.  He became consumed with the idea
of establishing a transcontinental railroad route which
would run through Texas--more specifically a road which
would run through or near his representative district. 
Between 1851 and 1857, Throckmorton’s commitment to
ensuring that any proposed transcontinental railway ran
through Texas was evident in his participation in various
railroad conventions.  The first railroad meeting that the
Collin County politician attended took place in Austin on
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November 17, 1851.  While he played only a limited role in
this convention, the young North Texan became more keenly
aware of the major issues confronting railroad development
in Texas and was able to make the acquaintance of other
railroad men in the state.40
On October 6, 1853, Throckmorton attended a railroad
convention in Bonham, Fannin County.  The meeting primarily
was comprised of delegates from North Texas counties, and
Throckmorton played a major role in the proceedings.  The
North Texans expressed that they wanted a railway that
would traverse the state.  Speaking for the assembled
delegates, Throckmorton announced that “counties should be
able to take stock in Railroads under certain restrictions,
by a majority of the votes of any county or counties, so
expressing themselves at the ballot box.”41  Furthermore,
Throckmorton found that “it would be best for the State to
lay out one route to extend directly from east to west,
across the State, and that such road be made the special
care of the State and all her energies.”42  Finally, he
stated that the delegates to the Bonham convention believed
that the state legislature should make the Memphis, El
Paso, and Southern Pacific road the primary line through
Texas, a road that would bisect the Red River counties. 
The delegates argued that competing railroads in the state
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could connect with Memphis, El Paso and Pacific road at
various points along the road as “the want of the country
demand[ed].”43  
By 1856, Throckmorton changed his mind concerning the
route that the transcontinental line should follow through
Texas.  Although he envisioned that the Memphis, El Paso,
and Pacific would connect with the transcontinental road,
he began to support a more centralized route for the main
line through his state.  As a result, he became a strong
supporter of the Texas Western Railroad Company.44  It seems
obvious that Throckmorton’s controversial shift in support
from the Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific to the Texas Western
Railroad Company resulted from his desire to compromise
with other prominent railroad men living in areas outside
of North Texas, especially in the eastern and Gulf regions
of the state.45
The Texas Western Railroad Company, commonly referred
to as the Texas Western, promised to be a major link in a
transcontinental railroad that would run through the
southern part of the United States to California.  On
February 16, 1852, the Texas legislature gave the company a
charter to build a railroad across the state from its
eastern boundary line near the East Texas town of Waskom to
the West Texas town of El Paso.  The list of incorporators
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included notable politicians and businessmen:  Samuel
Bogart and James Webb Throckmorton from the North Texas
region; and William T. Scott, the largest slaveholder in
Harrison County.  Other incorporators included James C.
Hill, Rufus Doane, Lucius Clopton, Willis Stewart, E. E.
Lott, L. B. Camp, and J. D. Todd.  Capital stock in the
company was divided into $100 shares, and no one was
eligible to become a director unless he owned a minimum of
five shares of stock.  The legislature granted the company
a right-of-way through state-owned lands, but it was
limited to 200 feet in width.  Like other railroad charters
during the era, the state promised the Texas Western eight
sections of land for each mile of road it completed, but
the company could not claim its land unless it laid ten
miles of track during the first five years of its charter. 
Furthermore, if construction of the first ten miles was not
complete during the allotted five-year span, or at least
twenty miles of track had not been laid within six years,
the state would consider the charter null and void.46
During the next four years, the Texas legislature
passed two new acts which promised additional benefits to
the Texas Western.  On January 30, 1854, new legislation
provided that when railroad companies constructed twenty-
five or more miles of track that they would be entitled to
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receive sixteen sections of land from the state for every
mile completed and in operation.  A little over two years
later on August 13, 1856, the Texas legislators once again
passed legislation designed to speed up the construction of
rail lines in the state.  The new railroad act allowed
companies to receive a loan of $6,000 from the Board of
School Commissioners of Texas for every mile of track
completed.  Because the Texas Western planned to connect
with a railroad which ran outside of the state, it was
entitled by the 1856 law to receive a loan when it built as
little as ten miles of track and had graded an additional
ten miles.  The incorporators of the Texas Western
supported the various legislative changes and provided the
railroad company with adequate resources with which to
complete its planned line in the East Texas region.47
On August 16, 1856, the legislature officially changed
the Texas Western’s company name to the Southern Pacific
Railroad Company.  Also, a new list of incorporators was
attached to the company, many of who had been formerly
associated with the Texas Western:  Rufus Doane, James C.
Hill, William T. Scott, Willis Stewart, Samuel Bogart, E.
E. Lott, L. B. Camp, James W. Throckmorton, J. D. Todd,
Joseph McDougal, Thomas H. Rogers, Adam Sullivan, Joshua
Starr, C. B. Holbert, Mason Mosely, and Jacob Fisher. 
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Despite the change in the company’s name and the slight
change in the list of incorporators, the railroad still had
to adhere to the time limits and obligations established by
the company’s original charter.48
On October 5, 1856, the stockholders of the Texas
Western held a meeting in New York and voted to accept the
new company name.  The stockholders also chose a board of
directors, which included an almost even balance between
individuals living in the North and those residing in the
South.49  The day after the meeting, the board met for the
first time and elected Horatio Allen of New York as the
company’s president, Edwin Post of New York as vice
president, S. Jaudon as company secretary, and E. A. Blanch
of Marshall, Texas, as chief engineer.50
The company immediately began preparations for
construction of the railroad.  Because of time limitations
the company had to locate its eastern terminus at the most
advantageous position of the Texas and Louisiana border. 
The company’s engineers decided on locating the terminus at
Swanson’s Landing on the southern shore of Caddo Lake.  The
location was ideal for the construction of a new rail line:
The company was able to ship supplies that its crews needed
for the construction of the road by way of steamboats which
traveled up the Red River and entered Caddo Lake at Twelve
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Mile Bayou.51
On February 11, 1858, the company completed twenty
miles of track which stretched from Swanson’s Landing to
Jonesville, a small Texas town located between Marshall and
Waskom.  By the end of September, the company had
constructed five additional miles of track toward Marshall. 
The company’s chief engineer and C. A. Frazier, Judge of
the Sixth Judicial District, inspected the line, certifying
that the company had fulfilled the obligation of its
charter.  At the end of 1858, the company could boast that
its rolling stock consisted of two functional locomotives
and five platform cars.  James Webb Throckmorton could
boast that he had played a part in helping the company
receive its charter from the state, serving as one of its
primary supporters.52  
The Southern Pacific Railroad Company had accomplished
what many railroads in Texas had failed to do:  It
fulfilled the requirements of its charter and became
operational.  This was no small feat considering that most
of the railroad ventures west of the Mississippi River did
not fair as well.  In a commercial enterprise where
speculation was rampant, most investors in railroad
companies never saw a return on their investments.  As one
historian stated, “the railroads did not pay and the people
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found that the debts incurred were hard to meet, while
railroad rates were high and prosperity did not ensue.”53 
As a result, “overspeculation and overbuilding” led to a
“financial depression ending in the panic of 1857, which
was caused to a considerable extent by the floating of
large amounts of practically worthless railroad stock and
of greatly depreciated state and local bonds.”54  The trans-
Mississippi railroads, including those in Texas, seemed to
be ahead of their time.  It was only after the western
lines connected with the east in the 1860s that those lines
began to prosper; thus, the railroads established in the
1850s in the trans-Mississippi area, including Texas, were
little more than supplemental to the more vital system of
river transportation.55  Throckmorton could claim to be a
part of one of the more success railroad ventures west of
the Mississippi River prior to the outbreak of the Civil
War.
A final issue which captured the attention of
Representative Throckmorton during the early 1850s was
frontier defense.  The most dire problem confronting the
people living along the Texas frontier was Indian raids. 
This was not a new problem in the development of American
frontiers.  From the first arrival of Anglos in North
America, conflicts existed between the two divergently
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opposed groups.  Just as other southerners had done during
their states’ formative years, Texans in the 1850s pushed
Native Americans off of their lands.  As a result, the
various Indian tribes of Texas sought to defend their lands
by attacking white settlements along the established
frontier line of state.56  These Indian raids were of great
interest to Representative Throckmorton because his home
and his representative district in the Texas legislature
were located along the North Texas frontier and were
vulnerable to attack.57  
One example of the type of attacks taking place in
North Texas occurred in 1850 at Farmersville, Collin
County.  John Leary was working in his fields located near
his home when he heard gun shots coming from the direction
of his home.  Leary’s wife was firing at Indians.  Leary,
along with a slave, ran toward his family’s cabin, and upon
their arrival, John and the slave were met at the house by
Indian attackers who prevented them from safely entering
the cabin.  Their attackers forced the two men to fight in
the open with the only weapons in their possession at the
time–the farming tools in their hands.  As they struggled
with the raiders, Mrs. Leary continued firing shots from
the cabin.  Apparently the defenders’ efforts were
effective because the Indians eventually retreated for
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cover allowing the men to enter the home.  With the men
safely confined in the cabin, their assailants apparently
decided that it would be too costly to overrun the Leary’s
position and abandoned the fight.58
Reacting to reports of Indian depredations such as the
Leary family faced, Throckmorton wrote a letter to Governor
Peter H. Bell asking for greater state assistance in
protecting the people of the frontier.  He wrote, “You have
doubtless before this time heard of the Indian difficulties
on our immediate frontier.  Accounts that can be relied
upon are coming in every day of the manifestations of the
hostile interactions of some of the wild tribes.”59  After
he reported of circumstances confronting the U.S. troops at
Fort Phantom Hill and Fort Belknap, Throckmorton encouraged
Governor Bell to “order out a sufficient force for the
protection of the frontier, and to be held in readiness to
aid, if necessary, in sustaining the U. S. troops at the
different stations [on the frontier].”60  
Throckmorton also told the governor that his
constituents believed the U.S. military had failed to
protect the frontier adequately and that it was necessary
for them to assume the task of ensuring their own safety. 
On this matter, he wrote, “I have been requested by my
fellow citizens to request of you [Governor Bell], in case
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you should order out a volunteer force, to authorize Maj.
George W. Barnett of this county [Collin] to raise a
company.”61  The North Texas representative continued, “In
mentioning the name of Maj. Barnett I need only say to you
that he has the entire confidence of the entire community.
. . .  I have been looking for a demonstration by the
Indians upon the northern frontier—I was this spring above
the Belknap—I was there satisfied of their intentions.”62 
After observing the conditions in the Belknap area,
Throckmorton concluded his letter by giving his opinion
regarding the effectiveness of U.S. troops on the Texas
frontier.  He wrote that he was of the opinion that “it is
absolutely necessary that a sufficient force should be
raised and a campaign made upon the sources of Brazos and
Upper Red River—the U.S. Government have wilfully neglected
to properly protect us, and I see no other alternative than
to do it ourselves.”63
Throckmorton’s suggestion that the U. S. Army had not
effectively protected the frontier settlements was partly
based on solid evidence.  Despite the U. S. Army’s best
efforts, the troop strength along the Texas frontier proved
inadequate for the purposes of protecting settlers.  Most
of the frontier garrisons maintained only one company of
soldiers and often these men were too sick to perform their
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duties.  Because most of the frontier companies were less
than full strength and due to rampant illness among the
soldiers, the garrisons frequently had only twelve or
fifteen men fit for duty each day.  In addition, many of
the frontier soldiers were infantrymen who had little
experience riding horses, and even those individuals who
had minimal knowledge with draft animals proved to be no
match for the mounted warriors that they confronted. 
Morale among the soldiers was dismal at best in these
conditions.  As a result of these circumstances, many
Texans, such as Throckmorton, began to demand that a more
realistic system of defense be initiated on the frontier. 
Most of the residents of the Lone Star State encouraged the
use of state ranger forces to aid the federal government’s
efforts.  While the United States inaugurated a variety of
defense programs, the results remained limited throughout
the 1850s, and by the 1860s, most frontier Texans believed
that they could protect themselves more effectively than 
the soldiers in the U. S. Army.64
Governor Bell apparently agreed with Throckmorton’s
assessment of frontier conditions and the need for
additional defense.  In an address to the extra session of
the Fourth Texas Legislature on January 13, 1853, Governor
Bell appealed for state funding of frontier defense.  After
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revealing the hostile conditions on the frontier, Bell
stated that he had repeatedly asked the federal government
for additional aid for defense.  According to Bell, the
Secretary of War had notified him that President Millard
Fillmore had asked Congress for additional men on the Texas
frontier, but Congress had adjourned without taking any
action.  Governor Bell stated that the Secretary’s
statement represented “an unqualified admission . . . that
the United States had failed to give adequate protection to
the frontier.”65 
Frontier defense remained a concern for Throckmorton
throughout the 1850s.  In March 1853, the Collin County
representative made a speech favoring a bill calling for
the legislature to appropriate money to cover the expenses
of volunteer companies on the frontier.  His speech seemed
to be well received by the other legislators because they
voted to pass a bill that covered the volunteers’ expenses. 
Additional legislative acts which were designed to provide
greater protection on the frontier were passed between 1855
and 1857, and in every case Throckmorton cast his vote in
favor of defending the settlers living on the fringes of
Texas society.66    
During the years that Throckmorton served in the Texas
House of Representatives, he remained dedicated to issues
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that directly affected his constituency.  He had devoted
much of his attention to settling land claims in the Peters
Colony, developing railroads that would benefit the North
Texas region, and attempting to provide more efficient and
adequate frontier defense to guard against the numerous
raids on the Texas settlements.  His actions revealed his
commitment to goals that earlier settlers established upon
arriving to the North Texas frontier.  Throckmorton, like
his constituents, sought to preserve the frontier for white
yeoman farmers and to protect them from the domination of
slaveowning planters.  In many ways the hatred of the
planter class also influenced the North Texans view of the
slaves.  In part, they viewed the slaves as the most
visible sign of the wealth and power of their owners.  As a
result, the people of the frontier attempted to create a
society that allowed them to retain political, economic,
and social control of their lives.  To accomplish this
goal, they supported preserving the whiteness of the land
that they had carved from the wilderness.  However, the
white settler’s disdain of the slaves did not purely stem
from their hatred of the planter class:  They also strongly
supported the traditional southern views of white
supremacy.  Evidence of the settlers’ racist views was
first evident in the desire to remove the Native Americans
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from their ancestral lands.  Throckmorton’s political
actions were clearly aligned to these frontier goals.  In
an effort to prevent the intrusion of the slaveowning
planters, he tirelessly worked to protect small farmers’
land claims in North Texas and diligently supported the
development of railroads to ensure their economic
prosperity throughout his early political career. 
Additionally, Throckmorton called on state government to
protect his constituents from Native American incursions,
believing that the Native Americans had no place in white
society.  
When the sectional conflict over slavery in the late
1850s and early 1860s created a widening rift between the
northern and southern states, Throckmorton’s task of
protecting the frontier from the domination of slaveholders
was challenged by forces beyond his control.  As Texas
embraced the fanaticism of secession in 1861, Collin
County’s guardian of the frontier was forced to make
difficult political decisions which would lead the former
physician to follow paths that he would have otherwise
avoided.
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CHAPTER IV
THE STORM OF PASSION AND SECTIONAL HATRED, 1857-1861
Between 1857 and 1861 Throckmorton continued to
protect the interests of the small farmers in North Texas
by focusing his attention on railroad development and
frontier defense; however, he found it increasingly
difficult to concentrate his efforts on these political
objectives because sectional debates about slavery began to
force Texas politics into new directions.  Citizens in all
sections of the United States realized that the period of
calm which followed the Compromise of 1850 was coming to an
abrupt end.1  In response to national events taking place
during the 1850s, southern politicians, even those on the
southern frontier, were forced to chose between remaining
loyal to the United States or joining the radical movement
for secession.  As Texans pondered the legitimacy of
secession during this period, Unionists in the state
attempted to ward off the efforts of the secessionists. 
The Unionists’ undertakings proved to be in vain as the
secession movement grew too powerful to be averted.2
Throckmorton’s experience on the frontier and his
early affiliation with the Whig party led him to oppose the
fanaticism of secession.  In part, his Unionism can be
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explained by his adherence to the conservative Whig
ideology which called for political stability, economic
growth, and an enduring attachment to traditional American
and Protestant values.  These Whiggish views closely
coincided with the local issues that Throckmorton
championed–frontier defense and railroad development. 
There was little doubt in Throckmorton’s mind that these
two issues could only be achieved within the Union.3  He
realized that the development of a transcontinental
railroad running through Texas depended on northern
investment capital, and he knew that northern and western
markets would prove vital to the future prosperity of the
North Texas region.  His judgments seem well founded
considering that southern slaveowners typically were
satisfied with using rivers to transport their cotton to
coastal ports where it was forwarded to markets in
northeastern United States and Europe.  From their
perspective, planters had little need for a
transcontinental railway.  
Likewise, the senator from North Texas understood that
the United States military was necessary for the protection
of the Texas frontier.  Even though Texans, including
Throckmorton himself, had criticized the U. S. Army’s
tactics on the frontier, the military was fairly effective
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within close proximity to their assigned posts. 
Furthermore, the army troops on the frontier served as a
potential market for North Texas crops, especially wheat
and corn.  The absence of the military would leave North
Texans exposed to the increasing threats of Indian raids
and a shrinking economy.4
Throckmorton’s loyalty to the Union was also directly
related to the nationalist principles of the Whig party. 
The Whigs throughout the late 1840s and 1850s believed that
the rights of individual citizens were more secure in the
Union.  Therefore, they tended to oppose the southern
Democrats ideology of states’ rights.  In this regard,
Throckmorton and other like-minded Whigs in the Upper South
believed that the Federal government could protect
nonslaveholding southerners from the political, economic,
and social domination of the planter class.  Foremost in
the minds of the Whigs was the belief that if the planter
class controlled southern society, the nonslaveowning class 
would become white slaves to the planters.  Unfortunately
for the Whigs in Texas, they witnessed the decline of their
party in the mid-1850s as it became the first victim of the
sectional debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act.5
Texans were once again confronted with the slavery
question in 1854 with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
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Act.  Basically, this act repealed the Missouri Compromise
of 1820 that had prohibited the extension of slavery in the
Louisiana Territory above the 360 30! line of latitude.  It
replaced the former restriction with an idea known as
“popular sovereignty.”  Thus, the first legislatures
elected in the Kansas and Nebraska territories could
decided whether or not slavery would exist within their
regions.  The act outraged antislavery supporters in the
North who viewed the measure as a triumph for pro-slavery
advocates and pleased southern slaveholders who saw the
possibility of spreading their peculiar institution
westward.6 
Senator Sam Houston voted against the Kansas-Nebraska
Act.  He argued that United States Constitution did not
allow territories to govern themselves and that treaties
between the United States and the Native Americans living
in the land west of the Missouri River had already dictated
that the territorial land in question belonged to the
native inhabitants.7  Additionally, Senator Houston tried
to appeal to the common sense of southern slaveowners by
stating that “no event of the future is more visible to my
perception than that, if the Missouri Compromise is
repealed, at some future day the South will be
overwhelmed.”8  Houston correctly pointed out that
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sectional differences would boil over in the fight to gain
dominance in the territories.
Loyal unionists in Texas approved of Sam Houston’s
negative vote for the act, but pro-slavery Democrats
ardently opposed the senator’s stance viewing it as a
direct challenge to the future of the South’s peculiar
institution.  This single issue served as the point of
origin for divisions in Texas between Unionists and
Secessionists.  Additionally, the act effectively divided
the national Whig Party into northern and southern
contingents, a consequence which eventually caused the
party to become ineffective.  Even though Whigs hoped that
their party unity could be revitalized in time for the 1856
presidential election, many Whigs understood that their
party was all but dead.  As a result, Texas Whigs,
including Throckmorton, began to seek new ways to achieve
their political objectives.  A significant number of Texas
Unionists, like Sam Houston, entertained joining the newly
formed American Party, also known as the Know-Nothing
party, but others, including Throckmorton, eventually
decided to join the well-entrenched Democratic Party,
believing that they could wrestle control of the party away
from its more radical slaveholding members.9 
The divisions caused by the Kansas-Nebraska Act
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continued into the 1857 gubernatorial election.  After
Houston’s vote on the Kansas-Nebraska bill, many Texas
Democrats pressured him to resign his senate seat; but
rather than cowering to their demands, Houston decided to
openly confront his Texas critics in the state’s
gubernatorial election of 1857.  At the same time,
Democrats held a nominating convention at the Baptist
Church in Waco in early May.  It was clear that pro-slavery
Democrats controlled the convention when Louis T. Whigfall
and Thomas P. Ochiltree, both secessionists, assumed
leadership roles.  Also, the platform committee endorsed
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 in which
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison explained the states’
rights doctrine of interposition.  The committee argued
that states had the power to annul Federal laws if those
laws were deemed unconstitutional, an argument which was
put forth earlier by Senator John C. Calhoun of South
Carolina.  Whigfall and other radical pro-slavery delegates
also supported reopening the African slave trade, stating
that every white man in the South should own at least one
slave.  Nevertheless, the final draft of the platform did
not address this more radical position.  Though the
delegates did not openly support opening the African slave
trade, they did endorsed Hardin Runnels, an ardent
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secessionist, as their gubernatorial candidate.10  
Throckmorton represented Collin County at the Waco
Convention, but evidence suggests that he played a limited
role in the convention’s final decisions.  From the printed
proceedings, it seems apparent that Throckmorton seemed to
assume a position counter to his core values, perhaps due
to political expediency.  As a new member of the Democratic
party, he undoubtedly felt compelled to give at least
limited support to the pro-southern platform formalized in
the convention and supported Runnels for governor.11 
However, Throckmorton did not completely abandon his
earlier political principles in his effort to gain a
position within his new party.  As a strong advocate of
internal improvements, he supported J. G. Stewart’s
resolutions of May 5.  Stewart, a representative from
Anderson County, resolved that the “completion of the
Pacific Railroad, is the great enterprise of the day; an
enterprise containing elements within itself susceptible of
uniting every fiber of our Union into one inseparable
body.”12  In a separate resolution, Stewart offered a
solution to problems associated with the United States
Constitutional prohibition against banking and internal
improvements.  He stated “that inasmuch as there is a
difference of opinion as to expediency and propriety of
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that clause of the Constitution which prohibits Banking and
Internal Improvements, aided by the State; and, as all
power is vested in the people, in order that they may have
an opportunity to still this vexed question themselves, the
Democracy recommends to the next Legislature of Texas the
propriety of presenting a resolution to the people . . . in
order that the people may either re-affirm or reject said
clause.”13  Much to the disappointment of Stewart and his
supporters, the resolutions were tabled and forgotten.14 
For the states’ rights delegates at Waco, talk of aligning
the state more closely with the Union was unacceptable.
With their candidacies solidified, Houston and Runnels
quickly began their gubernatorial campaigns.  The campaign
efforts of both men proved ugly.  Cris-crossing Texas in a
crimson buggy, the Hero of San Jacinto made speeches
throughout the summer attacking the policies of his
opponents and heralding his own political record.  In an
attempt to stall Houston’s momentum, Louis T. Whigfall and
W. S. Oldham, both Runnels supporters, followed the Texas
sage claiming that the senator had betrayed the rights of
southerners because of his own selfish desire to gain
northern antislavery support for a possible presidential
nomination.  Senator Houston often countered the remarks of
his detractors with his own stinging indictments.  A. W.
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Terrell, a member of the anti-Houston faction, recalled
that Houston closed one of his East Texas speeches by
stating that “he understood a man named Whiggletail
[Wigfall] would follow him–that he was an assassin,
nullifier and a common liar, and that those who were fond
of lies might remain and hear him.”15  
Houston’s attempt to counter the negative
pronouncements of his opponents proved to be an impossible
task:  Whigfall and Oldham’s comments seemed to resonate
with the Texas voters.  Perhaps anti-Houston Democrats’
claims might have fallen on deaf ears, but Houston
unwittingly gave his opponents arguments validity as he
vigorously defending his voting record in Congress,
including his negative vote on the Kansas-Nebraska bill. 
Additionally, Houston’s lukewarm support of anti-
immigration American Party candidates in 1855 turned German
and Tejano voters against him.  As a result, Runnels
defeated Sam Houston for the governorship by a vote of
36,527 to 23,628.  The election proved historic for
Houston; it was the first and last time that he lost a
political contest.  More importantly for Texans, the
election represented a solid defeat for Unionism in the
Lone Star State.16
Throckmorton fared better than Houston in the
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elections of 1857:  North Texas voters sent their favorite
son to the Texas senate.  They believed that he would
continue to represent their interest within the Democratic
party.  Their faith in him seemed to be well founded. 
Between 1857 and 1859, the North Texas senator continued to
work on railroad development and frontier defense in the
state senate, and he also became increasingly critical of
the fanatical secessionist position of the Runnels
administration.17  
While evidence does not directly reveal the extent of
Throckmorton’s concern over the ultra-southern position in
Texas between 1857 and 1859, it seems certain that he would
have agreed with the views espoused by fellow Unionist John
H. Reagan who was elected to the U. S. House of
Representatives in 1857.18  During this time Reagan outlined
his stand against the radical southern perspective:  He
stated that he was “in favor of the preservation of the
Union under the Constitution as made by the [founding]
fathers, and that [he] was opposed to the Abolitionists of
the North and to the Secessionists of the South.”  In
regards to filibustering activities, such as the actions of
the infamous William Walker in Nicaragua, Representative
Reagan further stated that he “was opposed to filibustering
because we would not be justified in morals or in law in
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making war on and murdering and robbing people who had done
us no harm, as a matter of political policy.”  Commenting
on the call to reopen the African slave trade, Reagan
stated that he was “opposed to [it], independently of any
question of morality, because the United States had treaty
engagements with a number of great nations, prohibiting
that trade . . . and because a majority of the people of
the United States were opposed to it . . . and because it
was impracticable, unreasonable, unjust, and
unstatesmanlike.”19  Throckmorton later echoed these same
sentiments prior to the state elections of 1859 in Texas. 
Given that the Runnels Administration embraced the revival
of the African slave trade, filibustering activities in
Latin America, and secession, Throckmorton’s desire to
protect the frontier from planter domination increasingly
led him to oppose the Democratic leadership in Texas.20  
Other issues which Throckmorton became concerned with
regarding the Runnels administration were more closely
related to the North Texas senator’s local concerns–
frontier defense and the development of a transcontinental
railroad through the state.  In a message to the Eighth
Texas Legislature Governor Runnels made clear that he did
not believe that Texas volunteer forces would be enough to
sustain adequate protection of the frontier and questioned
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whether or not it was appropriate for Texas to place
additional troops on the frontier.  According to the
governor, this was squarely the responsibility of the
United States government.  Runnels stated that “it is the
duty of the Federal Government to afford the protection
required, and that the expense is one which the State
should not properly be encumbered with.”21  The governor’s
position did not please men, like Senator Throckmorton, who
believed strongly in the protection of the frontier
regardless of the cost.  
Governor Runnels also proved to be an obstacle to the
development of railroads which promised to aid the
development of the North Texas region.  On February 4,
1858, the governor sent a message to the legislature
explaining his veto of a bill designed to give the Memphis,
El Paso, and Pacific Railroad Company additional time to
fulfill the terms of its charter.  The original charter had
granted the company four years to grade one hundred miles
of road:  The proposed amendment allowed the company an
additional six years to grade half the original distance. 
Runnels stated that “there is, and can be to my mind, no
good reason existing for such extraordinary delay.  By it,
not only the hopes of those who have been induced to embark
their means in the enterprise, are unnecessarily deferred
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and disappointed, but the object, which may be presumed to
have controlled the State, in granting the charter is
defeated, and its consideration is forfeited.”22  
Additionally, Governor Runnels vetoed a bill to
reinstate the Texas Western Railroad Company.  According to
Runnels the company had “never made any report, under the
general railroad law; and there is no official information
that any stock has ever been subscribed, or that a dollar
in money has been paid” despite the fact that the company’s
original charter had been granted six years earlier.23 
Runnels further stated “the Memphis, El Paso and Pacific,
and the Southern Pacific, all have the right to run on the
same line.  This charter is believed to have been once sold
to the Pacific Railroad Company, and if that contract has
ever been annulled there is no stipulation in the present
bill against a repetition of the abuse hereafter.”24  
The politically astute Throckmorton viewed Governor
Runnels’ political actions as an obstacle to local issues
which mattered most to his North Texas constituents. 
Protection from Indian depredations was a critical issue to
voters who lived along the Texas frontier, and the economic
prosperity of the North Texas region depended on the
development of the railroad companies that Runnels opposed. 
Throckmorton’s commitment to these local issues, which
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stemmed from the desire to keep planter and their slaves
from invading the frontier and his conservative Whig
economic principles, does much to explain his strong
support of the Union in the latter part of the 1850s.
On April 9 in McKinney, local Democrats in Collin
County met and elected Throckmorton to represent their
county at the Democratic convention that was slated to
convene on May 2 in Houston.  Additionally, members of the
local meeting announced their support for two politicians
in the upcoming state elections:  They called for the re-
election of John H. Reagan to the U. S. Congress and for
the election of Samuel Bogart as the party’s nominee for
Lieutenant Governor.  Throckmorton agreed with the
endorsement of these two politicians, respecting the
political views and accomplishments of both men.25 
Throckmorton’s role at the Houston convention proved to be
just as limited as it was two years earlier in Waco, but it
appears that he worked behind the scenes to garner support
for Bogart and Reagan.
The political division between loyal Unionists and
pro-slavery Democrats became more evident in the 1859
gubernatorial election.  The campaign began on May 2 when
the Texas Democrats held their convention in Houston. 
After organizing the convention, the delegates worked on
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their party’s state platform:  They immediately voted to
adopt the Waco platform of 1857 in its entirety. 
Additionally, the members of the convention declared the
Dred Scott decision to be a valid exposition of the
constitution; claimed that territorial legislatures had no
right to prevent the extension of slavery from the western
territories; and declared that Cuba should be made part of
the United States as quickly as possible.  A resolution
promoting the reopening of the African slave trade,
however, was defeated by a vote of 228 to 81, and a
resolution condemning the African slave trade was tabled by
a unanimous vote.  The members of the convention then
nominated Governor Runnels for reelection.26
The nomination of Runnels and the Democratic platform
caused great concern among Texas Unionists in the
Democratic party, especially Throckmorton and his frontier
constituency.27  As a member of the Texas legislature
between 1851 and 1859, Throckmorton remained concerned with
local issues.  However, in the 1859 gubernatorial election,
he was faced with choosing sides in the sectional debates
that threatened to rip the country apart.  His choices were
evident:  He had to either join radical Democrats in
support of Runnels or join the Unionists in their support
of Houston.  He chose to stand with Houston.28  
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Throckmorton’s support of Houston was multifaceted. 
One of the factors for the North Texan’s support was
Houston’s view toward railroad development.  In a broadside
published before the gubernatorial election, Houston’s
supporters defended the Texas sage’s railroad policy.  They
stated that “Gen. Houston is not only in favor of the
present bonus of 16 sections per mile to Railroads, but
originally advocated the granting of 20 instead of 16
sections.”  Houston’s supporters continued, “Thanks to the
action and influential exertions of Generals Houston and
[Thomas] Rusk, we are mainly indebted for the magnificent
arrangement by which we sold a part of the Sante Fe
territory to the General Government, and thereby enabled
Texas . . . to leave a large surplus to aid in building our
Railroads.”  Printed on this same broadside was a Houston
letter in which the Senator stated that “other subjects
than those of a local nature have engrossed my attention,
but should I be elected Governor, I will not fail to give
my especial attention to the subject of railroads, as well
as to other subjects, connected with the general interest
and prosperity of the country.”29  Given Runnels and
Houston’s opposing views regarding railroad development, it
is little wonder that Throckmorton aligned himself with
Houston.30
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Furthermore, circumstance on the frontier was becoming
increasingly volatile.  A public meeting was held at
McKinney for the purpose of expressing concern about Indian
depredations on the northern frontier of Texas. 
Throckmorton presided over the meeting and endorsed its
resolutions.  Representing the concerns of Collin County’s
citizenry, members of a resolution committee wrote that the
delegates at the meeting were in sympathy “with our
frontier brethren in their difficulties, and that [they
wanted to] give them all the aid in [their] power towards
removing the Indians North of the Red River.” 
Additionally, the resolution committee held that Collin
County citizens should “assist our brethren in the
protection of their homes, their firesides and their
families, from depredations of the savages” and that “the
Indians in the Reserve [in Oklahoma] must be removed, or
the homes of the frontiersman must be abandoned.”31  Many
Texans believed that Houston would be more effective in
eliciting Federal funding and troops for frontier defense. 
This belief gave Throckmorton another sound reason for
supporting the Houston camp.32  As a result of his support
of Senator Houston, Throckmorton toured his North Texas
district in support of the aging Texas hero.33  
With the 1859 gubernatorial race hinging on Runnels
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inability to provide adequate frontier protection and his
ultra-southern stance, Houston won the election by a vote
of 36,227 to 27,500.34  Edward Clark became lieutenant
governor with 31,458 to Francis Lubbock’s 30,325.35  The
conservative Unionists seemingly had won a victory.  On
August 17, Throckmorton reported in a letter to John H.
Reagan that “the battle is fought and won.  The enemy are
routed horse, foot, and dragoons.  The slave trade faction
must go under.”36  The defeat of those politicians
supporting the radical position of reopening the slave
trade was important to Throckmorton and his constituents
for two reasons:  First, if the advocates of renewing the
slave trade had been successful, Texas would have been
inundated with new slaves.  As a result, the planter class
could have solidified their control of the state, including
the North Texas frontier.  This was a proposition that
nonslaveholding Texans could not accept.  Second, the
people living in the northern frontier counties envisioned
their part of the state as being a haven for white
settlers.  As a result, their political views were often
tainted by their racist views.  For example, they worked
diligently to remove the Native Americans from their
society, and they opposed African American migration to the
frontier.  It mattered little whether the Native Americans
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were willing to assimilate into white society or whether
African Americans were slaves or free:  Non-white groups
were unwelcome in their communities.
According to Senator Throckmorton, the conservative
Unionists’ victory was not a rebuke of the Democratic
party, but rather was the righting of wrongs which had been
committed at the Houston convention earlier that year. 
Throckmorton believed that delegates at the Houston
convention had nominated unfit men for office and made an
effort to lug in new issues, pledging Texas Democrats to
them.37  Additionally, Throckmorton began to lay the ground
work for a new Union party with Reagan at its head.  In
trying to win Reagan to his side, Throckmorton argued that
the Runnels faction blamed him [Reagan] for their defeat. 
He also suggested that the leaders of the Democratic party
had supported his senatorial bid out of fear not because of
their friendship.  The North Texas senator also pointed out
that Reagan was in political danger and that he should head
the new political party to ensure his own political future. 
“If such a plan of Union is not pursued and carried out
energetically, every living Union man may see the state
ruled by the secessionist and slave trade men.  Whenever
they have the strength they will make the attack on you.”38
Even with Sam Houston’s victory at the polls, the
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Texas Unionists lacked the organization of an effective
political faction.  Throckmorton realized this and set out
to organize  Texas Unionists, thus giving meaning to the
1859 gubernatorial election.  On August 18, 1859,
Throckmorton wrote Benjamin H. Epperson a letter in which
he laid out his plan of organization.39  Senator
Throckmorton asked the rhetorical question, “How can old
line Whigs and conservative men best subserve their own
interests?”  Then the senator proceeded to answer his own
query, “Why, I say by taking that material that approaches
nearest our own notions of what is right.  But I wish to do
more.  I am for taking Reagan, and with him for a leader,
build up a Conservative Union Party in Texas.  This can be
done by showing him his true position–and the estimation in
which he is held by the Runnels faction.  They curse him in
their heart of hearts.  Necessarily he must fall with us.” 
Throckmorton continued, “But we must manage so as to
stretch out the arms of Pease, Johnson, Smythe, and
Maverick and such like to catch him when he falls, and we
poor devils who have always been for the Union and the
Constitution without any other mixtures must stand somewhat
in the background to sustain these gentlemen.”40
Despite Throckmorton’s passion, Reagan questioned the
decision to create a new Union party and suggested that the
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Democratic party should be reformed from within.  On
September 9, 1859, the North Texan senator wrote to Reagan
again: He stated that “I have canvassed in my mind . . .
and cannot say but [that] the suggestion you make [is]
correct.”  Throckmorton clarified his position by stating
that “in [his] judgement much depends upon the course that
will be adopted by those who have heretofore and who still
assume to speak for the Democratic party.”  He continued by
stating that he could only support Reagan’s position “if
those gentlemen who have advocated the slave trade
doctrine, and who . . . have attempted to foster it upon
the party as a part of its creed will back down entirely
from that position, and leave the filibustering question to
take care of itself, if they will in the next Democratic
convention express the will of the people of Texas in
opposition to the slave trade—and if they will cease their
proscription of Union conservative Democrats . . . then it
may be best that there should be no effort to organize the
Democratic party anew.”41
In the same letter, Throckmorton reminded Reagan of
the difficulty which confronted Union men within the
Democratic party.  The senator stated “if the proper spirit
is pursued by these men [secessionist Democrats], it would
be well to heal the differences that have arisen during the
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late canvass, which have been brewing since the Democratic
convention of ‘56 . . . but I wish to impress upon you that
your position is a delicate one and not entirely free from
danger, and it depends upon the course which you pursue
whether or not you can sustain your position.”  Continuing,
Throckmorton stated “I merely allude to these things to
show you that from the African slave trade men,
filibusters, secessionists, etc., and the friends of
Governor Runnels you have nothing to expect.”  Then the
North Texan voiced his strongest warning to his Democratic
colleague, “a temporizing course with them on your part
will injure you with the strong conservative element, and
will not do you any good with these men because they have
determined to hunt you down.”  As a solution, Throckmorton
stated that “my advice is to remain firm, and instead of
receiving advice from them, dictate to them yourself.  Show
them that you do not regard their threats or
machinations.”42  Despite the senator’s plea for Reagan to
lead a Unionist party, Reagan refused Throckmorton’s
overture to make a break from the Democratic ranks.
With his efforts to found a new Unionist party in
Texas dead, Throckmorton followed Reagan’s advice and
attempted to reform the Democratic party from within.  He
began by suggesting changes to the Democratic platform, he
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declared “that Congress should have the power to protect
slave property in the territories; that the slave trade
should not be reopened; that the states should have the
right of local self-government; that filibustering should
not be tolerated; and that Federal aid to the construction
of the Pacific Railroad should be encouraged.” 
Throckmorton believed these to be the basis of a “good,
strong, old-fashion Democratic platform.”43  Furthermore, he
believed that an independent organization at the next
Democratic convention should attempt to force his party to
adopt a conservative platform.  Such was the state of the
Texas Democratic party at the time of the 1860 presidential
election.44 
At the same time they were attempting to reorganize
the Democratic party, conservative Unionists were dealt a
series of setbacks between December 1859 and the summer of
1860.  During this brief period two critical events
occurred which fueled the flames of secession in Texas: 
John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, and an
insurrection-arson panic which swept through East Texas. 
Both incidents caused fear in the hearts of Texas citizens
and gave credibility to secessionist propaganda which
claimed that abolitionists were making plans to kill white
southerners and free the South’s slave population.45  
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The first of these two incidents occurred in December
1859, when the noted abolitionist, John Brown, attempted to
seize the Federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry and to free and
arm the nearby slave population.  According to his plan,
Brown contrived to march his newly formed army of freed
slaves southward, freeing all the slaves that he came
across and killing white southerners who stood in his way. 
In this manner, the army of freed slaves would grow as it
marched across the South:  The result would be a revolution
where the slaves essentially win their own freedom. 
Unfortunately for Brown and his fellow conspirators, his
invasion never materialized:  The United States army
captured Brown after a brief skirmish at Harper’s Ferry,
and later the state of Virginia tried Brown for treason and
murder. He met the hangman on December 2, 1859.  
As a martyr, John Brown proved more effective. 
Northern abolitionists strengthened their resolve against
the South’s peculiar institution which in turn promoted
greater fears of future attacks throughout the slaveholding
states.  Texans were not immune from such fears, and the
citizens of the Lone Star State often blamed any accident
or deviant behavior in the state on abolitionist plots
designed to kill white southerners and free slaves:  Logic
and reason were lacking during the period following Brown’s
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raid, a point made clear during the summer of 1860.46
On July 8, in Dallas, Denton, and Pilot Point, several
unexplained fires broke out, burning buildings in each of
the North Texas towns.  Immediately, Texans in the northern
and eastern regions of the state blamed the fires on covert
abolitionist activities.  Panic swept through the Lone Star
State as reports of similar incidents, some real and some
false, began to circulate among the state’s citizenry.47 
During an unseasonably hot summer, local men in every
corner of the state armed themselves and patrolled the
immediate areas surrounding their communities.  During the
frenzy, whites beat and killed blacks as well as whites
suspected of inciting slave insurrections.48  However, as
the summer came to a close, the panic subsided almost as
quickly as it had begun.  Closer investigations of the
fires revealed that many of the reported burnings in East
Texas were exaggerated or even false and that new unstable
phosphorus matches were probably the cause of the few fires
which actually had occurred:  Apparently the matches had
spontaneously ignited on the shelves of mercantile stores
as a result of the intense heat of the Texas summer.49 
Despite this scientific explanation of the fires, many
Texans remained unconvinced and continued to place blame on
a coordinated abolitionist plot to incite slave
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rebellions.50  Before Texans had time to erase the fires
from their minds, the outcome of the presidential election
of 1860 seemed to suggest that more trouble was on the
horizon for southern states.  
The presidential election of 1860 perhaps more than
any other national event influenced the direction that
Texas politics would take immediately prior to the Civil
War.  Abraham Lincoln’s victory in the election without
carrying a single southern state greatly strengthened the
secessionist position in Texas.  Because Throckmorton and
his supporters failed to organize conservative Unionists,
the secessionists easily seized control of the Democratic
party in Texas and enjoyed the advantage of the strongest
political institution in the state.  Events outside of the
state soon let them translate that advantage into a popular
political movement that swept the state from the Union. 
Additionally, Lincoln’s sectional triumph led many Texans
to believe that his electoral victory represented the first
step in making white southerners the slaves of Northern
politicians.  The only way to escape the conditions of
“sectional slavery” was to secede from the Union.51
Lincoln’s elevation to the presidency moved the
secessionists in South Carolina toward action.  In less
than a week after the election, the South Carolina
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legislature called for a convention to be held on December
17 to determine if the state should remain in the Union, or
secede.  At the same time, many Texans planned their own
secession convention.  On December 3, 1860, a group of
Texas secession leaders asked Governor Houston to call a
special session of the legislature to consider the
possibility of seceding from the Union, but Houston
refused.  Shortly following the rejection of their
proposal, the secessionists drafted and issued an address
to the people of Texas urging them to send delegates to a
popularly called secession convention.52  They suggested
that each representative district should hold local
meetings on January 8 and elect delegates to the conclave
which was slated to meet in Austin on January 28, 1861. 
Houston now realized that the secessionists were determined
to meet, either in the legislature or outside of it.  Thus,
the governor called for a special session of the
legislature to convene on January 21, just one week prior
to the secessionists’ called convention.  Three days after
Houston called for the special session of the legislature,
South Carolina seceded from the Union.53
Speaking at various public meetings, Throckmorton
espoused his opposition to secession.  At a meeting in
Plano on December 13, the Collin County politician had the
        156
opportunity to argue against leaving the Union.  Reverend
T. J. Malone, who presided over the meeting, called for the
formation of a committee to draw up resolutions expressing
the county’s support for secession.  Once completed, the
members planned to forward their resolutions to the state
legislature.  Though many of the attendees favored
secession, the leadership still invited Throckmorton to
express his support of the Union.  In his address, the
North Texas politician offered an alternative to secession. 
He suggested that the southern states should hold a general
convention for the purpose of formulating a cooperative
plan of action that would force the Federal government to
address the South’s concern under the Constitution.  In
this way, the southern states could avoid the radical step
of secession and the inevitable widespread carnage that
Unionists predicted would follow.  The attendees at the
Plano meeting voted on whether or not to include
Throckmorton’s proposal in their resolutions and flatly
rejected the idea.  By this time the resolution committee
had completed its task.  Their memorial was predictable: 
Texas must secede.  Representing a lone voice of reason at
the Plano meeting, Throckmorton cast the only vote against
joining the southern confederacy.54   
Though the secessionists carried the day at Plano,
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Collin County did not immediately elect delegates for the
state secession convention; rather the county became
divided between two groups: George W. Barnett became the
leader of the secessionists in the county, while
Throckmorton headed the anti-secessionists, or Conservative
party.  Brutal disputes between the two sides were
inevitable.  As the editor of the Dallas Herald stated,
“Barnett is a candidate on the secession ticket.  Good luck
to him and let him put the question fairly to the
people–will they go with the North or with the South?  The
Union question has been abandoned, since there is now no
Union to save.”55  In the days following the Plano meeting,
Barnett falsely charged that Throckmorton was a traitor to
the South and that the senator was a submissionist.  Collin
County’s vote against secession in the 1861 statewide
referendum on the issue proved that Throckmorton was more
in touch with his constituents than Barnett.  Furthermore,
the senator was no submissionist.  He never questioned the
South’s grievances against the Federal government, but he
simply did not believe that secession was the answer to the
problems confronting the southern states.56 
Throckmorton was also accused of plotting to divide
Texas.  The Southern Intelligencer on January 30, 1861,
alleged that the senator was at the forefront of a plan to
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make a small state out of the tier of Red River counties,
including Denton and Collin.  Once the new state was
created, the editor claimed that Throckmorton would seek to
have it admitted to the Union if Texas voted for
secession.57  While this rumor would have been consistent
with Throckmorton’s political beliefs, no evidence was
forthcoming to indicate that he actually proposed such a
plan.  Therefore, it is likely that Throckmorton’s
detractors made up this charge as propaganda to discredit
him with his constituents.  Despite the secessionists
efforts to ruin him, Collin County voters elected their
state senator to represent them at the Secession
Convention.58
Throckmorton was unaware that the voters had elected
him to represent them in the forthcoming convention,
because he had left the county before the local election
had taken place in order to attend the special session of
the legislature that Governor Houston had called forth on
December 17, 1860.  As Throckmorton made his way to the
capital, he plotted various ways to head off the
secessionists whom he thought were leading the state toward
ultimate destruction.  In Austin, the North Texas senator
attempted to stem the tide of secession by introducing a
bill calling for the election of delegates to a general
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convention of the people of Texas.  The bill was read
twice, and then it was buried in the Committee on State
Affairs, effectively stopping Throckmorton in his tracks.59 
Though opposed to secession, Throckmorton was just as
much opposed to coercion.60  He believed that the Federal
government had no right to force its will upon the people
of any state and that such actions justified the right of
secession.  Therefore, the senator believed in the right of
secession, but not in the wisdom of it at this juncture. 
This position was evident in his support of the Shepard
resolution of January 26, 1861.  This resolution declared
coercion subverted the Constitution and would be fatal to
the existence of the Union.  It also stated that Texas
would join any state in resistance to such unconstitutional
action by the Federal government.61  
Two days later, delegates to the Secession Convention
began to arrive in Austin and members in the Texas House of
Representatives voted fifty-six to twenty-four to pass a
resolution justifying the popularly called Secession
Convention.  The resolution was then sent to the state
Senate, where Throckmorton, Isaiah Paschal, Emory Rains,
Martin Hart, and Eggleston Townes tried to defeat it by
forcing a substitute resolution written by Abram Gentry
which called for a general convention of southern states. 
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George Quinan, a secessionist, moved to table the
substitution, and Throckmorton countered with a call for an
immediate vote on the substitution.  However, Quinan’s
motion was sustained.  The substitution was tabled with a
vote of twenty to ten.  At that point, Senator Townes
proposed several amendments to the pending resolution:
mainly that the action of the convention should be voted on
in a referendum; that the people should send delegates to a
general convention for the purpose of amending the state
constitution to conform to the relations of the state to
the Union; and that in case a new convention was not called
forth and the popular convention whose members were elected
on January 8 proceeded to convene, there should be an
election of new delegates in those districts where the
current attendees were elected by less than a majority of
the registered voters so that the minority’s interests
would be represented in the convention as well. 
Unfortunately for the Unionist faction, the senators also
tabled the Townes resolutions by a vote of twenty to ten. 
The senate then read the original house resolution and
passed it by a vote of twenty-five to five.  The anti-
secessionist senators failed to stall the secession
movement.62 
According to plan, the Secession Convention met in
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Austin on January 28 with 177 delegates in attendance.  At
the close of the first day the organization of the
convention was complete, and Oran M. Roberts, a Texas fire-
eater, was elected to preside over the meeting.  Delegates
quickly drafted an ordinance which called on the state to
sever its ties to the Union.  The Ordinance of Secession
was put before the convention on January 30, and debate
over the issue revealed that the delegates were divided as
to whether the ordinance should take effect after a vote in
the convention or whether the issue of secession should be
decided in a statewide referendum.  During the evening of
the following day, the delegates agreed that the issue
should be put before the people.  They also decided that
the convention would vote on the issue at noon on February
1.63
The delegates’ decision to vote on secession was
highly publicized, and a crowd gathered outside the hall of
the House of Representative to hear the results.  Inside,
state officials joined the delegates of the convention in
front of a full gallery of onlookers.  Governor Houston,
the lieutenant governor, and the justices of the state
Supreme Court were seated at the front of the hall with the
presiding officers of the convention.  The delegates were
called to order and instructed to cast a simple ballot of
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“aye” or “nay.”  Additionally, Roberts specified that the
delegates were not allowed to explaining their vote. 
Despite the presiding officer’s directions, several members
felt compelled to speak their mind.64  
The first to explain his vote was T. J. Chambers who
justified his support for secession.  Later, Thomas Hughes
of Williamson County, W. H. Johnson of Lamar, Joshua
Johnson of Titus, and A. P. Shuford of Wood caused a stir
among the delegates when they voted against leaving the
Union.  None of these gentlemen explained their vote.  This
group of Unionists shared some common characteristics: 
They represented North and East Texas counties, except for
Hughes who was from Williamson County; they, or their
fathers, had ties with Upper South states, migrating from
Tennessee or Kentucky; and finally, they were all members
of the Texas bar.  The next eight votes for secession
quieted the crowd again, but then Throckmorton’s name was
called.65  The senator rose from his chair and stated, “In
view of the responsibility, in the presence of God and my
country, and unawed by the wild spirit of revolution around
me, I vote no.”66  It was reported that an individual
perched in the gallery hissed at the senator as he took his
seat.  This prompted him to jump to his feet again and
deliver with dramatic flare, “Mr. President, the rabble may
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hiss when patriots tremble.”67  Out of respect for
Throckmorton, others in the gallery hushed the heckler. 
The senator’s negative vote was no surprise to the other
delegates in the convention because he had already
announced that while he believed the South had not been
treated fairly, secession was not the way for the South to
solve its grievances.  Furthermore, Throckmorton had made
clear that he would accept the results of the forthcoming
referendum.  If a majority of the people of Texas supported
the ordinance, Throckmorton vowed to take up arms in
defense of his state.  Before the convention was finished
voting, two more votes were cast against secession by L. H.
Williams and George W. Wright, both of whom were from Lamar
County.  The final tally was 166 to eight in favor of
secession.68 
With the convention voting for secession, all that was
left to do was to draft a declaration of causes which
impelled Texas to secede.  On February 2, a special
committee penned the following reasons for secession: “the
controlling majority of the Federal Government, under
various pretenses and disguises, has so administered the
same as to exclude the citizens of the Southern States
[from the western territories] for the avowed purpose of
acquiring sufficient power in the common government to use
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it as a means of destroying” the institution of slavery;
also “by the disloyalty of the Northern States and their
citizens and the imbecility of the Federal Government,
infamous combinations of incendiaries and outlaws have been
permitted in those States and the common territory of
Kansas to trample upon the federal laws [and] to war upon
the lives and property of Southern citizens in that
territory.”69  In addition, the committee stated that the
Federal government had failed to protect the Texas frontier
from Indian attacks and border raiders who came into the
state from Mexico; a number of northern states had violated
the fugitive slave law; and a sectional party of the North
had been sowing seeds of discord.  The committee’s
declaration also stated that northern politicians had
“placed the slave-holding States in a hopeless minority in
the Federal Congress, and rendered representation of no
avail in protecting Southern rights against their exactions
and encroachments,” and had “elected as president and vice-
president of the whole confederacy two men whose chief
claims to such high positions [were] their approval of
these long continued wrongs.”  Finally, the committee
members argued that “the secession of six of the slave-
holding States . . . [left] Texas [with] no alternative but
to remain in an isolated connection with the North, or
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unite her destinies with the South.”70  After approving the
committee’s resolutions, the members of the secession
convention voted to adjourn on February 4, planning to
reconvene on March 2 after the referendum.71
At this point the Unionists believed that they had one
more chance to prevent their state from leaving the Union. 
They planned to conduct a campaign against the secession
convention’s proposal which was scheduled for a referendum
vote on February 23.72  Before leaving for their home
districts, Throckmorton, three fellow senators, fourteen
representatives, and six other members of the convention
drew up an address to the people of Texas in which they put
forth their arguments against secession.73 
The Unionists acknowledged that the North seemed
hostile toward the South’s institution of slavery,
especially considering that many northern states passed
personal liberty laws to prevent the enforcement of the
fugitive slave law.  The Unionists also accepted that
Lincoln’s victory made further provisions for the
protection of slavery necessary.  However, the Unionists
reasoned that the grievances did not merit secession,
indicating that state governments in the South had not
exhausted all their options to prompt change within the
Union before moving to dissolve ties with the North.74
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Additionally, the Unionists argued that secessionists
had deceived the citizens of Texas.  They stated that those
who favored a break with the Union believed secession was
the only way to protect the rights and prosperity of the
southern people.  According to the Unionists, a break from
the Union would only serve to end slavery even faster than
the abolitionists could hope for.  The authors of the
Unionists’ address also predicted a grim future for “a
confederacy [formed from] cotton states alone.”  They
stated that “it is already apparent that in such a
confederacy slavery will be recognized as the principal
interest to be fostered by the government,” and therefore
“the legislation of such a Government would almost
necessarily proceed upon an invidious distinction between
those who owned slaves, and those who did not.” 
Continuing, the authors stated that “this would tend to
make the confederacy a confederacy of slaveholders.”  After
alluding to the fact that the newly formed Confederacy
would in all likelihood be a military state, the authors
posed the question:  “How long, in such a confederacy,
would liberty and free institutions survive the formation
of a powerful military force?”75  The authors of the anti-
secession tract ended with a proposed plan of action: 
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We would have you remain true to every
constitutional obligation although your northern
brethren, in some respects, proved recreant to
theirs.  We would have you put forth your best
efforts in aid of such of the slave holding states
as may make the attempt to reconstruct the Union. 
In the meantime, through the agency of your state
government or what may perhaps be better through a
convention called for that purpose, and clothed
with full powers, we would make preparation for
the worst that can come.  And having done that, if
you cannot by the help of others, restore the
Union, with every abuse corrected and all your
rights fully secured, then change your form of
government as you may think best.76
On February 9, three days after the publication of the
Unionists’ tract, Throckmorton and several other Unionists
gave public addresses at Buass Hall in Austin.  According
to a report in the Austin Southern Intelligencer, the
speeches “were able and eloquent . . . denunciations of the
[Secession] Convention for its usurpation of powers–its
establishment of a Committee of espionage, styled
Safety–its secret sessions, its midnight plottings, its
attempting to establish in our midst and to carry out the
Reign of Terror, inaugurated in parts of Texas by Vigilance
Committees.”77  Afterward, Throckmorton went to McKinney
where he tirelessly campaigned against secession.78  His
efforts seemed to bear fruit, Collin County rejected
secession by a vote of 710 to 215.  However, despite the
senator’s success at home, the Unionists were defeated
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statewide.  Texans voted to leave the Union by a vote of
44,317 to 13,020.79  The citizens of the state had sealed
their fate. 
After the voters elected to secede from the Union,
Throckmorton traveled back to Austin to attend the
secession convention as it reconvened.  Arriving after the
conclave had already convened, the senator found that
delegates were in the middle of a vote.  When the roll was
completed, Mr. Locke, a member of the convention from
Upshur County, proposed that every member of the convention
should cast a vote unless properly excused from doing so. 
Throckmorton inquired about the issue at hand and was
informed that a vote was being taken on the adoption of the
provisional constitution of the Confederate States. 
Throckmorton addressed the president of the convention:
Mr. President, only a moment since I returned from
my home where I had been to persuade the people of
my district to vote against the ordinance of
secession. I have the satisfaction to know that my
constituency agree with me on that grave and
momentous question.  When I entered the chamber
the vote was being taken upon a question unknown
to me.  When my name was called I did not vote. 
But since the gentleman from Upshur has called the
attention of the chair, I have inquired and
ascertained that the vote is upon the adoption of
the provisional constitution of the confederate
states.  Not knowing its provisions if required to
vote I shall vote against it.  But Mr. President,
while I am up if the convention will indulge me I
beg to say a word.  Sir, I had thought that I had
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satisfied every member of this body that I was not
afraid to vote or express my opinion on any
subject . . . my position has been well
understood.  But sir, I desire to go a little
further, and announce a determination known to my
friends, but perhaps not generally known to
members of this body. I believe we are on the
verge of a long and bloody war, the consequences
of which none can foresee.  While my judgement
dictates to me that we are not justified by the
surroundings or occasion, a majority of the people
of Texas have declared in favor of secession; the
die is cast; the step has been taken, and
regardless of consequences I expect and intend to
share the fortunes of my friends and neighbors.  I
wish to say especially for the benefit of those
who doubt my devotion to my country that I have no
doubt that the time will soon be upon us when the
clash of arms will be heard and the blood of my
countrymen will be shed in a great civil war. 
When it comes I will be in its midst, and I doubt
not will be there long before the gentleman from
Upshur.80 
Following Throckmorton comments, Ochiltree made a motion
and it was seconded that excused Throckmorton from the
vote.  
While the convention was still in session,
Throckmorton’s loyalty to the Confederacy was put to the
test.  Houston had attempted to have General David E.
Twiggs, who was in command of the Union troops at San
Antonio, surrender his arms directly to the state
government rather than to the convention’s Committee on
Public Safety.  This fact adds credibility to a story that
A. W. Terrell told in later years.  According to Terrell,
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President Lincoln sent a dispatch to Sam Houston by way of
George Giddings informing the Texas governor that the
federal government would send 50,000 soldiers to Texas to
keep the state in the Union.  After Houston received the
letter, he called a select group of Union sympathizers to
his home.  Among those present at this meeting were
Throckmorton, Benjamin Epperson, and David Culberson. 
Houston apparently read Lincoln’s letter to the men and
asked for their counsel.  To a man, Houston’s guests
cautioned against accepting Lincoln’s offer.  They
suggested that if the governor accepted the offer, a
violent civil war would erupt in their state.  Houston
heeded their advice and cast Lincoln’s letter into the
fireplace.  On April 1, the Secession Convention adjourned,
and the state government assumed its position of power that
it had held prior to being supplanted by the convention.81  
Unionism in Texas had been solidly defeated, and now
Unionists were left with difficult choices:  They could
continue to support the Union and run the risk of being
persecuted by Confederate authorities; they could remain
neutral in the approaching conflict; or they could bow to
the will of the Texas voters and join the Confederate
cause.  Following the logic and reason of Sam Houston,
Throckmorton chose the latter.  Even though Houston was
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removed from governor’s office because he refused to take
an oath of loyalty to the Confederacy, he respected the
will of the majority of Texas voters in the referendum on
secession.82  On October 18, 1861, Houston clearly stated
his position on Texas joining the Confederacy in The
McKinney Messenger:  He claimed to support the decision
made by the majority of voters to join the Confederacy even
if he did not personally feel that it was the best course
of action.  He stated, “Had I been disposed to involve
Texas in [a] civil war I had it in my power, for I was
tendered the aid of seventy thousand men and means to
sustain myself in Texas by adhering to the Union; but I
rejected, and . . . I gave my advice to the Federal
Government.”83  Houston suggested that Lincoln should 
“evacuate Fort Pickens and Sumter [and] recall all the
Federal troops from Texas.”84
  Houston also believed that the Lincoln administration
was operating outside of the executive branch’s
Constitutional authority.  He stated, “Mr. Lincoln and his
cabinet have usurped the powers of Congress and have waged
war against the Sovereign States, and have thereby not only
absolved the States, but all the people of the several
States from their allegiance to his government, the Federal
Government having ceased to exist by his act of
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usurpation.”85  Defining the coercive actions of the
president, Houston stated “[Lincoln] proclaimed martial law
in Missouri and assumed the civil administration of the
affairs of that State, thereby ignoring the constitution
and setting at nought the sovereignty of the people, and he
has in fact, with more than Vandalic malignity and Gothic
hate sought to incite a servile insurrection in that
State.”86
Several years after the Civil War ended, Throckmorton
echoed the same conclusions reached by Houston earlier.  In
front of a crowd at the International Fair Association at
San Antonio, Throckmorton reflected on the causes of the
Civil War.  He stated, ”My friends, on a recent occasion I
heard it announced by one of the most eloquent men of Texas
that slavery was the cause of the Civil War. 
Unquestionably it was one of the leading causes, and
undoubtedly it was the great lever used, both North and
South, that precipitated it, but there were other causes,
some apparent, and others latent, that gradually led up to,
and together with the institution of slavery, brought about
the unhappy contest.”87
Throckmorton traced the causes of the war to the
formation of the Federal government at the Constitutional
Convention (1787) in Philadelphia.  He stated that “there
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were two sets of statesmen who differed radically as to how
the Constitution should be construed, and the policy upon
which the government should be conducted.”  Throckmorton
revealed that “one party, in which there were many eminent
men who had rendered the country great service, believed
the Constitution should be construed liberally, that the
powers of government should operate directly upon the
citizens and [their] affairs, and that it should become
practically a parental government.”  In contrast,
Throckmorton stated that “the other party, in which there
were equally as eminent and patriotic men, believed that
the constitution should be construed strictly, and that no
power should be exercised unless it was clearly defined, or
made plain by the implication from the letter and spirit of
that sacred instrument.”88
Throckmorton commented that the two factions engaged
in bitter disputes concerning the “questions of free speech
and liberty of the press; how taxes, internal and external,
might be levied; whether industries of certain kinds should
be protected and encouraged; and for what purposes
appropriations from the common treasury should be made.” 
These questions, according to the North Texan, were the
foundation of the “causes that led up to sectional strife
that brought about the Civil War.”  Throckmorton reminded
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his audience that “nullification first reared its front in
New England, and afterwards took root in South Carolina.” 
During this time, the North Texas politician contended that
“there was a strong conservative element in the country
that did not go to the extremes of either of the great
parties that strove for the mastery; the representatives of
that element contended for moderation and forbearance, and
on different occasions exercised a salutary influence for
peace and fraternity.”89
Throckmorton also believed that “in a number of the
Northern States, and, as our people believed, in violation
of the Constitution and laws passed in pursuance of it, the
fugitive slave laws were enacted.”  Echoing Sam Houston’s
argument against coercion, Throckmorton claimed that the
fugitive slave laws as well as the question of the status
of slavery in the territories “culminated in the election
of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency, but not by a majority of
the votes of the American people.”  Like many people in the
South, he concluded that Lincoln’s “election was regarded
by many as a sectional triumph and as a menace to the
institution of slavery.”90
Throckmorton then commented on the secessionists and
their motives.  He felt that the secessionists “urged the
untoward condition of affairs to influence the public mind,
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and [brought] about a dissolution of the Union, not the
overthrow and destruction of the government, but the
erection of a new government out of States that had
belonged to the old.”  Offering further justification of
the Secessionist cause, the North Texan continued by
declaring that “We, of the South, were willing that our
Northern brothers should retain the old government, enjoy
their convictions of right and duty, and manage their own
affairs.  We claimed the same privilege, and asked, to be
let alone with our institutions, that had grown up with us,
and were as old as the colonies, from which all the States
had sprung.”91
Throckmorton also revealed that “there was a strong
element of conservatism in both sections [North and South],
led by great and good men, who tried to allay the storm.” 
Throckmorton then spoke of the virtues of the political
conservatives: “This class of men in the South did not
believe the election of Mr. Lincoln sufficient cause for a
dissolution of the States, or that the institution of
slavery in the States was seriously threatened.”  The North
Texan observed that the conservative perspective was shared
by “many in the North, and while those who entertained such
views appreciated the serious gravity of the situation” and
like conservatives in the South, “they believed an
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honorable adjustment of differences could be made, and that
no peaceful remedy should be left untried to attain an end
so priceless.”92  
Commenting on southern conservatives, Throckmorton
claimed that they acknowledged “the constitution and laws
had been infracted, yet we did not believe secession the
remedy, or that we could maintain our cause by a resort to
arms.”  Like Houston before him, he stated that the
conservatives “further believed the constitution conferred
no power upon the federal government to coerce a State by
an invasion with its armies, nor did we believe the
constitution would have been ratified by the requisite
number of States had such power been expressed in it.”
Throckmorton concluded that “when the efforts of the peace
party failed and the storm of passion and sectional hatred
. . . swept over the country, and civil war . . . became a
certainty, there was but one course, in the judgment of a
very great majority of the South to be pursued–and that was
to fight it out to the bitter end.”93
Earlier, Throckmorton had proved a loyal advocate of
the Union aligned against the forces which were pushing the
state toward secession.  Between 1857 and 1861, the North
Texas senator’s Unionism was shaped by traditional Whig
political ideology which he had acquired early in his life,
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a desire to promote economic prosperity in the North Texas
region through railroad development, and a devotion to
protecting small farmers from the political, social, and
economic domination of the planter class, and a desire to
preserve white supremacy on the frontier of North Texas by
removing Native Americans and preventing the migration of
African American slaves into the northern region of the
state.  Furthermore, the senator was concerned with what he
perceived as the coercive nature of the Federal government. 
In this regard, Throckmorton was closely aligned to his
constituency.  A large segment of the population in the
North Texas region had migrated from the Upper South states
of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia.  Just like the Upper
South states, the North Texas region did not have a strong
commitment to slavery, and therefore its people were more
reluctant to embrace the rhetoric of southern fire-eaters. 
Despite the results of the referendum vote, Texas Unionists
still hoped to work out a compromise between the northern
and southern states.  However, all of their plans for a
quick reconstruction of the Union came to an end when news
reached Texas of the hostilities at Fort Sumter and
President Lincoln’s proclamation calling for 75,000 state
militia volunteers to crush the southern rebellion.  Many
Unionists perceived Lincoln’s move as an act of coercion
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and as a result abandoned their efforts to preserve the
Union.  It was at this point that Throckmorton made the
fateful decision to join the Confederacy.94
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CHAPTER V
THE CIVIL WAR: PRESERVING WHITENESS
ON THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER, 1861-1865
Senator Throckmorton along with other North Texas
Unionists worked diligently to keep Texas in the Union and
thereby prevent the planter class from invading the
southern frontier, but their efforts ultimately failed.  As
a result, slaveholding planters were now in control of both
the Confederacy and Texas.  The people living on the
frontier had to come to terms with the fact that their
worst fears had become a reality.  They were living in a
slave society where planters dominated the social,
economic, and political institutions, a condition that the
settlers found difficult to reconcile.  Thus, Throckmorton
and his constituents were confronted with several difficult
choices:  They could either flee the state northward and
live under the protection of the Federal government; they
could remain in Texas and continue to oppose the
Confederacy; or they could accept and defend their state’s
decision to leave the Union.  Throckmorton chose to remain
in his home state and to pledge loyalty to the Confederate
government.  There can be little doubt that the senator’s
decision to take an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy
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was based on political expediency and a desire to defend
the frontier culture and society in the northwestern part
of the state.1  Writing to his friend Benjamin H. Epperson
on January 19, 1862, Throckmorton explained his decision. 
The North Texan stated that “reason had become dethroned in
the North and was not very stable in the South–success with
the Bl’k Republicans would make us hewers of wood and
drawers of water–and whilst I had as ardent an attachment
for the old Gov’t as any man living . . . I would not
consent to reunite with the north.”  Throckmorton
continued, saying that “the struggle is over with me–we had
better be separate–our interests, pursuits & habits are too
diversified ever to be made to harmonize.”2
After the secession convention and the state
legislature adjourned, Throckmorton returned to his home
district and resumed his law practice.  He must have been
rather distraught in his decision to support a government
which he believed had been founded upon on the false
pretenses of the fire-eaters, especially considering that
the frontier society which the pioneers of North Texas
established was designed to be an escape from the control
of the planter class in the Upper and Lower South.3 
Nevertheless, the senator believed that safety of the
northern frontier hinged upon on remaining loyal to the
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Confederacy. 
As a settler in a region that was accustomed to Indian
raids, Throckmorton was undoubtedly concerned about
protecting the frontier.  He knew that the Federal troops
which were stationed at fortifications in western Texas
would soon withdraw from their post leaving the region in
danger of future Indian depredations.  Therefore, the
senator supported the Confederate government’s attempt to
occupy the abandoned frontier posts.  Throckmorton, 
however, did not become a diehard proponent of the
Confederacy until April 1861 when national events provided
him with what he considered more dire reasons for siding
with the newly formed southern government.
While President Lincoln declared secession illegal, he
took a temporizing position regarding the South’s break
from the Union.  The president said that he would not
attempt to reclaim Federal property which Confederate
authorities seized in the states of the Lower South. 
However, two military institutions in the South remained
under Federal control, Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor,
South Carolina, and Fort Pickens at Pensacola, Florida. 
After weeks of indecision and pressure from his own party
to ignore the Confederacy’s demands that the forts be
surrendered, Lincoln sent a naval expedition to resupply
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Fort Sumter with provisions:  The primary cargo being food. 
Unwilling to allow the fortification to remain in Union
hands, the Confederates bombarded Fort Sumter on April 12
before the Union navy vessels arrived.  Following more than
thirty hours of continual bombardment, the commander of the
fort, Major Robert Anderson, surrendered to his attackers.4
The attack on Fort Sumter immediately caused an outcry
of patriotic indignation in the northern states, and
President Lincoln was forced to take more forceful measures
in dealing with the southern rebels.  Lincoln issued a call
for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion. 
Southerners considered the president’s call for troops an
open act of aggression.  Throckmorton later commented that
“I had hoped that the evil hour was not upon us–and that
our whole country as it was could be preserved, but when
the alarm was sounded at Fort Sumter I gave up that hope.”5 
While ignoring their own treasonous behavior, this group of
Southerners claimed that Lincoln had abandoned the
principles of democracy by refusing to allow Dixie to leave
the Union when a majority of the citizens in the southern
states clearly wished to do so.  At this point, many of
these self-proclaimed, constitutionally-minded
Confederates, including Throckmorton, professed that the
Union was attempting to coerce the southern states back
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into the Union.6  Despite the evident flaws in the
Confederates’ argument against coercion, the South’s
perception of the Federal government’s actions caused
Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee to follow
the Lower South in secession.7  
After the fall of Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s call for
volunteers, Throckmorton attended a convention in Collin
County which local secessionists organized.  The convention
opened at the courthouse in McKinney on April 27, 1861. 
Fearing that Unionists in the county might engage in
espionage, Confederate supporters refused to let them
attend the meeting.  In protest, David C. Dickson, the
former American party candidate in the 1855 Texas
gubernatorial election, led a group of Union men to the
Methodist church and held an independent meeting.  Aware
that such a move would invoke the suspicion of the
Confederates, Throckmorton refused to join them and decided
that it would be better to remain at the courthouse, even
though the gathering would not officially recognize him.8  
The intent of the Confederate meeting was to elect
delegates for a forthcoming meeting in Dallas which was
scheduled to discuss matters concerning the Confederacy. 
However, the event turned into a political rally for
politicians seeking to win office in the upcoming state
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elections.  Nevertheless, the attendees endorsed the
Confederate constitution and elected twenty delegates for
the Dallas convention.  Among the delegates was George W.
Barnett, Throckmorton’s earlier adversary during the
secession crisis.9
Even though the members of the convention doubted
Throckmorton’s allegiance to the Confederacy, they gave him
the opportunity to address the delegates of the meeting
once they had officially adjourned.  The North Texas
senator reaffirmed his new found devotion to the
Confederacy, and he suggested that southerners should form
a united front against the coercive nature of the Federal
government.  He called on Texans to wash away the political
dissension present in the state since the beginning of the
move toward secession.  To accomplish greater unity, the
senator stated that future political meetings should be
suspended until the end of the war.  Throckmorton concluded
his address with the proclamation that he would be the
first to sign up for the Confederate cause.  When the
delegates created a list of volunteers for service in the
military, Throckmorton’s name was one of the first
recorded.10  
While embracing southern rhetoric regarding the
coercive nature of the Federal government, Throckmorton had
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other motivations for becoming a crusader for the
Confederacy.  In a letter written after the war, the North
Texas senator stated that a primary factor in his decision
to join the southern cause was a desire to prevent civil
war in his region of the state.  Throckmorton wrote to
Hamilton Bee: 
The war came, I saw that unless I did something to
prevent it, that neighbors and friends of my own
immediate section of the state would be embroiled
with each other in a deadly conflict.  I at once
consulted with [Benjamin] Eppearson and [D.C.]
Dickson and told them this must not be.  The only
way to prevent it was for ourselves to set the
example.  Our friends were calling on us to head
the opposition.  They agreed with me as to the
course and I immediately called for men. . . . 
Our course saved the enactment of the scenes of
Missouri.11
Additionally, Throckmorton realized that the Federal
government would eventually attack the southern economy by
waging a war against the institution of slavery, an action
which would directly threaten Anglo society on the
frontier.12  Whites on the frontier feared that emancipated
slaves would move to areas in the western regions of the
Lone Star State where slavery had not been a dominant part
of the economy, effectively bringing an end to white
dominance on the frontier.  In this regard, racists in
North Texas were not much different than their northern
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counterparts who were concerned that emancipated slaves
would migrate to the northern states, thereby competing
with northern laborers for jobs.  Thus, Throckmorton and
other like-minded individuals in North Texas concluded that
the frontier society which white Anglos had created from
the Texas wilderness might potentially be threatened from
two fronts if the Confederacy lost the war: Native
Americans would try to push the frontier line eastward and
reclaim land which they had lost to white settlers over the
last three decades, and slaves, if freed, would push into
the frontier from East Texas counties where familiar
surroundings reminded them of the horrors of the peculiar
institution.  
Throckmorton was also concerned about the physical
safety of individuals living on the southern frontier.  The
settlers were exposed to two different threats:  First,
Confederates believed that Federal troops stationed in the
Indian Territory would invade the state from the north. 
This belief was based on the fact that the majority of the
citizens in several of the Red River counties had voted
against secession and might aid the Union troops entering
the state from the north.  Second, Indians posed a real
threat to the safety of North Texas settlements.  With
Federal troops withdrawing from forts along the frontier
     195
line in Texas, nothing stood between the Native Americans
in the Indian Territory and the Texans.  Motivated by a
desire to protect the whiteness of the frontier and the
settlers from physical harm, Throckmorton decided to become
actively involved in the military defense of the Red River
counties.13
  The first task of the newly mustered Confederate
forces in states contiguous with the Indian Territory was
to move against the United States troops stationed at Fort
Washita, Fort Arbuckle, and Fort Cobb.14  Because Federal
troops had abandoned these forts before the arrival of
Confederates, the rebel’s objectives were effectively
completed by the end of May 1861.15  In essence, the
engagements between Federal and Confederate forces were
minimal, and Throckmorton’s initial period of service in
the volunteer unit lasted less than a month.  Throughout
the month of May, Throckmorton’s company served in a
frontier regiment under the command of Colonel William C.
Young who was appointed by Governor Edward Clark to defend
the northwest frontier.  The men in the regiment elected
Throckmorton as their lieutenant colonel which was more a
testament to his standing with the citizens of his region
than his military abilities.16  
After Confederate forces occupied the forts,
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Throckmorton returned home and resumed his legal practice. 
Apparently, the North Texan was temporarily satisfied that
the immediate threat to the southern frontier was
thwarted.17  While attending District court at Sherman,
Grayson County, Throckmorton learned of new threats to
North Texas.  Earlier in May, Colonel Young, commander of
the Confederate frontier forces, warned that “if war
continues we shall have forays from Kansas, and this
northern frontier must be well prepared.”  Young continued,
“we [North Texans] cannot afford to send troops to the
South.  Any where on the Gulf coast, or in the railroad
region, troops can be rapidly conveyed to any assailed
point.  But up here [North Texas] a foray could be made,
immense damage done, and the parties away, before we could
have a defensive force to repel them.”  The colonel’s
solution was simple:  He stated that “we must maintain
Washita, as a permanent post, and should have spies out
northward, on all traveled routes, constantly, regularly
relieved and reporting.”18  Additionally, Young feared that
the Kickapoos and Caddoes would soon pose a threat to Fort
Cobb and probably North Texas, too.  According to one
account, these Native American tribes were “about [Fort]
Cobb in small squads, painted and taking whatever they
wanted.  The force in garrison was too weak to control
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them.”19  Colonel Young also made it known to the citizens
of North Texas that his most pressing need was for cavalry
troops, even though he did not have authority to receive
any at that time.20  
There is no record of Throckmorton meeting Colonel
Young in Sherman in late May or early June, but it seems
certain that the colonel’s assessment of perceived threats
to North Texas prompted the lawyer to action:  Throckmorton
completed his legal obligations at Sherman and returned to
his home in McKinney where he soon initiated efforts to
raise another voluntary cavalry company for active duty. 
His task was quickly accomplished:  The citizens apparently
were ready to confront any potential threat to their
homeland.  In a public meeting held on June 8, 1861, in
Lebanon, Collin County, local men mustered into military
service.  They clearly stated their reasons for joining the
newly formed company, stating that “whereas our country is
threatened with war, our homes and firesides with
devastation; it therefore becomes necessary for each and
every man to define his position, for he that is not for us
is against us.”  Additionally, the volunteers stressed that
they were forming a “military company for the protection of
[their] homes and [their] rights.”  Finally, the men
suggested that they wanted to assure the rest of the state
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that they no longer were loyal Unionists, claiming that “we
now of our own accord lay aside all party issues and unite
upon one common platform that is in the defense of our
rights to repel [an] invasion.”21  
On June 19, the Dallas Herald reported that “we are
indebted to Hon. J. W. Throckmorton for [sending us a] list
of officers of two companies of troops [one infantry and
one cavalry] just organized in Collin County.”  Continuing
the editor stated that the “100 men rank and file [in the
cavalry company was] ready for any service that they can
get.  Capt. Throckmorton visited [Dallas] in order to get
his men into the regiment of Col. Greer.  That regiment,
however, was already full, and could not receive them.” 
The editor then revealed in a post script to the article
that “Capt. Throckmorton’s company [was] received into
service, under Col. Young’s call, and will go into
immediate service in the Indian Nation.”22  
Colonel Young and Captain Throckmorton proceeded to
Ben McCulloch’s headquarters at Fort Smith where they
requested that the brigadier general receive their
regiment.  However, McCulloch denied their request, stating
that he did not have the authority to receive additional
troops.  However, the general requested that Colonel Young
carry a message back to the people of North Texas informing
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them that troops would soon be needed to defend Arkansas
and Texas from a Union force then present in Missouri. 
Young agreed to the general’s request.  The Clarksville
Northern Standard reported that Throckmorton’s “mission to
Fort Smith, undertaken for the purpose of having his
company received into Gen. McCulloch’s command, was not
successful. . . .  The company will be stationed
temporarily at Fort Cobb, at which place Capt. Throckmorton
will join them in a few days.  We understand from him that
Col. Young will soon start to Austin and will go thence to
Richmond, on important business connected with his
regiment.”23 
After his interview with General McCulloch, Colonel
Young ordered Throckmorton’s company to join troops already
stationed at Fort Cobb.24  However, Throckmorton did not
immediately join his men at the frontier garrison. 
Instead, Young requested that the former senator accompany
him to Texas and help inform the frontier settlers of the
current circumstances which existed north of the Red River. 
The two men brought news that Union troops under the
command of Jim Lane were planning to attack Arkansas and,
if successful, would then carry their attack forward to the
North Texas region.  Throckmorton and Young also informed
their fellow citizens that Brigadier General Ben McCulloch
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suggested that a general call to arms might soon be
forthcoming in an effort to raise enough troops to counter
Lane’s forces.  McCulloch’s message stated that “the State
of Missouri is almost subjugated; the small force she has
yet in the field is being driven back upon Arkansas.  We
march today to help and aid them!”  McCulloch also
attempted to stir racial animosities by subtly equating the
approaching Union forces with past ethnic enemies:  He
stated “Texans remember your former victories and prepare
to march to others.  You won your independence from Mexico
and will again do it from a more tyrannical foe.  The South
will never be subjugated, NEVER, NEVER!”25 
On July 9, Throckmorton wrote to Governor Edward Clark
informing him of General McCulloch’s assessment of the
battlefront in Missouri and Arkansas and requested that the
governor arrange for his regiment to join McCulloch’s
command.26  He stated “I [Throckmorton] have just returned
from a trip with Genl Young to see Ben McCulloch at Fort
Smith.  He had no authority to [receive] our regiment, but
expected out of necessity to have to call for troops from
Texas soon.”  Throckmorton continued, “I see it stated in
the papers that two regiments will be [received] from
Texas.  Now my Dr Sir, don’t overlook our section.  Our
regt is all ready complete and stationed in the forts north
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of [the] Red River.”  Throckmorton revealed that he planned
to leave the following morning to join his command at Fort
Cobb.27
Throckmorton waited before answering McCulloch’s
general call to arms.  During this delay, his volunteer
company remained at Fort Cobb until the end of August when
they returned to Sherman to obtain winter provisions for
their company.28  While in the North Texas town,
Throckmorton and his men resigned from state service and
joined the regular Confederate army.  Apparently, during
their return home, the men learned that their company was
listed as part of a volunteer regiment in the state
militia, rather than in the Confederate army.  Throckmorton
wrote to Governor Clark regarding the company’s
resignation:  He stated “the company which I command, in
the Regiment of Col Wm C Young, when they ascertained that
they were not in the Service of the Confederate States    
. . . disbanded–which was on the 31st day of August 1861.”29 
Throckmorton and many of the men under his former company
of volunteers went to Camp Bartow, near Dallas, and
officially mustered into the Sixth Texas Cavalry on
September 12, 1861.30  Throckmorton was commissioned as
captain of Company K, in the Second Regiment of Texas
Cavalry Volunteers, commanded by Colonel B. Warren Stone.31 
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After mustering into the Confederate service, Stone’s
regiment marched forward to join McCulloch’s army at Camp
Jackson, near Van Buren, Arkansas, on October 16.32
Stone’s regiment faced its first major test in combat
on December 26, 1861, at the Battle of Chustenahlah in the
Cherokee Nation.  At Chustenahlah, Stone’s regiment
confronted a group of Creek Indians who remained loyal to
the Union and who were traveling north to seek the
protection of Federal troops stationed in Kansas.33  Douglas
John Carter who served in the Third Texas Cavalry recalled
the battle:
It was Christmas day, 1861 when we came upon the
enemy some ten or twelve miles from where we had
spent the night.  Their pickets fired a few shots
at our advance column and retreated to their main
army which occupied a very strong position,
fortified by nature on a hill, a real breast work
of rocks and standing trees, and behind these they
were waiting to receive our attack.  We formed a
line of battle in front of them.  Bullets and
arrows were coming pretty fast.  A feathered arrow
passed in front of my face just before we were
ordered to dismount, and produced a strange
sensation in me.  After dismounting we were
ordered to leave every fifth man to hold our
horses.  Henry Miller of our company was crying
when the order came to charge because he had been
detailed to hold horses.  We made the charge in
‘double quick’ and climbed over the breast works. 
They fired volley after volley of rifles and
arrows as we charged and climbed over those rocks. 
Seeing they could not stop us, they commenced
running.  We were then ordered to go back for our
horses and get over those rocks with them as best
we could and form in line and continue the charge. 
     203
Some of those Indians were very brave and daring
and would not leave, but continued to shoot.  Of
course, they were killed.  One big feathered cap
fellow stood out from the trees and continued
shooting until he fell. I had shot both barrels of
my gun and one of my holster pistols at him before
he fell.  I don’t know who killed him.  I thought
I had, but some others of our company said they
shot at that feathered cap Indian.  We continued
this running fire about seven miles and until
there were no warriors in sight.34
According to the battle report of Lieutenant Colonel
John S. Griffith, Sixth Regiment Texas Cavalry,
Throckmorton led his men with grit and valor.  Griffith
stated, “To the brave and gallant Captains Ross, Hardin,
Wharton, and Throckmorton . . . I am much indebted for the
success we had by their fearless charges in the front of
their respective commands, which so signally routed the
enemy from every point.”  Griffith concluded his report
with “I must return my sincere thanks to Captains Ross,
Wharton, and Throckmorton, and Adjunct Gurley for timely
assistance when I was in imminent personal peril, and my
gratitude to Providence for crowning our arms with
victory.”35  The Creeks lost more than three hundred men and
all of their provisions, wives, children, and slaves.36 
Following the battle, Throckmorton returned to his home in
McKinney, escorting the remains of his friend Gabriel S.
Fitzhugh who lost his life during the course of battle.37 
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Captain Throckmorton rejoined Company K in winter quarters
near Fayetteville, Arkansas, in mid-February 1862.  
Following Throckmorton’s arrival in Fayetteville, his
company received orders to ride northward toward
Bentonville, Arkansas.  After several skirmishes along the
route to their destination, Throckmorton and his men were
involved in the Battle of Elkhorn, also known as Battle of
Pea Ridge.  Even though Pea Ridge proved to be a
Confederate blunder which ended any hopes of bringing
Missouri into the Confederacy, Throckmorton and his men
were once again cited for bravery under fire.  In a report
submitted on April 14 to Major General Earl Van Dorn,
Commander of the Trans-Mississippi District, Colonel Stone
stated that his “regiment gallantly led [a] brilliant
charge, which was but momentarily withstood by the enemy,
who left his guns in the most precipitous flight.”  The
colonel continued by stating that “the first three
companies, under Captains Wharton, Throckmorton, and
Bridges, poured a most destructive fire upon the enemy near
his guns, killing more than 80 of his number.  Thanks to
these gallant officers for their promptness, valor, and
success.”38  
During the course of the Battle of Elkhorn, a Union
bullet took the life of General McCulloch.  As a result,
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Colonel Stone’s Cavalry unit transferred to General Earl
Van Dorn’s command.  On March 19, General Pierre G. T.
Beuregard, ordered Van Dorn to move his forces to Corinth,
Mississippi, and protect the Memphis and Charleston
railroad from the approaching Union army under the command
of Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant.  Despite the
importance of this assignment, Colonel Stone resigned his
command and returned to Texas to raise another regiment: 
It seems evident that the colonel no longer had confidence
in Van Dorn’s leadership abilities.  Even though he
respected the colonel’s decision to return to Texas,
Throckmorton decided to make the trip to Corinth with his
men.39  However, upon arriving in Mississippi, the North
Texan fell seriously ill and was forced to accept an
honorable discharge on May 25, 1862, after which he
returned home to recover.40  Throckmorton’s ailment was not
recorded, but it seems likely that he suffered from some
form of kidney ailment just as he had during the Mexican
War.
On account of his earlier stance against secession,
Throckmorton made several dire enemies who would not
forgive him for his earlier Unionist sentiments.  Upon
returning home, he discovered that his political
adversaries had circulated a report stating that he had
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left the service at Corinth because he had not been offered
a rank higher than captain, and thus he had returned home
in hopes of obtaining a higher command with a new volunteer
regiment.41  While other Confederate military leaders,
especially commanders of volunteer companies, might have
used such tactics as a way to improve their rank within the
military, the accusations regarding Throckmorton seemed to
be unfounded. 
In another effort to further impugn Throckmorton’s
character, one of his political enemies nominated him for a
position in the Federal government, and as a result,
President Lincoln appointed the former North Texas Unionist
as a commissioner for the collection of taxes in the rebel
district of Texas.  Thus, his enemies claimed that
Throckmorton was consorting with other Unionists and was in
essence an apparent traitor to the Confederacy.42 
Throckmorton answered these charges in a letter published
in the McKinney Messenger on August 20, 1862:
I have by no word, act, or deed countenanced in
any manner whatsoever, or been privy to this or
any other appointment.  So far as I am concerned
it is wholly unwarranted.  Nor have I had any
connection or correspondence with any person
whatever since the war began who is in the
confidence of, or friendly with, the government of
the United States. . . .  Because I and thousands
of others in our state believed that our southern
leaders were too rash and precipitate and that
     207
other remedies should be resorted to before
secession, is no reason why I should look on
approvingly and see the mad hand of fanaticism
kindle the flames that are to consume every city,
town, and hamlet throughout the South.43  
This public pronouncement addressed the charges of his
enemies, but Throckmorton also acknowledged for the first
time in writing why he and undoubtedly other North Texans
were fighting in the war.  He stated that “The best and
unscrupulous conduct of the Lincoln administration upon the
slave question, its utter disregard of the Constitution,  
. . . too clearly show that this is a war, not only against
our institutions and property but a war of entire and utter
subjugation.”  The former senator continued by stating that
“it is the determination of the Federal Government to make
slaves the equals of white men, to rob us of our property,
and to make Southern freedmen hewers of wood and drawers of
water, none can doubt.”44  Throckmorton could not have made
clearer his intention of fighting a war to preserve the
white supremacy on the southern frontier.
Adding to Throckmorton’s problem was the discovery of
a secret peace party conspiracy in North Texas, especially
in the counties of Grayson, Wise, and Cooke.  The peace
party, also known as the loyal league, was made up of
Unionists and other individuals who entertained the idea of
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bringing the war to an end through negotiations rather than
continuing to fight a prolonged war.  Furthermore, the
members of the peace party movement opposed the Confederate
conscription law which was passed in April 1862, an act
which threatened to force Unionists into the Confederate
military.45  The members of the peace party met in secret
and created an organized hierarchy with those closest to
the top being the strongest advocates of negotiating peace
with the Federal government.  Apparently, the group’s plan
was to increase their numbers until they were strong enough
to mount a revolt against Confederate authority in the
state, reclaiming Texas for the Union.  The plot went
according to plan until Newton Chance, a loyal Confederate
from Wise County, was approached to join the movement. 
Chance immediately reported the incident to William J.
Hudson, a Confederate officer at Gainesville.  The result
was that Confederate authorities detained some fifty-five
men and hanged more than forty of them for treason. 
Although some of the members of the organization were of
questionable character, many of the men were forthright
citizens who were misled to the true nature of the secret
society.  They were simply told that the society was
created to promote peace between the North and the South.46
Throckmorton was the friend of several of the Union
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men involved in this matter, and he felt personally
responsible for their plight.  Many of the accused
Unionists had supported Throckmorton during the secession
movement, and their loyalty to the Union was strengthened
as a result of his influence.  Also, the North Texan agreed
with peace party members’ position on the Confederate
conscription law of 1862.  In October 1862, Throckmorton
learned that local authorities had arrested several
Unionists in the nearby town of Sherman, Grayson County,
and were preparing to lynch them.  Fearing another incident
like that which unfolded in Gainesville, Cooke County, the
North Texan traveled to Sherman with the state district
judge Robert W. Waddell and defended the men’s right to be
fairly represented in court.  While their specific
arguments were not recorded for posterity, the two men’s
plea for due process of the law persuaded local authorities
to send their prisoners to the Confederate district court
at Tyler where all were eventually released.47
Despite showing favor to some of the accused
Unionists, Throckmorton did justify the lynching of others
in the Red River counties by stating that a “great good to
society” had been accomplished because a group of
dissenters had been eliminated.  Apparently, he made these
comments after learning that some of the dissenters hanged
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at Gainesville had murdered his former commander and friend
Colonel William C. Young.  Additionally, the senator
believed that the accused individuals posed a threat to the
white society on the frontier especially considering that
they were found guilty of aiding a Federal invasion of
North Texas.48  Thus, while he could appreciate their
Unionist stance, Throckmorton could not accept the idea of
destroying the community which he helped to create on the
frontier, and as a result the former senator justified the
executions of North Texans who did not wholeheartedly
pledge to protect the interest of the people living on the
frontier.49 
The peace party movement in North Texas forced
Throckmorton once again to think about the vulnerability of
white settlers located on the frontier.  On October 25,
1862, the North Texan sent a letter to Governor Lubbock
expressing his concerns.  He offered to raise and to
command a new frontier regiment.  In the communication to
the governor, he stated that “the fact that the multiplied
thousands of our gallant men are beyond the Mississippi &
beyond the limits of this state, and the threatened
invasion of our soil from the north, as well as the federal
landing on the coast, our own internal commotions [peace
party movement], and defenseless condition has filled me
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with serious apprehension.”50  Throckmorton ascertained that
if the Federal Army moved into the Indian territory, “the
reserve Indians . . . will be turned loose on our
border–and our grain section here will be an inviting field
for federal raids–perhaps invasion.”51  Once again,
Throckmorton revealed that whites on the North Texas
frontier were gravely concerned about the threat that
Native Americans posed to settlers living in the northern
region of the state.  Throckmorton concluded his letter by
suggesting that he was willing to assume command of any
troops that the governor would authorize for service in his
region of the state.52  Lubbock, however, had other plans: 
The governor was in the process of transferring state
troops to Confederate service and did not plan on
organizing additional forces for service on the frontier. 
Frustrated that Lubbock failed to see the validity of
his request, Throckmorton rejoined the Confederate army.53 
He joined Colonel Stone in February 1863 in organizing a
new regiment:  Throckmorton was commissioned a major in
Colonel Isham Chisum’s Regiment of Texas Cavalry, also
known as the Second Partisan Rangers.54  The men gathered
together at the town of Fairfield in Freestone County and
remained there until March.55  Confederate leaders then
ordered the regiment to Navasota, Grimes County, where they
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spent much of their time engaged in military drills,
gathering supplies, and mustering men into their regiment. 
Colonel Stone was able to raise and equip two regiments
before receiving orders in late April to report to
Louisiana.56  Between May and August 1863, Colonel Stone’s
regiments engaged Federal troops in Louisiana at
Cheneyville, Brashear and Fort Butler.  During this time
Throckmorton’s health failed him once again:  Apparently,
he suffered a renewed bout with kidney disease and was
eventually forced from the field to a hospital in
Vermillionville, Louisiana.  While in Vermillionville, the
North Texan learned that his friends back home had elected
him to represent Collin and Grayson counties in the state
senate.  As a result of his failed health, the army
discharged Throckmorton on September 12, 1863, and he
started the long journey back home to resume his political
career.57
When Throckmorton arrived in Texas in late September,
he found the North Texas region in turmoil.  North Texans
still remained unsettled by the conscription issue. 
Because they were determined to keep troops on the
frontier, many North Texans refused to serve in the eastern
and central theaters of the war.  As a result, Confederate
authorities deemed the northern region of the state as a
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haven for deserters, common criminals, and staunch
Unionists, viewing such parties as threats to the
sovereignty of the Confederacy.  
Concerned that dissent in North Texas might lead some
Unionists to ship their crops and livestock to Union troops
in the North instead of sending the goods to Confederate
troops in the eastern theater, Confederate authorities sent
regular troops to the region in 1863.  Brigadier General
Smith P. Bankhead, who was successful in combating German
dissenters in Central Texas, took command of the newly
formed Northern Subdistrict.  Bankhead proved ineffective
in dealing with dissent in the region, and Lieutenant
General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-
Mississippi Confederacy, replaced him with Brigadier
General Henry E. McCulloch, who also proved successful in
dealing with dissent in Central Texas.  Kirby and McCulloch
forged a new policy that was designed to curb dissent in
the region by offering amnesty to all deserters of the
Confederate army, providing that they agreed to reenlist in
the army.  McCulloch asked prominent North Texas men, such
as Throckmorton, to aid in successful implementation of the
new policy.58  
In an effort to calm the crisis that was developing in
the northern counties, Throckmorton published a letter to
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his constituents in local newspapers in October 1863.  The
newly elected senator reminding them that if the
Confederacy failed to win the war, the white society which
they had forged out of the wilderness would be utterly
destroyed.  He wrote:
If we fail in this struggle [Civil War], we become
the most degraded people on the face of earth.  Our
own slaves will be put on an equality with us by
our masters.  Nay, they will become our
taskmasters.  Our inheritance will be divided out
with them.  Our property will be confiscated and so
burthened with taxes that the severest toll and
most rigid economy cannot pay them.  Our lands will
be sold by the tax gatherer, and Yankee capital
will become the purchaser; our whole country will
be overrun with Northern adventurers.  Your
ancestral homes will be filled with new faces of
Northern aspect; your sons and daughters will
mingle their blood with that of the new-comers. 
You and your sons will become renters of your own
soil, and wanderers on the face of the earth; and
in a few years the race of southern chivalry in
this beautiful land of ours, will have extinct and
numbered among the things that were.59
In part, Throckmorton wrote this letter to persuade the
citizens of North Texas to renew their commitment to the
Confederate cause and to convince deserters to return to
their post, but the underlying meaning of the excerpt above
is clear:  The senator wanted to remind people that white
supremacy on the frontier was in danger.  Apparently,
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation convinced
Throckmorton that the Federal government was now waging a
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war to free the slaves and perhaps to give them an equal
status with southern whites.
Throckmorton’s call for support of the Confederacy had
a limited impact on many North Texans.  For example, Henry
Boren, the leader of a large contingent of men in the North
Texas region, sent word to McCulloch that his men would
join the Confederate service if they were permanently
stationed near their homes and families.  Brigadier General
McCulloch was angered that Boren’s men still refused to
serve anywhere except on the North Texas frontier and
issued a stern warning to them in a letter penned on
October 24, 1863.  McCulloch stated that the Texans would
be allowed to temporarily remain in the region with the
understand that “this [would] be done, however, with the
distinct understanding that you cannot be allowed to elect
officers, and that you may be ordered to meet the Yankees
if they approach this section of the country from any
quarter.”  McCulloch then issued Boren and his men another
warning “if you are not willing to fight our common enemy 
. . . I don’t want you on the frontier or anywhere else in
our service.  If you are not willing to do this, you are
not our friends, and properly belong to the other side.”60 
Such pronouncements from McCulloch did little to stabilize
conditions on northern frontier.
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In November, Senator Throckmorton traveled to Austin
and assumed his duties in the Tenth Legislature of the
Texas Congress.  During his tenure in the state senate, the
North Texan debated and voted on several key issues
confronting the Lone Star State, including the depreciation
of Confederate currency, the Confederate government’s
impressment of cotton, the continued development of
economic enterprise, the rising rate of crime, and various
other less significant matters.  Throckmorton’s position on
the issues were by this time predictable.  The senator
staunchly supported the economic development of North Texas
and called for the protection of the settlers in the
region.  However, he also believed that the Confederacy had
to succeed in its bid for independence from the Union.  
Despite the apparent gravity of the circumstances
surrounding conscripts and dissent in the frontier
counties, the legislators spent relatively little time
debating the matter.61  However, the state leaders did not
ignore the issue completely.  On December 15, 1863, the
solons approved an act for protecting the frontier.  The
legislators called for the formation of able-bodied men
from certain counties to enroll in small frontier companies
to protect the Texas frontier from Indian raids.  According
to the provision, the governor was to divide the frontier
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into three separate regions and appoint a commander over
each.  The commanding officer was instructed to accept only
bona fide men, meaning those individuals who actually lived
inside the counties that they were charged with protecting. 
One-fourth of the men in each district was to remain on
duty at all times, and the commander could call all of his
men into service in an emergency.  Also, the governor could
order the frontier forces to any place on the frontier to
prevent Indian raids or other lawless activities, providing
the men were not used for more than one month at a time.62 
As a result of the changes in frontier legislation,
Governor Murrah initiated a new policy concerning the use
of Texas soldiers on the frontier:  Apparently, the
governor deemed it more appropriate to use the able-bodied
men of his state to defend the frontier rather than serve
in the Confederate armies in the Trans-Mississippi theater
of war.63 
Beginning on January 6, 1864, Murrah implemented the
new frontier defense policy.  The policy had two goals: 
First, Governor Murrah transferred the Frontier Regiment to
Confederate service on March 1, 1864.64  Second, the
governor authorized the organization of a new frontier
force–the Frontier Organization.  The new state troops
helped to fill the void which would existed after the
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Frontier Regiment was officially transferred to the
Confederate Army.
Governor Murrah immediately formed the new Frontier
Organization, wanting to have the regiments in place by
March 1, 1864, when the existing state troops were
scheduled to transfer to the Confederate army.  Following
the legislature’s guidelines, the governor divided the
frontier counties into three districts and appointed
suitable men to command the troops stationed in the new
districts:  William Quayle commanded the First Frontier
District, headquartered in Decatur; George B. Erath
commanded the Second Frontier District, headquartered in
Gatesville; and James M. Hunter commanded the Third
Frontier District, headquartered in Fredericksburg.65  The
appointed commanders immediately filled their ranks with
new recruits and by March 1, 1864, approximately four
thousand men were mustered for frontier service.  
By forming the Frontier Organization exclusively for
use on the fringes of Anglo settlement in Texas, Governor
Murrah and the legislature found themselves in direct
confrontation with Confederate authorities, who claimed
that all frontier units, including the newly formed
Frontier Organization, were deemed available for service in
Confederate army outside the state.  In essence, the
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members of the Texas government were involved in a
constitutional debate with Confederate commanders over the
legal status of conscription.  Governor Murrah claimed that
the state law which gave him the authority to form frontier
forces was superior to the conscription law passed by the
Confederate Congress.  Conversely, Confederate commanders
in the Trans-Mississippi Department disagreed, believing
that the laws passed by the Confederate Congress trumped
the state’s laws.  The military’s position regarding
conscription became even more uncompromising after the
summer of 1863 when it became apparent that the tides of
war were going against the South, and Confederate
recruitment began to decline.  
As a result of the increasing need for men in defense
of the Trans-Mississippi theater of the war, General John
B. Magruder, Confederate commander of the District of
Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, attempted to force
conscription on all eligible men in Texas.  Governor Murrah
balked at Magruder’s heavy-handed tactics but gave into the
general’s demand for troops once the U. S. Army, under the
command of General Nathaniel Banks, moved up the Red River
in the spring of 1864 and threatened to invade northeastern
Texas.  However, even as his state faced possible invasion,
the governor wrote to General Magruder requesting that the
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commander define how many troops were needed and detail
where the recruits would be stationed outside the state. 
The governor’s concession came too late to affect the
outcome of the Red River campaign, but it did effectively
end the controversy between state and Confederate
authorities over the question of conscription.66
In an effort to enlist men from the Northern Sub-
District in Texas, General Magruder suggested that the
Confederate authorities use influential men from the region
to aid in recruitment.  Knowing that approximately 10,000
men in the northern sub-district were eligible for military
service, Magruder stated “of these, several thousand can be
got out by influential men like Throckmorton, using his
influence as a State brigadier-general, but if the general
[Kirby Smith] would appoint Brigadier-General Throckmorton
. . . to have the same rank in the Confederate Army, we
could thus secure his influence and utmost exertions, and
furnish a brigadier-general to the reserve brigade.”67  
While the state and Confederate authorities came to a
mutual agreement over conscription, Governor Murrah and the
Texas legislature never fully conceded state control over
potential draftees who resided on the Texas frontier.  The
governor continued to maintain the position that frontier
settlers should be able to protect their homes and were not
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liable to Confederate conscription.  The Confederate
Conscription Bureau of the Trans-Mississippi Department
attempted to seize control over frontier conscripts in
Texas throughout the summer and fall of 1864, but the state
government refused the bureau’s demands.  General Kirby
Smith finally deemed the situation in Texas as hopeless and
submitted the matter to the Confederate government for a
final resolution, but before the matter could be settled,
the war ended.68
Brigadier General Throckmorton became concerned with
the growing division between die-hard Confederates and
those individuals who questioned the viability of the
southern war effort.  Throughout 1864, Throckmorton began
to doubt whether the Confederacy could successfully win
independence from the United States.  The clearest
expression of his concerns and doubts about the war were
evident in a letter to his close friend and confidant,
Benjamin H. Epperson.  In his correspondence, Throckmorton
discussed his concern over a set of resolutions that
radical Confederates introduced on the opening day of the
second extra session of the Tenth Legislature which met
from October 19 to November 15, 1864.69  The senator noted
that “on the first day of the session [the legislative
considered] a long set of resolutions that [declared] the
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power to make peace [with the Federal government] was
delegated to the Confederate government [and] that Texas
would never reconstruct.”  Throckmorton was against the
introduction of these resolutions because he believed that
it would produce disunity among the state’s leaders and the
people of Texas.70  
The primary cause for Throckmorton’s alarm was the
extremism of those who sought to condemn any individual who
did not fully support the Confederacy.  The North Texas
politician openly challenged Senator Chauncy Shepard’s
statement that “any man who talked of reconstruction would
be hanged.”71  Throckmorton reminded his colleagues:
Enthusiasm [for the war] was first damped by the
conscript law, which had induced thousands of
gallant soldiers to believe that they were serfs &
slaves and not freemen–that this was a government
in the opinion of these men not supported by the
voluntary offering of a free people, but supported
by a military despotism–that instead of being left
to their chivalry & devotion to the cause of
liberty to sustain the government they were hunted
down like wild beasts & forced into the ranks of
the army with the bayonet thrusting them along   
. . . Then I reviewed our actual condition–the
loss of territory–the immense destruction of
property–the thousands dead & thousands maimed &
diseased . . . judging by the past four years more
would bring our armies to the waters of the gulf &
the conscription up to the age of 100–from a
million of fighting men to none–If this statement
should continue–if Congress kept on centralizing
the  government–if the military were to continue
to grind the people into the dust with the iron
heel of tyranny . . . If then, in such a fearful
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contingency, some old gray haired minister of
God’s holy church who through years of weary toil
& suffering prayed for our success, but . . .
believed that the war should cease, and that
reconstruction was the surest & best means to
ensure it. Was he, I asked, to be swung to a
limb?72
After venting his frustrations about the illogical
position of the extremists, Throckmorton reaffirmed his
personal commitment to the Confederacy.  Furthermore, he
told Epperson, “I asserted that I was not for
reconstruction–but for separation & Independence & that I
wished no one to misunderstand me in this.  Now you will
see from this what course I think we (you & I) [should]
pursue.  Let everybody else take a different course if they
will.  But let us be the last to yield.”73  It was clear
that Throckmorton did not want to violently suppress the
growing dissent in the Lone Star State, especially in North
Texas.  However, he also believed that a Confederate
victory was the only way to protect the dominant position
of whites in the state.  Thus, the senator continued to
give unwavering support to the Confederate military until
it proved itself incapable of protecting white supremacy in
Texas.  
When the state legislature was not in secession,
Throckmorton commanded troops on the Texas frontier.  As a
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military leader, the North Texas politician served as a
brigadier general of two different frontier forces.  On
March 1, 1864, Governor Murrah appointed Throckmorton as a
brigadier general of the Brigadier District Number 3, one
of six militia districts created for service on the
frontier.74  Throckmorton maintained this position until the
governor ordered him in October 1864 to replace Major
William Quayle as commander of the First Frontier District
in October 1864.75  Therefore, Throckmorton remained in the
state’s frontier forces and carried out his charge of
providing military protection to the citizens of the Red
River counties.  Additionally, Throckmorton’s troops
tracked down Confederate deserters and helped local
officials maintain law and order within the northern region
of the state.76
Throckmorton dutifully carried out his orders,
especially after assuming command of the First Frontier
District.  With an increase in Indian depredations on the
frontier, Throckmorton ordered the frontier settlers to
build blockhouses and stockades in which to live and
protect themselves from potential attacks.77  He urged the
men of the Frontier Organization to cultivate a friendly
intercourse with the Confederate forces when they were
serving in the same area, and he took steps to rid the
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frontier forces of men who were not residents of the
frontier region prior to July 1, 1863.  Throckmorton also
recruited new men for service in the Frontier Organization. 
Largely due to his efforts, the First Frontier District had
twenty-six companies with a total enrollment of 1436 men by
December 1864.78  
To help combat Comanche and Kiowa warriors who were
crossing the Red River and raiding North Texas settlements,
Throckmorton suggested to the governor that some of the men
under his command be used as search-and-destroy units which
would primarily operate in the Indian Territory.  In
February 1865, the North Texas commander further
recommended that the newly formed units be give leeway to
openly confront hostile Indians, Jayhawkers, outlaws, and
military deserters.  In regard to attacking inauspicious
tribes in the Indian Territory, Throckmorton believed that
the soldiers should confiscate their enemies’ property.  By
doing this, Throckmorton proposed that the Indian’s
property should be given to his men and that the total
valuation of the confiscated items could be deducted from
their pay.  In this way, the units would be self-
sustaining, would be active in the frontier, and would keep
him informed of the enemies’ movements.  Despite the
apparent logic of Throckmorton’s plan, bad weather and
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logistical problems prevented the search-and-destroy units
from effectively fulfilling their task.79
Throckmorton was also concerned that his men were not
properly provisioned.  This had been one of the motivating
factors behind creating the self-sufficient, search-and-
destroy units.  Circumstances apparently were bad enough
that Throckmorton called on the state government to
organize the frontier forces into an active unit under the
command of the Confederate authorities, believing that the
southern government was in a better position to supply his
troops with adequate provisions.  Additionally, the North
Texas commander informed the governor that most of the
soldiers serving on active duty with the frontier troops,
or in reserve for emergency measures, would be willing to
spend three-fourths of their paychecks for provisions and
transportation.  The advantages according to Throckmorton
were two-fold:  First, this arrangement would provide
frontier soldiers with some form of regular compensation,
thereby improving the overall morale and discipline among
his troops.  Second, the provisions purchased for his
command would primarily come from the North Texas region,
allowing farmers and manufacturers in the Red River
counties to survive the economic hardships caused by the
war.80  However, before the governor and Confederate
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authorities responded to Throckmorton’s suggestions, the
Confederacy reassigned the North Texan to the Department of
Indian Affairs.  
Throckmorton’s superiors deemed his military service
between January and March 1865 as honorable.  The Collin
County politician had never shown any outward signs of
disloyalty to the Confederate cause.  Nevertheless, as the
war continued and as casualties mounted, Throckmorton
continued to seriously doubt the rebels’ ability to win the
war.  In a letter written to Epperson on February 3, 1865,
Throckmorton expressed that a Confederate victory hinged
upon the southern government’s ability to secure foreign
assistance.  He told Epperson that “I presume Mr. Davis all
ready knows what terms we will have to subscribe to get
foreign aid.  The abolishment of slavery is the first
sacrifice.  This is the base of all other terms.”81  The
North Texas senator could easily accept this proposition
considering that he only owned one slave, and therefore,
his personal economic loss would be minimal compared to
large plantation owners who had a significant amount of
money invested in slaves.  Also, Throckmorton knew that
abolition would cripple the political and social dominance
of the slaveholding planters.  Throckmorton continued by
stating that he expected “to remain faithful to the
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Confederacy and the State until the people determine
another course.  But I feel if the Ship of State is
compelled to founder that duty & patriotism requires every
effort be made possible to save the crew.”  The senator
concluded that “if there is no chance for foreign help, we
should make terms while we are in a condition to demand
living ones, and not postpone it until the chains of
slavery are riveted upon a helpless people.”82  Throckmorton
understood that the Confederacy was on the verge of
collapse.
In March 1865, Leathercoat wrote to Epperson once
again regarding the states of the Confederacy and the
inevitability that foreign aid would not be forthcoming. 
Throckmorton stated that “if this be true [that no foreign
aid could be obtained], and everything now indicates that
it is, nothing but diplomacy and skill [brought] to bear
[on] Lincoln and the federal government can save us from
irretrievable ruin, and the most appalling degradation.” 
He continued, “I have strong hope that some of the
statesmen of the Confederacy know and appreciate the
condition of affairs, and are determined to make a mighty
effort to save us.  This can only be done, I imagine, by
reconstruction.”  He soberly observed that “we may have to
give up slavery, but even that is not hopeless if properly
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managed; or at least the force of the shock to the great
industrial interests of the Country may be greatly
paralyzed and deadened.”83  This letter indicated
Throckmorton’s loyalty to the white frontier ideology: the
abolition of slavery did not mean the end of white
dominance over blacks, but it would effectively remove the
threat of future political dominance of white slaveowners. 
Additionally, his willingness to secure a peaceful and
quick reconstruction with the Federal government reveals
that he no longer believed that the Confederate government
could win the war.84
In March and April 1865, the Confederate government
desperately sought to enlist the help of Native Americans
in their failing attempt to win independence from the
Federal government.  Confederate authorities believed that
Kiowa, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Shoshone, Snake, and Blackfeet
tribes were willing to make peace with the Confederacy. 
Captain M. L. Bell, the Assistant Superintendent of Indian
Affairs of the Confederate States of America, sent Major 
J. C. Vore, a Confederate Indian agent to the Creek
Indians, to consult with the various tribes and to explore
whether a meaningful peace treaty could be arranged between
the them and the Confederate government.  Acting on the
advice of Major J. C. Vore, General Kirby Smith, without
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consulting Governor Murrah, appointed Throckmorton as the
Confederate Commissioner to the Indians.  He proved to be a
good choice.  The North Texan was well known and respected
by many of the principal tribes living in Texas.  Seeing
the soundness of General Smith’s decision, the governor
appointed Major John W. Lane as a substitute to command the
First Frontier District and immediately commissioned
Throckmorton as an Indian agent for the State of Texas,
giving the former commander wide latitude in making peace
with the frontier Indians.  Throckmorton left Decatur, the
First Frontier District headquarter, and traveled to Kenzos
on the Washita River, near Elm Springs, for the scheduled
May 15 meeting with the various tribes in the Indian
Territory.85  Confederate authorities ordered Throckmorton,
known as Leathercoat to the Native Americans, to obtain a
peace agreement between the friendly tribes of the Indian
Territory and to secure Native American support for a
potential Confederate raid into Kansas.  In essence,
Throckmorton was charged with making a tripartite agreement
between the Native Americans, the Lone Star State, and the
Confederate government.  Concerned that Native Americans
might be unwilling to negotiate with an agent from Texas,
General Smith decided to have an additional agent accompany
the North Texan during negotiations which were slated to
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take place at Council Grove, Indian Territory, in early May
1865.  General Smith first asked Albert Pike of Arkansas to
join Throckmorton, but when the Arkansan declined, the
Confederate commander selected Colonel W. D. Reagan, a
judge in the military court of the Trans-Mississippi
Department.  Colonel Reagan accepted the position and
immediately set out to join Leathercoat who was already in
the Indian Territory.86
Brigadier General Throckmorton and Colonel W. D.
Reagan set up a council meeting with a number of warriors
and chiefs from the following tribes: Choctaws, Cherokees,
Seminoles, Creeks, and Osages.  The Confederate agents even
asked some of the more war-like tribes to attend the peace
talks, including the Comanches, Cheyennes, Caddoes,
Arapahoes, Lipans, Kickapoos, Kiowas, and a limited number
of Sioux.  Official reports estimated that there were
approximately twenty thousand Native Americans present at
the council meeting.  During the course of negotiations,
Brigadier General D. H. Cooper, Confederate commander of
the Indian Territory, sent Throckmorton a dispatch
informing him that the Confederacy was in dire straits. 
Cooper believed that their county’s circumstances would
preclude Throckmorton from “undertaking anything more than
to secure peaceful relations among and with the Indians.”87 
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Confederate commanders in the Trans-Mississippi realized
that by 1865 an attack on Kansas was impractical, and
therefore they abandon their original plans to secure
support for an Indian-Confederate raid.  
Heeding the advice of General Cooper, Leathercoat once
again focused on protecting the frontier by attempting to
negotiate a treaty with the Indians which would forbid the
tribes in the Indian Territory from traveling south of the
Red River.  Masking his racial motivations, he argued that
frontier citizens could not tell which Native Americans
were friendly and which were foes.  Leathercoat had a
single solution:  If all the various Indians tribes agreed
to stay north of the Red River, he argued there would be
less chance of accidentally killing members of tribes who
were not hostile to frontier settlers.  While the North
Texan’s argument seemed logical, the chiefs refused to sign
any agreement that required them to give up their rights to
travel south of the Red River and freely hunt on lands west
of Anglo settlements during the autumn months. 
Throckmorton, however, was able to secure a mutual
agreement which promised friendly relations between the
frontier settlers and the various tribes represented at the
council meeting.  After winning the best terms possible, he
returned to Texas in the early June 1865.  Upon his
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arrival, he discovered that General Kirby Smith had
surrendered the Trans-Mississippi Department to Federal
troops just two weeks prior to his return.88  The
Confederacy was destroyed.
On May 26, 1865, the rebellion came to an end once
General Kirby Smith surrendered command of the Trans-
Mississippi Department to Union forces.  The Frontier
Organization continued protecting the Texas frontier until
the latter part of the summer 1865 when the Federal
military disbanded its units.  Once the Native Americans
discovered that the Texas frontier was void of defensive
troops, the more hostile tribes resumed their attacks on
the settlers, effectively pushing the frontier line in the
Lone Star State eastward by a distance of 150 to 200 miles
from its pre-war position.89  It seemed that the Anglo
society which had existed on the southern frontier since
the 1840s was on the verge of destruction.
On June 10, General Philip H. Sheridan, United States
commander of the Military Division of the Southwest,
ordered General Gordon Granger to occupy the Lone Star
State with a force of 1,800 men and to establish strategic
interior posts between Galveston Island and the small town
of Brenham, Washington County.  General Granger entered
Galveston on June 19 and found the state in shambles. 
     234
Despite the pleas of Governor Murrah for county authorities
to protect the public property of the state, former
Confederates soldiers began stealing state property,
including guns, ammunition, horses, and wagons.  Some
soldiers even began looting local merchants and county
treasuries, as well as the state treasury in Austin.  The
ex-Confederates justified their actions by simply stating
that they had not been paid for their military service and
that they were only taking what was owed them.  The actions
of these miscreants stimulated general mayhem in the state. 
Circumstances did not improve when state officials who
feared prosecution at the hands of the approaching Federal
army fled to the safety of Mexico:  Governor Murrah was one
of those officials seeking asylum in a foreign land.  With
no official government in Austin and the county governments
in disarray, lawless bands formed in the state and began a
wider campaign of looting and murder.  The activities of
these lawless rouges promised to bring the full weight of
the Federal government to bear on all Texans in an effort
to restore order to the state.90
Throckmorton recognized that the uncontrolled violence
posed a threat to conservative Democrats’ chances of
controlling the state government.  As an able politician,
he apparently understood that Unionists would capitalize on
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the violence in an effort to secure political office. 
Throckmorton believed that these Unionists would side with
Radical Republicans in Washington, D.C., and as a result,
they would impose their political views on the citizens of
Texas.  On June 13, Throckmorotn wrote to Epperson that he
feared “Radicalism will prevail in the federal councils. 
If so, none of our sort will be elected [to political
office], for the simple reason that the people will be
easily persuaded that such things are done through the
advice of our friends.”  The North Texan continued that
“there must be another thing guarded against by us.  We
must prevent, if possible, too many men who were opposed to
Secession to run for office.  Whenever a man of an opposite
policy can be found who is conservative & sensible offers. 
We should show a willingness to sustain him.”  Thus,
Throckmorton revealed his views about the reconstruction of
his state:  Conservatives must triumph over the Radical
Republicans in statewide elections.  In essence, he and
other North Texans believed that the defeat of the
Confederacy was a golden opportunity to reconstruct the
state’s social and economic systems in such a way as to
protect the white supremacy on the frontier.  To
successfully achieve this goal, prominent frontier
politicians wanted to replace the antebellum plantation
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system with an economic alternative which would encourage
the former slaves, now known as the freedmen, to remain in
the same geographical location where their former masters
had held them in bondage.  Additionally, these frontier
politicians had to convince the state and national
government to continue their relentless extermination of
the Native American tribes which threatened to stall the
westward advancement of Anglo cultural and society. 
Throckmorton unequivocally supported the ideology of white
supremacy and was willing to sacrifice his future political
career to ensure that the frontier remained a white man’s
world.
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CHAPTER VI
TAINTED BLOOD: EARLY RECONSTRUCTION IN TEXAS, 1865-1866
The end of the Civil War brought drastic changes to
the people of Texas, as they faced the challenges of
reestablishing their state as a viable part of the Union. 
One of the most difficult issues for white Texans,
especially ex-Confederates, was accepting the results of
the war:  The Federal government was now in charge of
setting the standards for reconstructing their state.  To
make matters worse, President Johnson and Radical
Republicans in Congress did not agree on the method of
restoring the Union.  The political conflict added to the
confusion and misunderstanding among Texans.  While the
Federal government worked out its differences, ex-
Confederates and former secessionists sought ways to
maintain the pre-war status of their social and economic
institutions.1  
During the early days of Reconstruction, Throckmorton
saw an opportunity to preserve white political and social
dominance in North Texas.  He saw an opportunity to create
a new society where blacks were prevented from rising in
social status and planters were prevented from dominating
people in the northern region of the state.  Because the
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northern counties between Dallas and the Red River were
primarily populated with small farmers and mechanics from
the Upper South and Mid-West, cotton was relatively
unimportant to the region’s economy, and as a result, few
freedmen resided among the area’s white population.  During
the antebellum era, the North Texas farmers resented the
planter class which dominated the eastern counties of the
state and threatened to spread their influence westward. 
The small farmers on the frontier believed that the elite
planters were over represented, under taxed, and highly
subsidized by the state government.  In essence, these
farmers grew to hate equally the planters as well as their
slaves who were symbols of their wealth and dominance in
society.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
North Texas yeoman farmers who were ardent Unionists before
and during the war could also find secession and
emancipation equally unacceptable.  Considering that the
yeoman farmers often turned to local elites to represent
them in government, prominent politicians, like
Throckmorton, represented and protected this contingent of
North Texas settlers.2  
In order to ensure that the northern counties remained
firmly under the control of white citizens, Throckmorton
believed that two objectives had to be accomplished: 
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First, the Texas government needed to remove Native
Americans from the northern frontier to the Indian
Territory.  Second, the state government needed to develop
policies which would keep the newly freed slaves from
migrating to the frontier lands.  In other words, an
economic system would have to be created which kept the
freedmen on lands in the regions of the state where they
had lived in servitude.  As part of this policy,
legislators would also have to deny freedmen the right to
vote, especially considering that the former slaves would
support Republican candidates in statewide elections. 
Throckmorton believed that Radical Republicans would call
for greater racial equality in Texas, and thereby thwart
any plans to ensure white supremacy.  Throckmorton’s
position became clear early in the process of
Reconstruction.
Scholars typically divide the Reconstruction era in
Texas into three different phases:  Presidential
Reconstruction, which began in June 1865 and ended in March
1867; Congressional Reconstruction, from March 1867 to
April 1870; and Radical Rule, which ended in 1873. 
Presidential Reconstruction was ushered in when General
Gordon Granger entered Galveston with eighteen hundred
Federal troops.  He declared the Emancipation Proclamation
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in effect in the state; nullified all acts passed by the
Texas government after secession; and began the process of
paroling soldiers of the Confederate army.  Presidential
Reconstruction ended on March 2, 1867, when Congress
assumed control of the administration of the southern
states from President Andrew Johnson.  Radical
Reconstruction began with the adoption of the Texas
Constitution of 1869, and the election of Edmund J. Davis
as governor.  The military authorities officially handed
over control of the state to Davis’s administration on
April 16, 1870.  Radical Republican control of the state
began to deteriorate when Texas Democrats regained control
of both houses of the state legislature in the 1872 general
elections.3
Following the Union’s victory over the Confederacy,
President Johnson established provisional governments in
each of the southern states.  In Texas, the president
appointed Andrew Jackson Hamilton as the provisional
governor of the state on June 17, 1865.  The new appointee
arrived in Texas at the end of the next month.  Hamilton
was a reasonable choice for the position as he had served
in various state offices in Texas before the war and, like
Throckmorton, he was a noted Unionist in the state during
the secession crisis.  However, unlike many of the
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Unionists in the Lone Star State, Hamilton left the state
in 1862 and commanded a Texas cavalry unit in the Union
army.  As a result, Johnson hoped that Hamilton’s past
would make the provisional governor acceptable to Unionist
Democrats in Texas as well as Radical Republicans in the
northern states.4
President Johnson, like President Lincoln before him,
sought a speedy reconstruction of the southern states.  As
a result, his plan of reconstruction required the southern
states to renounce the right of secession and to accept the
abolition of slavery.  However, the president, a southerner
himself, was unwilling to demand that the southern states
extend the right to vote to the freedmen as a requirement
for readmission into the Union.  Therefore, Johnson left
the way open for southern lawmakers to obstruct the rights
of the freed people.
In late July, Throckmorton traveled to Austin where he
tried to influence the political decisions of Governor
Hamilton.  The North Texan hoped that political strife in
Texas would not stand in the way of his state’s quick
readmission to the Union.  Throckmorton hoped to achieve
two purposes in going to the state’s capital:  One, he
wanted Governor Hamilton to retain all county and local
officials then currently holding office.  Second, he wanted
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Hamilton to convene the state’s constitutional convention. 
Hamilton received Throckmorton and listened to his advice
but disagreed with the North Texan’s plan for readmittance
to the Union.5  
On August 6, Throckmorton wrote a letter to his close
confidant, Benjamin Epperson, in which he expressed his
concern over the political developments in Texas.  He
stated that Hamilton should “authorize by proclamation all
the county officers elect to go on and discharge their
several duties with the statement that if any county
officer had rendered himself obnoxious by his bad conduct,
upon the proper representation he should be turned out and
another put in [his place].”  Throckmorton believed that
the “state could be organized in one month” if these
measures were enacted.  Throckmorton also stated that
Hamilton did not completely agree with his assessment of
the political environment in the state.  The North Texan
then gave his personal assessment of Hamilton’s public
speeches at Galveston, Houston, and Austin, which clarified
the provisional governor’s position that civil rights must
be granted to the state’s freedmen.  Leathercoat stated
that Hamilton “was an abolitionists & glorified in it and I
fear that he is for negro suffrage & sitting on juries.” 
Throckmorton stated that “I am for remaining under military
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rule always rather than yield anything but an
acknowledgment that the negro has been freed by the act of
the govern’t & that we recognize it as an existing fact and
that we have no disposition to quarrell any more about it
or any desire to reestablish slavery. . . .  But I do
believe we will be enabled to adopt a coercive system of
labor.”  Additionally, Throckmorton stated “I take it that
it is our policy to look out for ourselves.  Certain it is
I do not intend to be abolitionized nor to be the aiders or
abetters in the further humiliation & degradation of our
people.”6
Throckmorton was clearly unsatisfied with the
provisional governor and other Unionists who had gathered
in Austin.  As a result, he suggested to Epperson a
contingency plan already mentioned and understood. 
Throckmorton stated:
One thing is well worth our serious consideration-
a division of the State when the convention meets,
or at least the ground work for it–Western Tex
with the foreign element here now & that to come
will unquestionably make this section purely
radical.  Think of this-keep it to yourself-with a
new State East of the Brazos our section will have
the votes-small farms & white labor can flourish-
we will have a dense population-Red River Co as
much so as any of our counties-but all this aside. 
My dear friend I feel very much like doing one of
two things-either settling quietly at home & never
appearing in any public capacity-or of emigrating
the first chance-I am thoroughly disgusted-wearied
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& feel that I should give up all public life
forever.7
With this statement, Throckmorton revealed his intentions
of making all necessary attempts to preserve the whiteness
of Texas, or at least the whiteness of the northern
counties.  
A frustrated Throckmorton decided that he had done all
he could in Austin and made the long journey back home in
early August.  However, he had not completely given up on
trying to influence the Hamilton administration.  The North
Texas politician wrote to the governor informing him of the
current conditions on the frontier.  Leathercoat stressed
that the judicial districts in his region were in a state
of confusion.  Apparently, the people of North Texas were
puzzled about changes in jurisdiction and even the times
when the courts should convene.  Throckmorton assured the
governor that “three fourths of the community & perhaps
greatly more, are really desirous of testifying their
loyalty to the government–at least such was the impression
made upon my mind with the people whom I met & conversed
with on my way from Austin.”  The North Texas politician
then informed Hamilton that he had received word of
increased Indian depredations on the frontier. 
Throckmorton reported that “the Indians seem to be worse
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than ever known before, and great numbers of the settlers
are moving.  Since [the] breaking up of the state frontier
forces, & withdrawal of other troops, the Indians seem to
know it, & instead of coming in and depridating as usual
and then leaving, they now remain in country.” 
Throckmorton concluded his letter by commenting on the
lawlessness in the counties on the western fringes of the
frontier.  He suggested that “a speedy opening of the
courts is the best remedy for such evils, and I will take
the liberty of suggesting that instructions from you to the
judicial officers of the state [ordering them] to hold the
courts as soon as jurors can be qualified will do much to
restore order & quiet.”  Leathercoat even acknowledged the
break down of law and order in his home county, stating
that “every few days there is a row & sometimes a shooting
scrape and as there is no person to issue a warrant of
arrest this sort of gentry have their own way.  Besides
[people] are refusing to pay their rents & the parties
concerned are powerless to enforce payment.”  Throckmorton
made it clear that the circumstances on the northern
frontier could be improved if the Hamilton administration
would enact practical solutions to the northern region’s
existing problems.8 
In accordance with President Johnson’s plan of
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Reconstruction, Governor Hamilton called on the counties in
his state to elect delegates to a constitutional convention
which was slated to convene at Austin in February 1866. 
The election of delegates took place on January 8, 1866. 
Voter turnout was lacking due to inclement weather, voter
apathy, and the fact that only those individuals who
qualified according to President Johnson’s general amnesty
proclamation, or had received an official pardon from the
president, could vote in the elections.  The increasingly
embittered Throckmorton, however, claimed that the voters
were muzzled and that the whole election was a farce.  He
argued that many North Texans believed that the elected
delegates would simply travel to Austin and confirm the
edicts of their conquerors.  Regardless of his personal
convictions, the people of Grayson and Collin counties
elected Throckmorton as their representative to the
constitutional convention.  He immediately left home to
join other delegates as they gathered in Austin for the
opening of the convention in early February.9
Texans in other counties also chose to send former
anti-secession men to the convention.  Prominent Unionist
delegates included Isaiah A. Paschal, Edward Degener, John
Hancock, Edmund J. Davis, Xenophon B. Saunders, Albert H.
Latimer, Robert H. Taylor, and James W. Flanagan.  These
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men typically supported a moderate position concerning the
reconstruction of Texas.  Their efforts at the convention,
however, was challenged by a strong contingent of former
secessionists, many of whom were elected to the convention
despite the fact that they were not covered under the
Federal government’s general amnesty policy and had not yet
received presidential pardons.  The most prominent of this
group of secessionists was Oran M. Roberts, who in 1861 had
been president of the secession convention in Texas.  Other
well-known secessionists at the convention included Hardin
R. Runnels, John Ireland, Dewitt C. Giddings, Reuben A.
Reeves, James W. Henderson, John W. Whitfield, and Thomas
N. Waul.  The former secessionists were reactionaries,
because they tried to preserve as much of the pre-war
status of the state as possible, especially concerning the
status of the freedmen.10  Despite the fact that the Dallas
Herald called the convention members “some of the ablest
and far-seeing men in the State,” the presence of ex-
Confederates at the convention led many loyal Unionists to
question the motives and legitimacy of the convention.11
On August 11, 1865, John H. Reagan, a prominent state
politician during the 1850s and a cabinet member in the
Confederate government during the war, sent Texans a
prophetic warning from his Federal prison cell at Fort
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Warren in Boston, Massachusetts.  Like other high-ranking
officials in the Confederate government who were captured
during the final days of the war, Reagan was placed in a
northern prison where he was indirectly afforded the
opportunity to learn more about northern plans for
reconstructing the South.  However, unlike other southern
captives, Reagan took it upon himself to share his newly
acquired knowledge with the citizens of his home state.  In
a widely published letter, the politico attempted to
persuade Texans to “adopt a course which would save them
from military government and from universal negro
suffrage.”  First, Reagan reminded his readers that they
were part of a conquered nation and that they should accept
the terms handed down by their victors.  He noted that “a
refusal to accede these conditions would only result in a
prolongation of the time during which you will be deprived
of the civil government of your choice, and will continue
[to be] subject to military rule.”  Next, Reagan suggested
that Texans should recognize the supreme authority of the
United States government and its right to protect itself
against secession and to accept the abolition of slavery as
well as the rights of the freedmen.  Finally, Reagan
revealed that the more radical members of Congress
considered it necessary for the ex-Confederate states to
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extend full civil rights to the freedmen.  Before any
southern state could reassume its former position in the
Union, its legislators would have to grant the freedmen
suffrage rights and equal access to the courts. 
Nevertheless, the Texas captive also suggested that state
officials could limit black suffrage by establishing
carefully constructed voting requirements, such as a
literacy test, residency statutes, and tax-payer
qualifications.  While some politicians heeded Reagan’s
advice, most Texans ignored his suggestions.12
Throckmorton knew that Hamilton did not trust him to
take part in reconstructing the state.  The provisional
governor based his opinion of the North Texan on two
primary issues:  First, he had failed to rejoice in the
defeat of the Confederacy.  Second, he received support
from the secessionists in his election to the convention. 
Evidence seems to suggest that Hamilton had reason for
concern.  In a letter to Epperson, Throckmorton shared his
thoughts on the major issues that the delegates would
address in the constitutional convention.  Challenging
Hamilton’s charges against him, he rhetorically asked,
“What excuse have these gentry for such insinuation?  None
on earth, except, I did not shout hosannas to our defeat &
ignominy, and because some who were secessionists have
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expressed themselves favorably to me.”13 
More important, Throckmorton discussed ways to
obstruct Federal Reconstruction policies.  He stated that
“if our people had moral courage, if our merchants were
patriots instead of greedy speculators we could tame their
radicalism and insolence.”  The North Texan continued,
saying that “we could sell & buy from Europe, or not sell
or buy at all.  We had better do this until they [Federal
officials] show a disposition to treat us as countrymen &
friends.”  Without considering that he was a rebel just a
few months before, Throckmorton stated that “if I had my
way not one dollar from the South or one pound of cotton or
tobacco or anything else should go north, nor should one
Yankee land here until we were treated as a Christian
people should be treated.”  However, he added that “as a
matter course when I speak of Yankees, I do mean not to
include all, because of these & of the foreigners who come
amongst us there are men who are an ornament to any country
or people.”  Obviously, this seemed to be a reference to
men like President Andrew Johnson who supported a
conservative approach to Reconstruction.14 
Apparently, the number of ornamental Northerners and
foreigners were few in Texas, because he venomously
announced that “I wish to see no yankee in my neighborhood. 
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I desire no foreigner of any class, and so help me God, I
would go home & spend all the days of my life, teach my
children honest industry, and live within the earnings of
our own circle than to see these cheating canting
hypocrites, or foreign scum among us.”  Part of the reason
Throckmorton held such disdain for northerners and
foreigners stemmed from his belief that the New England
states had been “contaminated with fashion & folly” and
were “carried away by fast living” and “luxuries.” 
Regarding northern society, he stated that “foreign
immigration, greediness for gain, an inordinate desire to
grow rich fast, crowded towns & cities, has enervated her
people.  They preserve but two distinctive elements of
their original character, yes three, one puritanical psalm
singing hypocrisy, chicanery, & a desire to get rich off of
other people’s labor.”  Fearing that the South would follow
a similar path of decline, Throckmorton claimed that if
“psalm singing, lying, swindling yankees & sour krouts &
blackguard Irish” infiltrated the southern states, a few of
us may grow rich, but as a “whole we become corrupted with
fast times.  With follies & dissipations and luxuries, our
children so grow up, they catch the spirit of speculation &
fine & fast living and finally they marry these d_m_d negro
worshiping skunks and southern blood is tainted & spoiled
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forever–I want none of it.”15  While Throckmorton championed
the preservation of white society, it seemed evident that
not all whites were equal.  White native southerners were
clearly deemed superior.
In addition, Throckmorton discussed an issue which was
slated for debate at the constitutional convention–the
right of African Americans to testify in court cases.  The
North Texan stated that he had “weighed in [his] own mind
all the reasons pro & con, and I am clearly of the opinion
it is wrong except” in cases involving their race which “is
just because otherwise laws for their protection would be a
farce.”  He further stated that “it is wrong because the
hell hounds of radicalism demand it of us a right [that]
many of their own free states do not allow, and wrong,
because if we yield, [it will allow freedmen] to sit on
juries, suffrage [rights], and finally to perfect social &
political equality.”  While Throckmorton was willing to
comply with the wishes of the President, he stated that
“upon these questions which the Constitution gives the
states the right to determine, I am for standing by them.” 
He then concluded by announcing that “if they have a
sufficient radical majority to keep us from our proper
place in the Government, why, we can stay out, and they may
be d_m_d.”  Thus, Throckmorton’s biased views were apparent
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prior to the convening of the state’s constitutional
convention in Austin.16
The convention assembled on February 7, 1866 with 62
of the 89 elected delegates present.  James H. Bell took
the chair on the motion of Throckmorton, called roll, and
verified the credentials of the delegates.  It soon became
apparent that the members were divided into two main
groups:  Unionists and Secessionists.  The Unionists were
composed of Republican Unionists, commonly referred to as
radicals, and conservative Unionists, referred to as
conservatives.  The faction of ex-Confederates and
secessionists was also divided into two camps: extremists
and moderates.  On the second day of the convention, with
James W. Henderson of Harris County presiding as president
pro tem, the delegates nominated several men to preside
over convention:  James W. Throckmorton, Hardin R. Runnels,
Robert H. Taylor, and Albert H. Latimer.  Because the
members considered their nomination too divisive, Runnels
and Taylor were removed from consideration.  When the
delegates voted, Throckmorton defeated Latimer by a vote of
41 to 24.  He received support of the more moderate
secessionist and Unionist members.  However, because
secessionists favored him, many Republican Unionists viewed
Throckmorton as unsound on the question of Reconstruction. 
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Remembering that Throckmorton was a staunch Unionists
before the Civil War, many Unionists believed that
Throckmorton had betrayed his earlier principles.  But,
whatever his earlier principles may have been, he now
believed that he was one of the chief defenders of
President Johnson’s Reconstruction policies.17
If newspaper accounts were reflective of popular
opinion, it appears that Texans were pleased with
Throckmorton’s election as president of the convention. 
The Houston Telegraph wrote “Hon. J. W. Throckmorton,
President of the Convention, stands confessedly in the
front rank of public men in this State.  He is a man of
great judgment and [has a] thorough appreciation of human
nature.”18  The Tyler Journal reported that “No better
selection could have been made and all parties ought to be
satisfied. . . .  He is a fine speaker, in every respect a
man of ability, and will grace any position that his State
may honor him with.”19  Even outside the state newspapers
were singing his praise: The New Orleans Picayune stated
that “Mr. Throckmorton is one of the most talented,
influential and respected citizens of North Eastern  
Texas. . . .  As soon as the war ended, he exerted himself
to calm the troubled waters and to restore harmony and
peace.”20  This widespread praise of Throckmorton’s
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reputation among the general public undoubtedly filled him
with a false sense of security, which might have
contributed to his eventual political downfall. 
On February 10, Governor Hamilton spoke to the members
of the convention.  In his speech, Hamilton stressed that
“the most important questions . . . grow out of the
emancipation of those who were formerly in a state of
bondage, and who still remain in our midst.”  He informed
the convention that “our former slaves are declared by the
Constitution of the United States to be free . . . let us
not deceive ourselves by the supposition that the nation
will fail to make that declaration good, or to redeem,
fully, the high obligations which it has assumed in this
behalf, before the civilized world.”  The provisional
governor concluded by stating that “there could not be
devised a more successful mode of procrastinating our
return to our original position in the Union, than to deny
to the freedmen, in our midst, those civil rights and
privileges, without which, to call them free would be only
to keep the word of promise to the ear, and break it to the
hope.”21 
As the presiding officer of the convention,
Throckmorton also addressed the assembled delegates, but
his inaugural address was more focused on bringing the
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state back into the Union than with ensuring civil rights
to the freedmen.  Throckmorton reminded the members that
they “had passed through a period in the history of our
country momentous in its character, and from which a new
era will be inaugurated.”  The North Texan continued by
stating that “as the representatives of the people of Texas
we have been intrusted, at a critical moment with her most
sacred interests.  We should act with the purest
patriotism, and, in my humble judgment, with a view to the
future–uninfluenced by past predilections or opinions, and
uncontaminated by passion or prejudice.”  Finally, the
presiding officer called on the delegates to “strengthen
the hands of the Executive of the nation, and by a ready
and willing compliance with his suggestions, show to our
Northern brethren that we are, in good faith, disposed to
renew our allegiance to the general Government.”  In
essence, Throckmorton informed the convention that he
favored the speedy reconstruction of Texas, according to
the policies of Presidential Reconstruction.  However, he
made no mention of providing civil rights to black Texans.22 
At the conclusion of Throckmorton’s address, the
delegates began debating several issues:  The most
important of these centered on whether or not the delegates
should take the loyalty oath and if they should declare
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secession null and void from its beginning; whether or not
the state laws of Texas passed during the years of the
rebellion should be claimed null and void (an issue
commonly referred to as ab initio); whether or not the debt
of Texas should be rendered invalid; and whether or not the
legislature should be prohibited the right to pay wartime
debts.  Additionally, the delegates had to decide if they
were going to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment, and they had
to define the future status of the freedmen.23  
On the first question, delegate Isaiah A. Paschal
introduced a resolution that all members should take the
“constitutional” oath.  After much debate and the
introduction of alternate resolutions, John Hancock of
Travis County, offered an amendment to Paschal’s proposal. 
Hancock’s proposed amendment struck out “constitutional”
and substituted “amnesty.”  Throckmorton believed that the
Federal government would more likely accept Paschal’s
original resolution.  He knew that if the convention
refused to take the constitutional oath, northerners would
perceive this as an act of defiance and even disloyalty. 
Throckmorton’s view reflected the general mood of the
delegates; and as a result, Paschal reintroduced his
resolution which passed with a majority vote.24 
In deciding whether or not the convention should
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declare the ordinance of secession null and void and thus
accepting that the Constitution denied the right of a state
to withdraw from the Union, the delegates declared the
state’s Ordinance of Secession void.  However, the members
of the convention did not agree on the ab initio issue. 
After much debate, the delegates decided that all laws not
directly in contrast to the U. S. Constitution would remain
intact.  Throckmorton supported the idea that the secession
ordinance was null and void, and he agreed with the
convention’s decision on ab initio.  One of the primary
reasons he supported maintaining the state’s laws centered
on his support of railroad development in the state.  If ab
initio had passed, it would have voided state legislation
concerning railroad charters and funding, essentially
delaying railroad development in Texas.25
The status of the freedmen was the most controversial
of the issues before the convention.  The members agreed
that the former slaves were freed by the Thirteenth
Amendment and that by taking the oath in support of the
Constitution, they had indirectly accepted that slavery was
abolished in the United States.  However, the delegates
were divided on the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment.  Throckmorton was opposed to the forced
ratification of the amendment, viewing it as an act of
     266
coercion by the federal government.  Following his lead,
the convention did not formally ratify the Thirteenth
Amendment; rather, the delegates claimed that taking the
Constitutional oath was sufficient enough.  However, the
delegates did suggest that the next session of the
legislature should take up the matter of ratification.26
The delegates were also divided on the question of
allowing the freedmen to testify in the courts.  The
majority of the delegates favored limiting the freedmen’s
testimony to civil and criminal cases involving other
blacks.  However, a strong faction of the delegates
supported giving blacks the right to testify in all cases
on an equal basis with whites.  Throckmorton believed that
the freedmen’s testimony should be limited to cases
involving their own race, and he stood unswerving on
allowing them anything more.27  Throckmorton eventually
compromised on this issue, offering to extend to the
legislature the power to authorize testimony in all cases
when it saw fit.  Apparently, Throckmorton did not believe
that the freedmen were mentally capable of participating in
the political process.  In addition, Throckmorton objected
to black testimony because he was afraid that it eventually
lead to complete social and political equality with whites,
especially in regards to suffrage rights.28
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Throckmorton was ill during the final days of the
convention and seemed to have little to do with its
official proceedings.  In his absence, delegates elected
David C. Dickson president pro tem.  On the last day of the
convention, the delegates passed an ordinance for a
possible division of the state.  It was rumored that
Throckmorton was the main force behind this move to divide
the state into several new states.  It seems that this
charge was overstated.  According to a report in the Dallas
Herald, William Jones was the originator of the resolution
which called for the dissection of the state. 
Additionally, the newspaper stated that Throckmorton “only
wanted the resolution referred to a committee.”29  However,
as previously mentioned, Throckmorton had entertained the
same idea prior to the convention, believing that North
Texas could become an independent state.  If the northern
counties had become a state, it would have been easier to
secure white supremacy in the region.  Considering that
this was one of Throckmorton’s political objectives, it is
probable that he strongly favored Jones’ resolution.
The stage was now set to elect a new government for
Texas.  The delegates at constitutional convention set June
25, 1866, as the date for state elections, and August 6, as
the date when the Eleventh Texas legislature would convene. 
     268
The quick action of the convention was pleasing to most
conservatives, but there were others who believed that
Texas should refuse to send members to Congress as long as
Texans were required to pass the test oath, or loyalty
oath, where citizens pledge their loyalty to the United
States government.  Throckmorton was part of this group,
and prior to the convention, he expressed that he was not
in favor of sending men to Congress if the Federal
government did receive the southern states back into the
Union as equals in the Union.30  Historian Claude Elliott
states:
Though he felt that the honor of Texas almost
demanded a refusal to send men to Congress under
such circumstances, he was not willing to advocate
such a radical policy.  In his heart he was one of
the bitterest against the radical group and the
so-called designated “damned Yankees’ in the
convention or in Texas; but his good sense put him
in a compromising attitude, and he never went as
far as he would have gone had it been for his
desire to create harmony and to make political
friends in both parties.31
Throckmorton’s bitterness toward the North was further
evident in his statements to Epperson regarding
immigration.  Epperson, who promoted the building of
railroads in Texas, was interested in increasing
immigration from the North.  No record exists of
Throckmorton’s opposition to immigration in the
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constitutional convention, but he objected to any act
designed to encourage it.  Throckmorton, however, was in
the minority, and he did not reveal his feelings on the
matter to the other delegates in the convention.  The
delegates in the convention decided to leave the matter to
the state legislature once it convened.32
The convention adjourned on April 2.  The meeting had
been more harmonious than many expected, even though many
issues were hotly debated.  Nevertheless, party lines were
clearly evident during the course of the convention, and
there was much contempt on all sides.33  Throckmorton found
it somewhat disturbing that some of his earlier political
allies seemed to favor the radical position.  Of James H.
Bell, he stated “in my heart of hearts I have grieved that
one so gifted should have suffered himself to be so easily
molded & controlled by one [Hamilton], who, through a long
career has shown himself so unstable, and such a
unrelenting enemy to the land that gave him birth.”  He
made the same observations about Latimer, calling him a
“radical.”34  Leathercoat then claimed that “these
gentlemen, who denounce everybody else as unsound and
disloyal, shirk the only great question before the American
people.  It is plain why they do so:  They are themselves
for [Thaddeus] Stevens & [Charles] Sumner’s policy.  They
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hate the President, & every now & then some of them in the
bitterness of their hearts leak it out.”  Generally
speaking, the North Texan characterized the radicals in the
convention as individuals who “drew their swords against
their country; who led armies to sack & pillage their own
state; who rejoiced in the ruin of their native & adopted
land; who shed no tears of sympathy over the utter
degradation of their fallen Countryman; who rejoiced in the
deaths of thousands of their fellow citizens; [and] who
laugh at the broken hearts & of the orphans & daughters &
mothers of their own land.”35  It seems evident that the
Civil War left Throckmorton bitter.  In his resentment of
the circumstances confronting Texas in the post-war period,
he blamed the extremists in both the North and South for
starting the war.  
While Throckmorton showed complete disdain for the
radicals, he noted with surprise that the secessionists had
been willing to work so closely with the conservative
delegates.  He stated that before the convention he “did
not foresee that the Secession party would lay down their
prejudice and act with so much discretion, and I am glad to
say, disinterestedness & patriotism.”  He further stated
that “the secession men said they desired to support
conservative men both to convince the [General] Government
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of their earnest desire for an early restoration as well as
loyalty, and to show the masses at home that we should
forget, forgive, harmonize and work like brothers together
for the general good.”36  Believing that ex-Confederates
were now willing to accept the consequences of the South’s
defeat and that Radical Republicans wanted to punish the
southern states for their rebellious actions, it is not
surprising that Throckmorton aligned himself against those
who supported the radicals’ agenda.  The factional
differences noted by Throckmorton would ultimately become a
pervasive part of the political landscape in the upcoming
state elections.
During the closing days of the constitutional
convention, members met in various caucuses to nominate
candidates for the forthcoming gubernatorial election.  Two
weeks prior to adjournment, a caucus of radicals nominated
A. J. Hamilton for governor.  However, Hamilton who was
worn down by the war and his efforts as provisional
governor, declined the radical’s offer.  After Hamilton
refused to run on the radical ticket, the radicals
nominated Elisha M. Pease as their gubernatorial candidate,
and they chose Benjamin Epperson as their candidate for
lieutenant governor.  Meanwhile, a conservative caucus
chose Throckmorton as their candidate for governor and
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George W. Jones of Bastrop County for lieutenant governor: 
Both men supported Presidential Reconstruction and opposed
black suffrage.  Though reluctant at first, Throckmorton
agreed to accept the nomination, but he realized that the
conservative movement which he was leading was in danger of
breaking apart if Epperson, a noted conservative, remained
on the Pease ticket.  The two men corresponded with one
another regarding the matter, and Throckmorton eventually
persuaded Epperson to withdraw his name from the Pease
ticket.  For his friend’s loyalty, Throckmorton promised
that if he won the upcoming gubernatorial election, he
would use his influence to assure Epperson’s election to
the United States Senate.  Radicals quickly replaced
Epperson with Livingston Lindsay.37  
The campaign for governor was characterized by strong
campaign rhetoric on both sides.  Radicals denounced the
work of the Constitutional Convention claiming that the
secessionists and conservatives had conspired to preserve
their prewar status.  Also, they suggested that if
Throckmorton was elected governor, he would immediately
forget his Union principles just as he had done in 1861
after the state had seceded from the Union.  Additionally,
Republican Unionists correctly charged that Throckmorton
would be an impediment to restoring the state to the Union
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because he opposed Congressional Republicans’ suggestion
that the southern states give the freedmen the right to
vote.  However, they could not make the most of this issue
because E. M. Pease also opposed universal suffrage for
black Texans.  At best, Pease was only willing to concede
the vote to freedmen who could read and write.38
Throckmorton and his supporters countered the
radical’s arguments by reaffirming that he supported
President Johnson’s plan of Reconstruction and that he
would work diligently for the speedy restoration of the
state to the Union.  The strong show of support for
Presidential Reconstruction resulted primarily from the
fact that President Johnson opposed giving suffrage to the
freedmen.  Throckmorton reminded the people of Texas that
northern radicals and their supporters in Texas favored the
social and political equality of blacks with whites and
that they called for an amendment to the U. S. Constitution
as to disenfranchise white southerners and enfranchise the
freedmen.  Throckmorton also claimed that the radicals
wanted to centralize the Federal government’s power over
the states, leaving the South at the mercy of politicians
in Washington, D.C.  Throckmorton’s rhetoric resonated with
the majority of white Texans who were opposed to granting
blacks anything more than their freedom:  Throckmorton was
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elected governor by a landslide majority of 48,631 out of
60,682 ballots cast.  The North Texas politician now
prepared to fulfill his agenda of protecting the frontier
and preserving white dominance in the state.39
On August 6, the Eleventh Legislature of Texas
assembled at Austin and declared Throckmorton and Jones the
duly elected governor and lieutenant governor of the state. 
While no instructions had been received from Washington
concerning the new government, the state legislature made
arrangements for the inauguration of the newly elected
administration.  On August 9, in front of both houses of
the Texas legislature and a large crowd of citizens, Thomas
H. Duval, Judge of the United States District Court,
administered the oath of office to the new governor.40
Throckmorton’s inaugural address presented the
legislature with a guideline for rebuilding the state and
for solidifying its restoration in the Union.  The
governor’s speech painted a somewhat biased portrait of the
current conditions in the state.  He stated:
At a time like the present, when we have just
emerged from the most terrible conflict known to
modern times, with homes made dreary and desolate
by the heavy hand of war; the people impoverished,
and groaning under public and private debts; the
great industrial energies of the country sadly
depressed; occupying in some respects the position
of a State of the Federal Union, and in others,
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the condition of a conquered province, exercising
only such privileges as the conqueror in his
wisdom and mercy may allow; the loyalty of the
people to the General Government doubted; their
integrity questioned; their holiest aspirations
for peace and restoration disbelieved, maligned
and traduced, with a constant misapprehension of
their most innocent actions and intentions; with a
frontier many hundred miles extent, being
desolated by a murderous and powerful enemy, our
devoted frontiersmen filling bloody graves, their
property given to the flames, or carried off as
booty, their little ones murdered, and their wives
and daughters carried into a captivity more
terrible than death, . . . unprotected by the
government we support, with troops quartered in
the interior, where there is peace and quiet;
unwilling to send armed citizens to defend the
suffering border, for fear of arousing unjust
suspicious as to the motive . . . under such
circumstances, with such surroundings, when so
much depends upon prudence, and so great an amount
of patriotism and intelligence is required, I feel
sadly oppressed with difficulties which lie before
me.41
After noting that the state had renewed its relations
with the Federal government and had recognized the end of
slavery, Throckmorton pledged his support to help the
freedmen.  The governor stated that he “would endeavor to
recommend and aid in carrying out such measures as [would]
insure exact justice to all classes of men, of every
political faith, religious creed, race and color.”  The
governor announced that the freedmen would receive the
protection “of all the rights of person and property
guaranteed them by our Amended Constitution.”  Throckmorton
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promised that black Texans would soon be convinced that
white Texans were their “truest friends.”  Obviously, this
was a claim that proved more rhetoric than reality.42
Throckmorton also reflected on a variety of other
issues confronting the state, including the dire conditions
of the frontier, rampant crime, the fair collection of
taxes, internal improvements, a reorganization of the
public school system, the establishment of a state
university, and the charitable care of “afflicted and
unfortunate portion” of the population, referring in
particular to the mentally ill.  At no point did
Throckmorton clarify that African Americans would be
included in these improvements.43  The governor’s failure to
provide equitable treatment to the freedmen and to their
white allies would soon prove costly:  In less than a year,
he would be removed from the office.
Two days after Throckmorton’s inauguration, President
Johnson sent a letter that officially recognized the North
Texan as the governor of Texas.  The same day A. J.
Hamilton received a dispatch relieving him of his duties as
provisional governor.  Throckmorton’s administration
immediately took possession of the state’s official papers
and property and assumed the duties of governance.  On
August 20, President Johnson issued a proclamation
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declaring the insurrection in Texas finished.  Throckmorton
interpreted the president’s proclamation to mean that civil
authority was once again superior to military rule in the
state and that Texas had been readmitted to the Union.44
On August 21, the legislature convened in joint
session to elect U. S. senators.  The legislators’ actions
foreshadowed future problems which would plague the state
until the end of Reconstruction:  Texas officials found it
extremely difficult to keep the peace between Unionists and
ex-Confederates.  While the legislature considered eight or
ten individuals for the Senate position, four men were
clearly in the running for the position:  Oran M. Roberts,
David G. Burnet, Benjamin Epperson, and John Hancock.  In
accordance with an agreement among the legislators, one of
the new senators would be chosen from eastern Texas and the
other from the west.  The candidates from the western
district included Burnet, Hancock, and former governor,  
E. M. Pease.  Burnet was easily elected on the first
ballot.  Roberts and Epperson along with five other
candidates attempted to secure the eastern district seat. 
Despite Governor Throckmorton’s promised support for his
friend Epperson, the ex-Confederates were successful in
securing the election of Roberts after thirteen ballots. 
Thus, the Texas legislature chose to send two former
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secessionists to Washington, a decision that later led
Radical Republicans to refuse the Texans their seats. 
Additionally, Congress refused to allow the elected
representatives from Texas, George W. Chilton, Epperson,
and A. M. Branch, to take their seats in the House of
Representatives.  The Texas senators and representatives
remained in Washington for a short time before deciding to
return to Texas.  Only Epperson stayed in Washington,
keeping Throckmorton abreast of events in the nation’s
capitol.45 
The state legislature took other actions which created
distrust among northern Republicans and proved detrimental
to Throckmorton’s administration.  Believing that military
defeat and universal emancipation of the slaves had already
caused Texans enough humiliation, the legislators refused
to ratify the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.  Additionally, in
November 1866, the legislators passed a series of laws,
known as Black Codes, which were designed to restrict the
rights of the freedmen in areas such as interracial
marriage, apprenticeships, and contract labor.  The codes
also called for segregation in public schools and on
railroads.  Furthermore the legislature reenforced the idea
that the homestead laws only applied to white people, and
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passed laws regulating vagrancy and convict leasing. 
Finally, the lawmakers afforded the former slaves limited
civil rights:  They could make contracts, sue and be sued
in court, hold personal and real property, make wills, and
have personal security, but they were denied the right to
vote, hold political office, serve on juries, or give
testimony in court except in cases involving other blacks.
In essence, the Black Codes reduced black Texans to a
position of semi-slavery.46  
Throckmorton’s approval of the legislature’s actions
placed him at odds with both radical members of the U. S.
Congress and Federal military authorities in charge of
reconstructing the state.  Two issues were especially
problematic:  the rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the passage of the Black Codes.47  The Black Codes failed to
meet the governor’s recommendation that the legislature
pass “laws to secure the protection of [the freedmen’s]
person and property.”  As a result, Governor Throckmorton
was unable to convince military authorities of the state’s
good intentions toward black Texans, and therefore, Texas’
chief executive failed to achieve the removal of “all
military forces and the Freedmen’s Bureau” from the
“interior of the state.”48  General Sheridan considered the
Black Codes as “oppressive legislation” which developed a
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“policy of gross injustice toward the colored people on the
part of the courts.”49  Regarding the rejection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the legislators simply followed the
governor’s recommendation.  On August 20, Throckmorton
recommended the “rejection of the proposed fourteenth
article of the United States Constitution, that was passed
by the late Radical Congress.  It is impolitic, unwise and
unjust.”50  This statement reinforced southerners’ commonly
held idea that the freedmen were socially and politically
inferior to whites.  Under these circumstances, the
military authorities felt that the state’s freedmen faced
serious danger with Throckmorton in power.
Even though the legislature did little to help
strengthen the relationship between the state and the
Federal government, Governor Throckmorton’s dealings with
Federal troops stationed in Texas between August 1866 and
April 1867 provides better insights into the degree of
cooperation which prevailed between the state and national
authorities.  The governor’s personal confrontation with
individual military commanders resulted from two major
problems:  First, the state confronted an increasing wave
of lawlessness caused by the refusal of white Texans to
accept emancipation of the slaves.  Second, Throckmorton,
though a Unionists prior to the war, had no intention of
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implementing political, social, or economic reforms that
were slowly gaining support in the U. S. Congress between
early 1866 and mid-1867.51  The governor made his views of
Reconstruction clear in a letter to James J. Diamond, a
prominent secessionist in Grayson County.  He wrote:
I hold that it is the duty of every patriot to
contribute his best exertions in behalf of the
country.  Heretofore at different periods of the
country’s history, the purest devotion to
principle have been largely in demand to save
American institutions and Republican Government
from destruction.  But at no former period has the
danger been so imminent or menacing. . . .  The
stars and bars have gone down, and will perhaps
only live in history.  But that which was failed
to be accomplished by war, will be fought for at
the ballot box.  Although many seem not to realize
the magnitude of the great contest now going on,
yet no great length of time, in my judgement, will
elapse before it is determined by the American
people whether their government shall be
perpetuated as it was intended to be by its
founders, or shall become a consolidated and
centralized despotism, more terrible and
oppressive than the most absolute monarchy. . . .
The experience of the past will arouse statesmen
and patriots to renewed exertions, and the ship of
state will be headed again on the old Republican
track, and the respective land marks of National
authority and States rights will be remarked and
more permanently established.  To accomplish this
victory the South is powerless, except so far as
she may contribute, by prudence and wisdom . . .
when I speak of prudence, I do not mean to guard
against useless expressions that can avail
nothing, or acts that are calculated to pull down
those who are storming the beach that we may be
saved. . . .  Such are the objects which our
Northern friends are now battling to achieve. 
Shall we aid them by reasonable conduct, or weaken
them by folly?52
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The governor apparently felt secure under Johnson’s
tutelage to affect minimal reforms and to strongly deny the
military’s role in enacting the adjustments demanded by
Congress.  Perhaps, if he had followed the advice that he
wrote to Diamond, he would have served out his term as
governor.  Unfortunately for him, he chose a different path
which placed him on a collision course with the Federal
authorities in charge of reconstructing the state.
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CHAPTER VII
EVERY EXERTION WITHIN MY REACH:  CHALLENGING
PRESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN TEXAS, 1866
Throckmorton’s governorship was characterized by three
key issues: frontier defense, his belief that civil
authority triumphed over military rule, and the governor’s
removal from office.  The North Texan’s attempt to preserve
white dominance in Texas served as the bases for the
positions that he took in each of these issues.  Regarding
the defense of the frontier, the governor wanted to remove
the Indians from the state’s western lands, making that
part of the state safe for Anglo settlers.  Also, if whites
were going to effectively keep blacks from enjoying full
citizenship, it was clear that the civil government would
have to be able to work independent of the military
authorities who were charged with the duty of protecting
the freedmen and their white allies.  Thus, the governor
sought to eliminate the necessity of military courts,
particularly those of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and to induce
military authorities to yield to the jurisdiction of state
and local courts.  Finally, Throckmorton was removed from
the governor’s office because he refused to accept
Congressional Reconstruction which promised to give the
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former slaves an equal footing with white Texans.1
By the time of Throckmorton’s inauguration on August
9, 1866, white settlers on the Texas frontier were
suffering from repeated Indian raids.  While the conditions
of the settlers were deplorable, the new state government
carefully approached the issue of frontier defense.  Some
legislators believed that the Federal authorities opposed
the idea of sending state troops to the frontier counties. 
According to them, the Federal government believed that the
Texas forces might later be used against the U. S. troops
in the interior of the state.  Though the legislature was
initially timid about protecting the western region of the
state, Throckmorton was not.  He had lived on the frontier
most of his life and had witnessed Indian raids on white
settlements.  The governor’s sympathies clearly were with
the settlers.  Before his inauguration, Throckmorton wrote
to the citizens living on the frontier assuring them that
adequate protection of their region would soon be
forthcoming:  He stated that “every exertion within my
reach shall be exhausted—the frontier shall be protected. 
We must first look to the General Government.  If that
fails, then [we will] take the burden upon ourselves.”  The
North Texan continued, “I shall urge upon the Legislature
the passage of such measures as will give me the power to
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defend the border, in the event of failure on the part of
the General Government to afford adequate and permanent
protection.”  The governor-elect then asked the people on
the frontier to send him as much information as possible on
the condition of their region.2  
During his inaugural address, Throckmorton reaffirmed
his pledge to provide protection for the people in the
western regions of the state.3  In his inaugural address,
the governor stated:
The condition of the frontier shall receive my
serious attention.  At the earliest moment, I
shall endeavor to secure from the General
Government adequate and permanent protection, and
will, at the same time, use every exertion to have
such treaties, made by the proper authorities, as
will insure future security to the people.  In the
event, a sufficient number of troops cannot be
procured from the Government, for the protection
of the frontier, I shall not hesitate to urge
expenditures by the State for this purpose.4
The ink had barely dried on the inaugural address when
the governor’s office was inundated with letters from the
frontier which described the intensity and horror of the
Indian attacks on whites:  Each correspondent asked for the
same thing—protection for white settlers until the Native
Americans could be removed or exterminated.5  
On August 14, the governor received a report from the
Cherokee Nation that “a party of thirty Osage Indians on
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their return from Texas with a large number of [stolen]
horses passed” nearby Washita “about a week ago and “thence
came two miles in the direction of this place where they
turned north towards the Osage Country.”  The report
concluded that their “intention was evidently to attach the
blame to the Reserve Indians in case of pursuit.”6  Another
report of stock theft detailed that four white men ran
across two different groups of Indians near the “mouth of
the Concho [River]” and that the Indians were in possession
of a large number of stolen horses and cattle.  According
to this report, “cattle in that section of country were
nearly all driven out,” and “many settlers have left the
country” because “a general feeling of uncertainty
prevails.”7  Numerous reports such as these crossed the
governor’s desk, and financial loss due to theft was a
commonly reported occurrence.  However, these accounts were
not as terrifying as those accounts reporting the violent
acts committed against the pioneers.
On August 16, T. Smiley, a trader in the Cherokee
Nation, sent Governor Throckmorton the grave news that a
potential Indian war against Texas seemed evident. 
Relaying information which he had obtained from Major R.
Miller, a former United States Indian agent in the Indian
Territories, Smiley reported that “the Indians of the
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prairie (Kiowas & Comanches) have had their usual annual
council and being represented by the Arapahos and others. 
They have determined to make war on the state of Texas with
renewed vigor.”  Smiley continued “I need not explain to
you the small amount of interest that the agents and other
officials on this side of Red River take in the welfare of
the state of Texas, and it would appear from the slow
movement of the Government troops that the protection of
the frontier is almost lost sight of.”  The Indian trader
then warned Throckmorton that “unless there is some active
measures taken, the people of the border counties [of
Texas] are bound to suffer.”8  Undoubtedly, this report as
well as other accounts of Indian depredations which
continued to trickle into his office strengthened the
governor’s resolve to protect settlers living on the Texas
frontier.  
Believing that one of the primary responsibilities of
government was to protect and to aid the people it served,
Throckmorton turned to the Federal military for a solution
to the frontier problems.  It seems ironic that he was not
bothered by the crimes being committed against the freedmen
and their white allies in the interior of the state.9 
However, it should be noted that most of the correspondence
reaching the governor’s desk during his early months in
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office was from frontier settlers who were pleading for the
state government to provide relief from Indian depredations
in the western regions of the state.  As a result, the
governor initiated plans to have the U. S. Army move its
troops to frontier counties in the state.
Throckmorton’s appeal to the Federal government for
frontier protection faced two major obstacles.  First,   
U. S. Army commanders believed that reports of hostile
activities on the Texas frontier were exaggerated.  Second,
the occupation forces distrusted the loyalty of the Texas
government, inferring that the state officials were only
trying to move the U. S. forces from the interior where
soldiers were protecting freedmen and white radical
Unionists from ex-Confederates and former secessionists. 
Throckmorton quickly realized that he would need to gain
the trust of the occupying forces if the frontier was to be
rid of Native Americans.10
In August, Throckmorton sent a request for frontier
troops to Major General Horatio G. Wright, who had replaced
General Granger as commander of the District of Texas a
year earlier.  General Wright replied to Throckmorton that
he had no authority to send troops to the western region of
the state but that he would send the governor’s request to
his superior General Philip Sheridan, commander of the
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Department of the Gulf.  Major General Wright also informed
Throckmorton that there were few available troops for the
frontier service and that current hostilities in Texas
against the freedmen and Unionists warranted keeping all
available forces in the interior of the state.11  
The governor undoubtedly was disappointed in Wright’s
reply, believing that Federal troops were no longer needed
within the interior of the state.  Throckmorton undoubtedly
weighed the evidence which crossed his desk:  The majority
of the reports reaching his office were concerned with
Indian depredations on the frontier, while reports of the
injustices perpetrated against freedmen and Unionists were
primarily limited to a few military reports.12  Thus, while
waiting for General Sheridan to respond to Wright’s
forwarded message, the governor wrote to President Johnson
on August 25, informing him of the conditions on the
frontier. 
Throckmorton’s decision to write the President was a
logical move considering that the governor had earlier
pledged support for his plan of reconstruction and
considering that the President’s views of the freedmen were
closely aligned with his own:  Neither man was willing to
afford the ex-slaves more than freedom from slavery.  Thus,
the governor may have entertained the idea that Johnson
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would order the military from the interior where its
primary function was to protect the freedmen.  In his
letter to the President, Throckmorton strongly suggested
that the settlers’ safety hinged on troop deployment to the
frontier, especially in the northern part of the state.  He
voiced his opinion that only a show of force could prevent
future Indian raids on the white Texans.13
Meanwhile, Major General Wright forwarded
Throckmorton’s request to General Sheridan with an
endorsement of the governor’s petition for frontier
troops.14  Sheridan was not convinced by his subordinate’s
assessment of the frontier conditions in Texas, believing
that Throckmorton was purposely exaggerating the severity
of the Indian depredations in an effort to obstruct the
military’s effort to protect blacks and Unionists from
their ex-Confederate neighbors.  Nevertheless, the general
promptly informed the governor that he had “directed the
District [of Texas] commander to send a cavalry force to
Fredericksburg or [in the] vicinity, from thence to operate
against such Indians and white men as are committing
depredations on this portion of the frontier.”  Sheridan
also noted that “as soon as additional troops are sent me
to establish forts on the frontier, it will be done.”15
While Throckmorton was trying to secure a Federal
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presence in West Texas, the state legislature attempted to
provide relief to the settlers by creating three mounted
regiments for service on the frontier.  In an effort to win
Federal approval for their act, the legislators placed the
newly formed regiments under the direction of the Federal
military with the stipulation that the volunteers could not
be removed from the state for detached service.  The Texas
legislature justified the creation of the frontier troops
by arguing that a majority of the Federal soldiers were
posted along the Rio Grande due to political unrest in
Mexico:  At the instigation of Napoleon III of France,
Maximilian was attempting to establish himself as emperor
of Mexico, and Federal authorities were concerned that
Maximilian might contemplate an invasion of Texas if he was
successful in seizing the reins of power.  Therefore, the
legislature deemed it necessary to authorize the enlistment
of the Texas frontier troops for use in the northern and
western regions of the state.16  
The legislature’s debates regarding the formation of
frontier regiments were published in various newspapers
throughout the state, and even before the legislature
officially passed the act, the governor received numerous
letters from individuals who recommended various men to
command ranging companies that might be raised in their
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region of the state.  Typical of these letters was the one
received from John Baylor on September 1, 1866.  He wrote
“I take the liberty of recommending for your favorable
consideration, Capt John Pulliam, as one of the Captains
for the proposed Frontier Regiments.”  Baylor then
presented the qualifications for the position, stating that
“Capt Pulliam was with me during the late war and was a
most efficient and excellent officer.  Should you think
proper to authorize him to raise a Company I have no
hesitation in saying that he will prove in every way worthy
of your confidence.”17  
The governor also continued to receive reports
throughout September from settlers on the frontier
outlining new Indian depredations and letters from
frontiersmen requesting that he provide immediate and
adequate protection of their homes.  In one such letter,
Jack J. Cureton, a noted Indian fighter, wrote that people
“in all parts of the country” were continually asking him
what he thought the governor would do to protect them. 
Cureton then reflected that “I answer them as I did when
talking about the election.  Throckmorton will do all in
his power to protect us.  I assured the frontier people if
we elect Throckmorton we will have a friend on whom we can
depend.”  Cureton then moved to central point of his
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letter, stating that “I have been solicited time and again
to [write] to you on this subject.  We want some
organization of a military character to compel men to there
duty . . . all eyes are directed towards Austin for relief. 
They hope to hear of our own countrymen being called out in
addition to the troops sent by the Federal Government.” 
The frontiersman concluded by stating that “the sentiments
of [the] frontier people who are willing to shoulder their
arms to protect their property, wives, children, fathers &
mothers if they are permitted to take part in the work and
they think that there are no men in the world so capable of
doing justice to the service as those who have lived and
battled with the enemy for the last eight years.”18
Throckmorton replied to Cureton on September 8 and
reaffirmed his determination to help the people of the
frontier, but he also revealed the obstacles that
confronted him in providing relief.  Leathercoat stated
that “I can assure you that I will give every exertion in
my power to the protection of the frontier.”  Throckmorton
continued, “the legislature is now considering a bill for
this purpose, and I hope they will do something.  But
unless they provide the means to pay for it, it is useless
to give me the power to raise men.”  The governor concluded
with a prophetic statement, “After the legislature does all
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it can, it may be that the General Government will not
permit us to call out men for this purpose.  I have already
called upon the President and Military authorities for
protection, and shall continue to press it in every
conceivable way until it is accomplished.”19
A more alarming report of depredations in Montague and
Cooke counties reached Governor Throckmorton’s desk at
about the same time Cureton letter arrived.  According to
J. T. Mosby, “a man by the name of Box was killed and his
family consisting of a wife & four daughters were carried
off.”  Mosby stated that “immediate action in reference to
frontier protection” was necessary.  “Something must be
done,” proclaimed the frontiersman, because “the
settlements on the frontier will be abandoned.”20  After
receiving numerous letters like those mentioned above and
reading the many newspaper accounts of the same stripe,
Throckmorton strengthened his resolve to provide relief to
the people living in the western counties. 
At the end of September, Throckmorton informed both
Secretary of War E. M. Stanton and General Sheridan of the
legislature’s act which authorized him to raise state
troops for the frontier.  The governor urged Sheridan to
accept the frontier regiments as part of his command and
stressed the need for troops on the frontier.  In his
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letter to Stanton, Leathercoat was more forward:  He stated
that if the General government failed to adequately protect
the frontier settlers then the “state will be compelled to
undertake it.”  The governor also expressed his opinion
that stationing Federal troops in the interior of the state
wasted human resources, and that “the troops stationed in
the interior of the state are of no service whatever.  The
laws can be enforced, and every class of our population can
be protected in all their rights, without the aid of the
military, and I most respectfully ask that the troops be
withdrawn.”21  He also requested again that Federal troops,
especially black soldiers, be removed from the interior of
the state, blaming them for inciting unnecessary violence
in the state.  The governor’s apprisal of the troops in the
interior seemed to reflect his own racist views:  He
unfairly blamed black troops for the atrocities occurring
in the interior of the state, rather than properly faulting
unreconstructed white Texans.22
At the end of September, Major General George W. Getty
replaced Wright as the commander of the District of Texas. 
Still waiting to hear from Federal authorities in
Washington, Throckmorton immediately wrote to Getty
apprising him of the situation on the frontier and
requested that he use his influence to ensure the
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protection of the settlers.  Additionally, the governor
wrote to General U. S. Grant, requesting that the Texas be
allowed to raise state troops to protect the frontier.  By
early October, Throckmorton’s campaign to procure troops
was being closely scrutinized by Federal officials and
military commanders.23
The governor soon received disappointing news.  On
October 11, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wrote to
Throckmorton that the President had considered the
circumstances in Texas in a recent cabinet meeting and was
disposed to provide the Texas settlers all possible aid. 
Stanton continued by informing the governor that the
President believed that the United States military would be
able to provide adequate protection to the settlers without
the help of the Texas volunteers.  Stanton’s letter to
Throckmorton reaffirmed an earlier telegram which General
Sheridan wrote to the governor on October 9, 1866. 
Sheridan informed the state’s chief executive that he would
not accept the Texas volunteers as part of his command. 
However, despite his suspicious belief that the Texas
legislature was conspiring to remove the Federal troops
from the interior, General Sheridan stated that “I have the
pleasure of informing you that additional troops have been
ordered to your state; that an inspector will be at once
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sent to the northern frontier of Texas and that as much
protection as we possibly can give to the frontier will be
cheerfully given, and also, that in the early spring the
frontier posts will be established.”24  
The Federal authorities’ refusal to allow the state to
raise frontier troops created an embarrassing situation for
the governor because he had already issued an order to
begin organizing companies for frontier service on October
6.25  In many of the frontier counties, the inhabitants
enthusiastically responded to the governor’s call for
troops and immediately began to volunteer for service.  In
early November with Federal troops on their way to the
frontier, Throckmorton was forced to rescind his earlier
order.  In writing to the frontiersmen, Throckmorton put
the best possible interpretation on his predicament.  For
example, the governor wrote to Thomas F. Mosby that “I do
not contemplate at this time, being forced to the necessity
of using them [state frontier troops].  Yet, I desired very
much that the company should be organized so that should
the absolute necessity occur I could order them out.” 
Throckmorton then updated Mosby on the Federal army’s
efforts to protect the frontier citizens.  He stated that
“eleven companies [of] regular cavalry, under Lt. Col.
Oats, an old experienced frontier officer, are ordered to
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concentrate immediately at Jacksboro.  I have asked and
believe I will succeed in the request, to have four
companies stationed in Montague, one or two in Cook
[County]. . . .  Finally, Leathercoat stated that he had
“such hints from Sheridan that I am satisfied it would not
do for me to order out the frontier reg’s at this juncture. 
This will explain the reason of my not rushing them in the
field.”26  Despite his awkward situation, Throckmorton had
reasons to be optimistic about the Federal government’s
protection of the frontier.
In mid-October, Sheridan initiated a plan to provide
protection to the western and northern counties of the
state.  The commanding officer wrote to Brevet Major
General Heintzelman authorizing him to post troops under
his command on the frontier if he deemed it necessary. 
Sheridan also informed Heintzleman that additional infantry
troops were en route to Texas.  On October 16, General
Sheridan informed Governor Throckmorton that he had
transferred command of the District of Texas to General
Heintzlman and that he had authorized the new commander to
concentrate the entire cavalry force under his command,
approximately 2,000 men, on the frontier.27
Additionally, Sheridan ordered Major G. A. Forsythe to
the northwestern part of the state to ascertain the true
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nature of the Indian threat.28  Throckmorton sent a dispatch
to Major Forsythe after learning of his mission.  The
governor urged the army scout to closely examine the
circumstances in Montague, Jack, Palo Pinto, Erath,
Comanche, Brown, San Saba, Llano, and Mason counties which
seemed to be the areas most devastated by Indian raids. 
The governor also wrote to J. P. Dumas of Sherman informing
him that Forsythe was en route to the area to examine
possible locations for additional fortifications.  In
essence, Throckmorton asked Dumas to function as a guide
for Major Forsythe and to inform him of the Indians’
devastating affect on the northern frontier.  Naturally, it
took time for Forsythe to complete his task.  As a result,
the deployment of troops was delayed several weeks.29
Desiring that troops be deployed to the frontier as
quickly as possible, Throckmorton wrote to the commander of
the Sixth United States Cavalry on November 5, 1866, and
inquired as to why Federal forces had not started their
march to the frontier region.  The governor warned the
commander that additional delays and continued raids would
force him to muster the Texas volunteers into service.30
Throckmorton’s impatience was unfounded.  Even as he
wrote to the commander of the Sixth Cavalry, General
Sheridan ordered troops deployed to the frontier.  On
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November 6, he instructed General Heintzelman to post the
second battalion of the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry at
Austin and to send the Fourth and Sixth U. S. Cavalry units
to the northern and western counties of the state. 
Sheridan also ordered Heintzelman to move troops without
orders from the headquarters in cases of emergency.31  After
receiving these instructions, the Texas commander ordered
eleven companies of the Sixth Cavalry to take winter
quarters in Jacksboro while he sent five companies of
Fourth Cavalry to Fort Mason.  Of the companies sent to
Fort Mason, one was to remain there while three were to
proceed to Camp Verde and one to Fort Clark.  While
Heintzelman relocated troops, he also left some soldiers in
the southern part of the state:  One company remained at
Fort Inge and two others were ordered to the subdistrict of
the Rio Grande border.  Additionally, the general sent
troops to reinforce interior post.  Ten companies in the
first battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry were sent to
major points in southeast Texas:  Two companies were sent
to Hempstead; two to Brenham; two to Houston; and four to
Galveston.32
The deployment of troops slowly proceeded, but it
appears that the U. S. Army reacted in good faith to
protect the citizen on the Texas frontier.  By the end of
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December 1866, the northern and western counties had been
adequately supplied with U. S. soldiers, and the troops
seemed to have been effective in curbing Indian raids.  The
number of the reports of new depredations declined in 1867. 
As a result, the frontier ceased to be a major issue of
concern for the Throckmorton administration.  The governor
could boast that he had been the driving force behind
protecting the settlers.  However, the governor’s threat to
use Texas volunteers obviously produced distrust between
his administration and the military authorities.  It seems
certain that Throckmorton’s persistence in demanding that
the troops be removed from the interior of the state to
frontier fortifications and the tactics of appealing to
General Sheridan’s superiors in Washington were two
contributing factors which eventually led to the governor’s
removal from office in August 1867.33
Governor Throckmorton’s problems with military
authority went well beyond conflicts over the deployment of
troops to the frontier region of the state.  A wider rift
between the Throckmorton administration and the military
authorities developed over the governor’s insistence that
civil rule was superior to the military’s authority in the
state.  After President Johnson’s proclamation on August
20, 1866, the governor immediately set out to solidify the
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civil government’s control of the state.  Throckmorton’s
task was nearly impossible, especially considering that the
Radical Republicans in Congress were challenging President
Johnson’s plan of reconstruction.  The infighting in the
nation’s capitol caused delays in transferring sovereignty
of the state from military to civilian rule.  In addition
to the problems in Washington, D.C., events in Texas seemed
to suggest that the state officials were unwilling to
accept the dictates of Reconstruction policies, especially
recognition of the newly won status of freedmen and the
protection of white Unionists.34  It was clear that
Throckmorton and other like-minded Texans wanted an end to
Reconstruction.
In his effort to reinstate the civil control of Texas,
Throckmorton repeatedly informed local officials of the
necessity of maintaining law and order.  The governor
requested county sheriffs and judges to practice impartial
justice at the local level:  He reinforced his directive by
stating that Union men, ex-Confederates, and the freedmen
should receive equal justice before the law.  However, it
is doubtful that Throckmorton acted out of a sense of
humanitarianism; rather, it seems more probable that he
simply desired to bring Reconstruction to an end.35
One of Throckmorton’s earliest battles with the
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military authorities occurred less than a month after the
governor’s inauguration.  This clash was with the Bureau of
Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned Lands, commonly known as
the Freedmen’s Bureau.  The Federal government created the
bureau on March 3, 1865, and charged it with helping the
freedmen make their transition from slavery to freedom. 
The bureau officially began its task in Texas in December
of 1865.  The first assistant commissioner of the bureau in
Texas was General E. M. Gregory, but General J. B. Kiddoo
replaced him in May 1866 prior to Throckmorton’s
gubernatorial election.  On July 16, 1866, Congress passed
an act which allowed the bureau to continue operating in
the southern states and gave its officers complete
authority over all matters relating to the former slaves. 
After Throckmorton was officially elected as the chief
executive of the state, General Kiddoo wrote to him
explaining the bureau’s purpose and seeking the governor’s
cooperation in helping the freedmen of Texas.36  The
governor responded favorably to Kiddoo’s correspondence
assuring the bureau commander of his “readiness to
cooperate . . . in lending all aid in [his] power, that the
duties required of you may be discharged in such a manner
as will ensure justice to that class of people who are
placed under your charge.”37
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While Throckmorton and Kiddoo exchanged pleasantries,
a crisis erupted at Brenham which would test the good
intentions of both sides.  The local bureau agent Captain
Samuel Craig arrested the editor of the Brenham Banner, Dan
L. McGary.  The editor had published several unflattering
editorials about James Whann and his wife, two bureau
teachers working near Brenham, and had criticized the sub-
assistant agent’s efforts to protect the interest of local
freedmen.  Fearing that the editor’s comments would arouse
the ire of local whites against the freedmen and the
bureau, Captain Craig warned the editor that the military
would arrest him if he continued to print slanderous
rhetoric about the bureau and its teachers.  McGary ignored
the subassistant’s warning and proceeded to publish his
defamatory rag.  As a result, Craig arrested the editor and
assessed a fine of two hundred dollars against him. 
Instead of paying the fine, McGary chose to remain in jail,
perhaps viewing himself as a martyr of the South’s “lost
cause.”38
After receiving word of the incident, Throckmorton
wrote to Kiddoo protesting the arrest of the editor as an
infringement of the Constitution’s guaranteed right of
freedom of the press.  Kiddoo responded by informing
Throckmorton that the editor had constantly used his
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newspaper to unnecessarily abuse the character of the
freedmen, the bureau, and the soldiers stationed at
Brenham.  However, in an effort to secure peace, General
Kiddoo reluctantly ordered Craig to release McGary. 
Subsequently, Kiddoo also transferred Captain Craig to the
bureau office in Seguin, Guadalupe County.39  
While the problems with McGary were seemingly
resolved, Captain Craig found himself once again at the
center of a controversy in Guadalupe County.  The bureau
agent actually had inherited the problems of his two
predecessors, Judge William Longworth and Lieutenant James
B. Moore of the United States Colored Infantry.  Longworth
was an ardent protector of the freedmen in Guadalupe
County, and as a result, General Gregory appointed him as
the bureau agent for the county in December of 1865.  The
judge, however, was unfamiliar with bureau policies and
began to use questionable tactics in achieving his noble
goal of protecting the freedmen.  Apparently, Longworth had
even stepped outside the law:  A bureau investigator
looking into complaints levied against Longworth stated
that the judge had reopened cases that had already been
settled to the satisfaction of both sides, compelled
citizens to testify even when their were no formal
complaints, kept freedmen from work for days until their
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cases had been heard, charged illegal fees, and made
unnecessary, vitriolic speeches to the freedmen which
served to disrupt the agricultural pursuits in the county. 
Judge Longworth actions understandably caused the white
citizens of the county to side against not only him, but
also against the bureau and the freedmen under its
protection.  Longworth became such a liability that General
Kiddoo replaced him with Lieutenant Moore.  After being
removed from office, Longworth returned to his home in
Sutherland Springs, Wilson County.  Lieutenant Moore soon
proved to be just as much a liability to the bureau as had
Longworth.  The bureau inspector who investigated the
complaints against Moore described him as a man of little
principle and a drunk.  It was also reported that Moore
solicited prostitution from freedwomen on the street and
that he was under indictment for gambling within the city
limits of Seguin.40
After arriving at Seguin, Captain Craig, under orders
from General Kiddoo, informed the judge that he should
return to Seguin and face the possibility of arrest for his
illegal activities.  Longworth informed Craig that he
feared for his own safety given his past actions as sub-
assistant commissioner.  The captain assured the former
bureau agent that he would be protected under General Order
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No. 3 of the Adjunct General’s Office in Washington and
General Order No. 5 of the District of Texas.  Both these
documents protected military personnel from prosecution in
state courts while preforming their duties.  Craig also
ensured Longworth that he would take personal
responsibility for his safety.  After the commander of the
District of Texas intervened on Longworth’s behalf, the
judge was exempted from any arrest and was shielded from
future prosecution.  
With Longworth safe for the time being, Craig turned
his attention to Lieutenant Moore’s indictment for illegal
gambling.  After Craig posted bond for Moore, the
lieutenant made a clandestine escape from the town.  While
disappointed that Moore had escaped prosecution, the
citizens of Seguin took some comfort in the fact that the
lieutenant’s last paycheck of $143 was intercepted and
distributed to people in the town whom Moore owed money. 
All seemed well, but when Captain Craig visited Judge
Longworth at his new home in Electo, Karnes County, the
former agent expressed despair that the ex-Confederates
would eventually prosecute him for real and unsubstantiated
crimes against the county.41 
Captain Craig, who was sympathetic to Longworth’s
circumstances, attempted to save him from further
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prosecution by securing all the court records relevant to
both Longworth and Moore cases.  When the local district
clerk of Guadalupe County, James Wilcox, refused to turn
the records over to Craig, the bureau agent had him
arrested.  Wilcox eventually surrendered the requested
documents, and Craig promptly destroyed them.  In early
December, the grand jury in the county indicted the bureau
agent for “stealing” state records and placed him in jail
without bail.  After three days, the military forced the
local authorities to release the captain.42
Throckmorton protested the military’s actions in
Guadalupe County to General Kiddoo and General Sheridan,
but both believed that the governor’s protest were invalid
given the circumstances of the cases.  By this time, Craig
had grown weary of the troubles in Texas.  As a result, the
captain retired from the military.  Once Craig left the
state, the controversy faded from public attention.43
At the same time that he was battling the Freedman’s
Bureau, Throckmorton was also contesting the authority of
the United States army.  His first opportunity to challenge
the army’s command came in early September when he
protested the actions of Federal troops stationed in the
coastal community of Victoria.  The chief justice of
Victoria County, C. Carson, wrote to Throckmorton claiming
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that the Federal commander stationed in Victoria refused to
recognize local authority and was protecting black troops
from criminal prosecution.  According to Carson, Federal
troops were not upholding the law in the county.  They
stood accused of aiding the escape of African Americans
from the county jail; of hanging a white man accused of
murdering a black man; and of arresting and imprisoning
various citizens of the county on false charges.  Carson
stated that all of Victoria was experiencing a reign of
terror.  Furthermore, the chief justice reported that
Captain Spaulding, commander of the forces at Victoria,
refused to turn over two black soldiers accused of
murdering William Walker, a white citizen of the county.44  
Reacting to evidence presented in Carson’s letter,
Governor Throckmorton wrote to General Heintzelman stating
that “these things are hard to be borne and I must
earnestly beg of you, that not only those soldiers be
arrested and held for trial by the civil authorities if
there is any proceedings against them, but also ask that
Captain Spaulding be arrested and tried by Court Martial
for not discharging his duty in this case.”45  Heintzelman
informed Throckmorton that he was “satisfied that many
illegal & unlawful acts have been committed by Capt.
Spaulding’s command” in Victoria and that he would turn the
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matter over to General Sheridan.46  
In November, Sheridan ordered that one of the soldiers
be turned over to the civil authorities for trial.  The
governor was pleased with the military’s response to the
circumstance in Victoria and believed that he had
effectively secured official recognition from the military
that civil authority was once again superior in the state. 
However, Throckmorton’s euphoria was short lived as another
conflict erupted between the civil and military authorities
in Brenham.47
On September 7, 1866, just two days before Captain
Craig left Brenham, a group of Federal soldiers of the
Seventeenth Infantry under the command of Brevet Major
George W. Smith apparently went to an African American
dance.  When they were asked to purchase a ticket to the
social function, the soldiers reportedly forced their way
into the dance hall and caused the breakup of the party. 
Some of the African Americans left the dance and went to
Duke’s Dance Hall where whites in the community were
holding their own party.  The soldiers followed the African
Americans and proceeded to break up the white gathering. 
Sometime after the arrival of the troops to Duke’s Dance
Hall, the white citizen fired at the soldiers, wounding two
of them.  Major Smith appeared on the scene with his
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company shortly after twelve o’clock and arrested two
citizens involved in the disturbance and demanded that
other be surrendered to his command.  Smith further
stipulated that the town would suffer if the citizens did
not carry out his orders within the hour.  While waiting
for the surrender of additional men, Smith’s troops were
reported to have patrolled the streets of Brenham.  Once
the hour had passed and no one was brought forth, the
soldiers gathered at Wyatt’s saloon and then proceeded to
ransack the town, breaking into Compton’s general store and
pillaging it.  At some point, the store was then set fire,
and before the blaze could be brought under controlled, the
inferno spread to several adjacent buildings, destroying a
large section of the town.48
After receiving word of the crisis in Brenham,
Governor Throckmorton directed the sheriff of Washington
County to restore law and order in the town, and he
dispatched a telegram to Major Solon H. Lathrop, who was
stationed at Houston, asking the army officer to
investigate the events which had transpired at Brenham. 
The governor also sent a special message to the state
legislature recommending that they appoint a joint
committee to investigate the matter:  They were instructed
to take testimony regarding the origins of the fire and to
     317
estimate the property damage which resulted from the blaze. 
Throckmorton then wrote to Lieutenant Colonel E. C. Mason,
regimental commander stationed at Galveston, and asked that
Smith and his company be removed from the area. 
Additionally, Throckmorton requested that Mason turn over
the soldiers who were involved in setting the fires for
civil prosecution.  Much to the governor’s surprise,
Lieutenant Colonel Mason’s official report of the incident
exonerated the army of any wrong doing.  He further
stipulated that citizens disguised in military uniforms
were actually responsible for starting the fire.  On
September 20, General Sheridan telegraphed the governor
that he had ordered Smith not to turn himself or any of the
men in his command over to civil authorities until the
matter had been properly sorted out.  Sheridan also asked
Throckmorton to aid him in calming the excitement
surrounding the crisis.  Throckmorton responded to Sheridan
stating that his office would cooperate with the military
but stressed that Smith and his men should be removed from
Brenham to avoid further turmoil.  Throckmorton also sent
word to Representative James Shephard, who was in charge of
the legislative committee investigating the fire, not to
arrest any of the Federal troops stationed at Brenham.49
Fearing that the military would not turn over the
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soldiers, Throckmorton wrote two letters to Henry Stanbery,
the United States Attorney General.  In the first,
Throckmorton sent evidence which suggested that U. S.
soldiers were involved in burning the town and asked
Stanbery to bring them to justice.  He also mentioned the
problems which had occurred in Victoria.  Generally,
Throckmorton wanted an order handed down from Washington
which would force the military authorities to recognize the
supremacy of civil officials in the state.50  
The governor’s second letter was more direct.  He
stated that “these cases in addition to others heretofore
sent to your office will show the necessity for the
authorities of the General Government to make known to the
State authorities how far State laws and the laws and
Constitution of the United States are to look to for
protection.”  The governor then asked whether the military
were subject to the President’s proclamation of August 19,
or were they going to be allowed to “continue to disregard
and override the rights of the loyal citizens of the U. S.,
leaving them powerless, and at the mercy of every petty
military upstart, who may chance to have bayonets to
enforce the edicts of a heart and mind too callus to be
touched with a single aspiration for the peace and
prosperity of a suffering country, and so benighted as
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never to have had flashed upon it a single ray of
intelligence.”51  Attorney General Stanbery replied rather
promptly to Throckmorton stating “orders have been issued
to the military authorities as will prevent the recurrence
of collision between the military & civil jurisdictions in
the State of Texas.”52  While Throckmorton was pleased with
the response from Washington, it seems certain that the
governor’s vitriolic attack of the military did little to
improve relations between his administration and the army
commanders in Texas.
The legislative committee proceeded to Brenham, but
found the military to be less than cooperative: Captain
Smith refused to allow the committee to question his
soldiers.  The committee’s official report claimed that
Smith was responsible for the incident and recommended that
civil authorities should detain him.  Subsequently, a
Washington County grand jury indicted the commander for
arson and burglary.  At that point, Throckmorton asked
General Griffin to turn Smith over to the civil authorities
in the county.  However, the military took no immediate
action to solve the matter.53  As the relations between
civil and military deteriorated, General Sheridan wrote to
General U. S. Grant that the soldiers involved in the
incident at Brenham were reported to be unarmed and
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inoffensive and that the townspeople’s insolent and
threatening attitude toward the army was the root cause of
the confrontation.  Furthermore, he added that the damage
to the town was minimal and that the buildings as well as
the contents inside them were not particularly valuable
anyway.54
Sheridan ordered Lieutenant Colonel Mason to come to
New Orleans and give him a detailed report of the Brenham
incident.  After interviewing Mason, Sheridan decided to
travel to Texas to personally investigate the matter.  Upon
arriving in Brenham and examining the facts more closely,
the general wrote to Grant again.  Sheridan conceded that
Union soldiers had, indeed, set the fire.  Nevertheless,
despite continued protest from Throckmorton, the general
did little to prosecute the matter.55  Though Captain Smith
appeared to be at fault, the military authorities
reassigned him to duties outside of Brenham, rather than
turning him over to the civil courts.  In July 1867, the
Department of Texas put an end to the matter by issuing a
special order that formally cleared Smith of all charges
against him.56
One more incident occurred in September 1866 which
afforded Throckmorton an opportunity to confront the
military authorities.  However, this case proved
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detrimental to the governor’s call for Federal troops to
leave the interior.  In a Bell County court case, Johnathon
Lindsey was accused of conspiring to murder two men named
Davis and Duncan.  Apparently, the history of the case
extended back to the Civil War.  Lindsey, a rabid
secessionist, was found to be connected with a gang of
horse-thieves in Collin County and was forced to leave the
North Texas region during the war.57  
At the close of the war, Lindsey returned to his
former trade in Lampasas County.  Fearing that two Bell
County men might have incriminating evidence against him,
Lindsey hatched a plan to save his neck from the hangman’s
noose.  He approached the Federal authorities and claimed
that Duncan and Davis had led a mob in North Texas during
the war which hanged his son for pro-Union views.  Given
the widespread knowledge of the Gainesville hangings, the
Federal authorities believed his story probable, and as a
result, the military arrested the two suspects, planning to
bring the men before a military court. Unfortunately for
Duncan and Davis, Lindsey was with the military unit which
arrested them.  At some point, he shot and killed the two
suspects for attempting to escape.  The grand jury in Bell
County issued warrants for the arrest of both Lindsey and
the officer in charge of the military escort, but the
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military authorities insisted that a military commission
try the case.  Furthermore, they refused Throckmorton’s
request to allow his attorney general to attend the
military trial.  All parties in the Lindsey affair were
acquitted of wrong doing.  However, Lindsey was later
arrested in Bell County and despite the assurance of
Governor Throckmorton to the military authorities that
Lindsey was safe in the hands of the local authorities, a
mob broke into the jail, seized the accused murderer, and
lynched him.  The inability of the Bell County authorities
to secure the safety of Lindsey was prejudicial to
Throckmorton’s claim that the state and local governments
could administer fair justice in civil affairs.  It seems
certain that General Sheridan would have used this case to
illustrate the necessity of maintaining troops in the
interior of Texas, but his own position was seriously
weakened by the events which had transpired in Brenham.58
During the early days of Throckmorton’s governorship,
Texas became a virtual killing field.  The frontier was out
of control with Indian raids threatening the lives of
settlers in the west.  Ex-Confederates nefariously
terrorized the freedmen and their white allies in the
interior of the state.  While these atrocities developed,
state authorities and military commanders vehemently
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disagreed over which citizens were in greater need of
protection.  Though underfunded and undermanned, soldiers
in the U. S. Army and the agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau
did their best to preserve the peace.  Despite some
anomalies, the Federal troops served admirably and remained
true to their mission, protect the rights of all loyal men
in the state regardless of ethnicity.  Throckmorton, on the
other hand, fought to ensure that white Texans dominated
the social, political, and economic institutions of the
state, especially on the frontier.  For him, as well as
many ex-Confederates the lives and rights of the freedmen,
or the Plains Indians, mattered little.  There was little
doubt that the governor’s attitude toward the non-white
population made him an impediment to Reconstruction, a
circumstance that ultimately led to his removal from
office.
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CHAPTER VIII
AN IMPEDIMENT TO RECONSTRUCTION, 1867
As the confrontation between the civil and military
authorities unfolded, the legislature was in session and
was debating laws designed to restrict the rights of Texas
freedmen.  Concerned about the controversies between the
military and civil authorities and worried that the United
Congress might establish complete military rule over the
state, John H. Reagan wrote to Throckmorton on October 12,
1866.  Reagan candidly told the governor that Texas had yet
to fulfill the North’s wishes, and he reminded his
colleague that the state had not yet made provisions for
black testimony in all court cases, nor had the legislature
granted suffrage rights to the freedmen.  The East Texas
politician questioned whether whites in his home state
understood that such actions would lead to the possible
loss of their own political rights, the perpetuation of
territorial status in the state, and the continued
rejection of their elected officials in Washington.  Reagan
reminded Throckmorton of his earlier letter sent from his
prison cell at Fort Warren on August 11, 1865, and observed
that the predictions he had made from his prison cell were
materializing.  He suggested that the continued existence
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of the Freedmen’s Bureau and military rule were the direct
result of the South’s failure to act judiciously.  Reagan
then warned that the state government might be terminated
at any time and suggested that further hardships in Texas
might be avoided if the state legislature would grant
blacks full civil rights, equal access to the courts,
limited suffrage rights, and equal but separate educational
facilities for African American children.1
After receiving Reagan’s letter, Throckmorton
questioned the appropriate course the state should follow
concerning the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U. S. Constitution.  As a result, the governor sent a
telegram to President Johnson on October 29, asking the
nation’s chief executive for advice in the matter.  The
next day, Johnson replied to Throckmorton request,
informing him that he had “nothing to suggest further than
urging the legislature to make all laws involving civil
rights as complete as possible, so as to extend equal and
exact justice to all persons without regard to color, if it
has not been done.”  The President then attempted to
reassure Throckmorton that the Union would soon be united
again:  He stated that “we should not despair of the
Republic.  My faith is strong, my confidence unlimited in
the wisdom, performance, virtue, intelligence . . . of the
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great map of the people.”  The President continued, “their
ultimate decision will be uninfluenced by passion and
prejudice engendered by the recent civil war, for the
complete restoration of the Union, by the admission of
loyal Senators and Representatives from all States to the
respective Houses of the Congress of the United States.”2
Throckmorton saw some validity in Reagan and Johnson’s
arguments.  On October 31, he delivered an address to the
state legislature which denied that ex-Confederates were
preying on Unionists and freedmen and claimed that Federal
troops were no longer needed in the interior of the state. 
The governor also suggested that the legislature pass a
resolution pledging law and order without racial
distinctions, and he urged the lawmakers to extend the
witness provision to include blacks in all court cases.  In
an effort to strengthen his position, he submitted the
letter that President Johnson sent to him the day before so
that the legislators could read it for themselves. 
However, he stopped short of calling on the legislature to
give suffrage rights to African Americans.  Despite the
governor’s recommendations, the legislators were unwilling
to give black Texans anything more than freedom:  As a
result, they refused to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and
instead decided to pass the infamous Black Codes, as
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mentioned earlier, which severely limited the civil rights
of black Texans.3
Soon after the legislature passed the Black Codes,
state officials learned that Radical Republicans had swept
the mid-term congressional election in November.  The
Republicans were now in a position to force the southern
states to provide civil rights to the freedmen.  The
Radical Republican’s success demoralized Throckmorton.  In
a lengthy letter to H. G. Hendricks, the governor
prophetically stated “our political prospects are to my
mind, quite gloomy.  The Radicals have the majority [in the
United States Congress] and from what we know of them, we
cannot doubt they will use it.  But there are some very
powerful causes that will perhaps make them somewhat
cautious.”  Throckmorton continued with the observation
that “the safety and stability of the public debt in which
their interests are much greater than ours, will perhaps
keep them within bounds.”  However, Throckmorton understood
that the South would experience changes.  He stated, “I
incline to the opinion that Hamilton and his especial
friends, [Benjamin] Butler, [Nathaniel] Banks, and
[Thaddeus] Stevens, will make a serious effort to destroy
our State government,” but the governor did hold out hope
that “the more conservative among the leaders, [Horace]
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Greeley, [James] Bennett, [Henry] Raymond, and [Henry]
Beecher and those who agree with them, will not consent to
this, and their influence will be thrown to sustain the
President in his veto of any bill that the extremists might
pass for this purpose.”4  
Throckmorton also commented to Hendricks on the
probability that universal suffrage for the freedmen would
soon become a reality:  He stated that “Greeley, [William]
Smith, Beecher, and some others are and have been all the
strive, in favor of universal suffrage and a general and
full amnesty.  I incline to the opinion that Chase and a
number of the other prominent radical leaders are for this
plan.”  The governor stated that he “believe[d] that many
leading democrats in the North will side in the same way. 
They go upon the hypothesis that there will be no
restoration, no peace, no stability of trade, no safety for
the public debt, until a compromise is made.”  Throckmorton
was convinced that “the Northern democracy [would] yield on
the suffrage question for the purpose of getting the
electoral vote of the South in the next presidential
canvas.  How far the President may be disposed to harmonize
on this point, I am not able to judge.  But I believe he
will agree to advise the South to accept such terms, but
standing firm upon his doctrine that the States have the
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right to fix such qualifications as they may deem proper.” 
Throckmorton also believed that “the proposed amendments
will not be adopted by three-fourths of the States.  And I
do not believe the radicals will go so far as to contend
that three-fourths of the States represented in Congress
are competent, though this is their theory.  But the truth
is they prefer negro suffrage to those amendments.  I am of
the opinion that such will be the solution of our
difficulties.”  For the governor the final question to be
answered was whether “we will agree to accept this, or be
afflicted with the Freedmen’s bureau, and a semi-military
government-and run the risk of losing our State
organizations and the disfranchisement of the largest
portion of our leading men to the extent of voting [or]
holding office State or federal.”5
In a letter to Charles R. Breedlove, Throckmorton
contemplated the way southern states should vote regarding
the issue of the suffrage amendment.  He asked the
rhetorical question, “Will enough of the Southern States
vote for the suffrage amendment to the Constitution to
carry it?”  He then answered, “I believe they will.  For
instance:  Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware would, having
nothing to loose except the principle, as there are not
sufficient blacks in these States, for any risk to be run. 
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The same may be said of Missouri and Tennessee, and I think
Arkansas and North Carolina, would also adopt it.” 
Throckmorton concluded, “the other southern states would
run too much risk in being onslaughted by negro voters,
unless such qualifications should be adopted as would
exclude them and at the same time exclude many white
citizens.”6  Without knowing it, Throckmorton had
visualized a plan of disfranchisement that would become all
to common in the New South of the 1890s and early 1900s.  
Throughout December, Throckmorton continued to be
consumed with the prospect that freedmen would be able to
vote in Texas.  The governor slowly began to frame his
arguments against universal suffrage in a format that had
served him well in the past:  He claimed that Congress was
going to coerce the South to accept black voting rights. 
Throckmorton wrote to Epperson that “if coercive measures
are resorted to, if the best citizens are to be degraded by
the laws of their country, if they are to be prescribed
with a mark upon them, denied the same proud and high
privileges . . . there can be no prosperity, no harmony, no
restoration.”  He then warned that “the poor negro will be
the greatest sufferers.”7  
The congressional victories of the Radical Republicans
brought about rumors that Throckmorton might soon be
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removed from the governor’s office.  He addressed these
rumors in a letter to one of his long-time friends in
Collin County, that “if it was not for the great injury
that would result to the country, so far as I am concerned,
I would be glad to be relieved from my position . . . it
makes me sad to realize that I am not my own man, and
cannot control my own actions but must continue [to be] the
slave of the public.”8  Throckmorton even stated that he
would resign his position, but he was afraid that a radical
would replace him.  Therefore, he believed that he had to
remain in office for as long as possible in order to thwart
the radical agenda.  
Throckmorton also knew that his standing with military
authorities was tenuous at best and that General Sheridan
would welcome the governor’s resignation.  Writing to
Charles R. Breedlove, the governor stated that “Sheridan  
. . . has some reason for making a lick at me.  I have
denounced his course in my correspondence to Washington. 
In one of my letters, I said that the great misfortune the
south labored under was being cursed by military satraps,
who had not the sense to appreciate the condition of the
Country and whose hearts never had a patriotic emotion.”9 
Assuming that Radicals in Congress would soon strengthen
military rule in the South, Throckmorton attempted to
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repair his reputation with General Sheridan and his
subordinate officers by recognizing their authority in the
state.  Nevertheless, while Throckmorton believed it
necessary to appease the military authorities, he still
attempted to ensure the removal of federal troops from the
interior of the state and to restore civil rule as soon as
possible.  Ultimately, it was these goals that led to
Throckmorton’s removal from office.
The governor’s first opportunity to work more closely
with the military came in December 1866, when troubles
erupted in Prairie Lea, Caldwell County.  A group of
Unionists sent a memorial to the Freedmen’s Bureau stating
that whites were persecuting the freedmen in the community
and requesting that the military come to their aid.  At
about the same time, W. C. Phillips wrote to the governor
that whites frequently were intimidating, cheating and
murdering black citizens.10  Throckmorton immediately wrote
to General Griffin who had replaced Heitzlman and asked him
to investigate the reported atrocities taking place in
Caldwell County.11  The governor also sent a dispatch to the
county judge in Caldwell County, stating that “information
from various persons has convinced me of the necessity of
asking from the military authorities assistance in
maintaining laws in the neighborhood of Prairie Lea in your
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county.”  Throckmorton continued, “I deem it just and
proper that you should know of my request, not to take the
administration of the law into their hands, but when called
upon by the civil authorities to render assistance as may
be necessary to insure the arrest and trial of offenders.” 
The governor concluded, “I need not remind you of how much
the good people of Texas suffer on account of the
occasional acts of lawlessness of bad & vicious men.  I
sincerely trust you will impress upon the civil
authorities, and upon your fellow citizens, the necessity
of the laws–It must be done.”12
Additionally, Throckmorton attempted to repair his
reputation with the Freedmen’s Bureau.  During the
temporary absence of General Kiddoo, William Sinclair
contacted the governor about the ill treatment of a
freedman accused of murder in the court of Wharton County. 
After receiving Sinclair’s correspondence, Throckmorton
dispatched a communication to the judge of the county,
requesting him to check into the matter.  Throckmorton
informed the judge that Sinclair believed that “a freedman
confined in jail for the killing of ‘Jake’ a freedman” was
not “properly treated as a prisoner & c.”  Throckmorton
then instructed the judge to make sure “that the prisoner
receives such treatment as is contemplated by the law, and
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the same given to white men under similar circumstances.”13 
The extent of the governor’s sincerity cannot be measured,
but it seems likely that Throckmorton sent this letter with
the knowledge that he could later use this incident to
strengthen his argument that his administration was making
an honest effort to protect the freedmen.  
Despite Throckmorton’s maneuvers to salvage his
administration’s reputation with Federal officials, events
in early 1867 prevented the two sides from cooperating with
one another.  The Freedmen’s Bureau continued to intervene
in cases where civil officials failed to protect the rights
of African Americans.  As a result, Throckmorton appealed
to Major General Griffin in several cases where local
authorities accused bureau agents of making illegal arrests
and of their refusal to obey the writs of habeas corpus
issued by county judges.  One such case involved the arrest
of J. C. McCrary of McLennan County, Doctor John Bell of
Bosque County, and a Dr. Irving of Milam County.  According
to the citizens in McLennan County, Lieutenant Manning, the
subassistant agent for the county, arrested the men without
informing the accused of the charges against them.  Even
though he was not familiar with the particulars of the
case, Throckmorton immediately protested Lieutenant
Manning’s actions.  Perhaps, if he had investigated the
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case more closely, Throckmorton would not have sided so
quickly with the accused supporters because the governor
was politically astute enough to avoid confrontations that
could not be won.  Doctor Bell’s crime was inexcusable:  He
had helped the other men castrate a young black boy living
in McLennan County, alleging the youth attempted to rape a
white woman.14  This case undoubtedly jeopardized what
little credibility Throckmorton had with the military
authorities in Texas, especially General Griffin.  
The commander of the District of Texas was outraged by
the McLennan County case.  As soon as his subordinates
informed him of the castration of the young man, Griffin
sent a letter to the governor.  He stated that “I have
directed with view to brining these parties to trial and it
appearing that the civil authorities are unable to hold
them.”  The general informed Throckmorton that the accused
would be detained “by the sub agent of the Freedmen’s
Bureau, at Waco, Texas, until otherwise ordered from these
Headquarters.”  Griffin concluded his letter with a stern
warning:  “If the civil courts are prepared to try this
case and can be relied upon to give impartial justice, I
will direct these citizens to be turned over to the proper
civil officer of the state.  If this negro boy cannot
receive full justice, so far as the law is qualified to
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give reparation for the great crime done him, and the
parties guilty of the same punishment for their barbarity,
I shall be obliged to take action as laid down in Sec. III
of the Civil Rights Bill.”15  The incident apparently ended
when Lieutenant Manning was order to consult with the
prosecuting attorney of his district and to take the
“proper measures and turn over Dr. Bell and [others] to the
civil courts for trial.”16  Since the accused men were tried
by a group of their peers, the results of the trial were
predictable:  The defendants were set free.  The outcome 
infuriated and disgusted Manning to the point that General
Griffin reassigned him in February 1867.17 
By January 1867, General Sheridan had become
increasingly concerned with the political conditions in
Texas.  As a result, he sent a scathing report to the War
Department in Washington, D.C.  The general questioned the
legitimacy of Throckmorton’s repeated request to have the
military removed from the interior to the frontier
counties.  Sheridan reported that during the last six
months of 1866, Indian depredations had indeed taken place
on the frontier, but the extent of those raids was yet to
be determined.  The general theorized that the attacks were
not very alarming and that the Texas governor was purposely
exaggerating the reports to convince Federal authorities of
     342
the necessity of stationing troops in the northern and
western counties, and thereby improving the economic
circumstances of the frontier population by providing them
with army contracts for their crops and livestock. 
Additionally, Sheridan alleged that Throckmorton desired to
remove troops from the interior as part of a plot to leave
freedmen and Unionists defenseless against lawless ex-
Confederates.18
As reports of violence continued to reach General
Sheridan’s office, he became more convinced that the
freedmen and Unionists in Texas were in grave danger. 
Sheridan wrote to Throckmorton stating that “there are more
casualties occurring from [ex-Confederate] outrages
perpetrated upon Union men and freedmen in the interior of
the state than occurs from Indian depredations on the
frontier.”  Fearing that troops would remain in the
interior of the state, Throckmorton assured Sheridan that
many of the men who professed to be Unionists were actually
criminals and sought the protection of the military from
civil authorities by claiming to be persecuted for their
political beliefs.  In an effort to prove Sheridan’s
accusations false, Governor Throckmorton called on county
judges to inform his office of the conditions of freedmen
and Union men within their jurisdiction.  The judges
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universally replied that all citizens received justice
before their courts, including secessionists, freedmen, and
Unionists.  The judges also stated that the crimes
committed against the freedmen often were perpetrated by
individuals who had drifted into their jurisdiction during
and after the war.  For example, the judge of Grayson
County revealed that many foul murders had been committed
in his county, but insisted that they were the work of a
band of outlaws which resided across the Red River in the
Indian Territory.19  Throckmorton seemed assured that the
crime rate in Texas was no worse than other states in the
Union and claimed that the military’s charges were
basically groundless.
As late as February 12, Throckmorton felt that he had
sufficiently appeased the Federal authorities enough to
save his administration.  In a letter to Richard B.
Hubbard, the governor analyzed the circumstances
confronting the state.  He wrote that “we cannot refer to
the past for a parallel by which to form a judgement as to
our future.  To your inquires I answer, 1st, I do not
believe our present State government will be abolished, and
territorial ones in place thereof be established.” 
Throckmorton continued, “2nd, I believe negro suffrage will
be forced upon us by Congressional action. 3rd, I do not
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believe the Amnesty Proclamation of the President and the
pardons granted thereunder will be declared null and void.” 
The governor concluded, “4th, I do not believe any
confiscation measure will pass.  In regards to the 2nd
proposition of negro suffrage I believe it is coming upon
us in some shape.  It is the very least of all the ills
which we are threatened by the Radical majority in
Congress.”20
Governor Throckmorton’s statements to Hubbard
suggested that he underestimated Radical Congressmen’s
desire to reconstruct the southern states.  On March 2,
1867, Congress claimed that President Johnson’s plan for
the South was essentially a failure and therefore passed
the first of a series of Reconstruction Acts over the veto
of the president.  This act declared that no legal
government existed in the southern states; that Congress
planned to divide the South into five military districts,
with Texas and Louisiana comprising the Fifth Military
District; and that President Johnson should appoint an army
officer to command each district.  The acts further stated
that the southern states would have to hold another
constitutional convention and adopt a new state
constitution which was in accordance with the U. S.
Constitution.  In addition, each state was required to
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adopt the Fourteenth Amendment.  When these requirements
were met, the state could officially apply for readmission
to the Union.  General Sheridan who commanded the
Department of the Gulf was appointed the commander of the
Fifth Military district, and General Charles Griffin was
made the Commander of the District of Texas.21
The Reconstruction Acts placed Throckmorton in an
awkward situation:  The laws provided that only loyal Union
men could hold office or vote in elections.  Thus, the
governor and many of those in his administration did not
qualify to hold office or the franchise.  The laws also
gave the military commanders more authority to carry out
the Reconstruction policies of Congress.  This naturally
proved problematic for the governor considering he had
obstructed the military’s efforts in the months prior to
the passage of the acts.  Thus, Throckmorton realized that
the military would now exercise greater control over the
civil affairs of the state.22
Because the military’s authority was strengthened in
the southern states, Throckmorton redoubled his efforts to
give the appearance of aiding the military’s efforts to
reconstruct the state.  Thus, he seized the opportunity to
aid the Freedmen’s Bureau in investigating alleged crimes
committed against freedmen in Marshall, Texas.  The
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governor wrote to the county judge in Harrison County,
requesting an official report of any “violations of the
rights of property or person of freedmen by the white race
and any violation of law by freedmen upon freedmen.” 
Throckmorton also requested that the judge send him “an
official statement as to the correctness of the charge made
by the agent that the civil authorities will not, and does
not, act in cases of shooting & robbing, as in fact in any
case of any imprudence unless the freedmen is the
defendant, for fear of disfavor.”  Throckmorton concluded
that “I trust civil authorities of your section will [make
every effort] to punish crime of any shade and character,
and if these charges are slanderous furnish me the
evidence.”  This call for a report on the crimes against
freedmen might have served the governor well had he not
expressed his own biases in his letter to the Harrison
County judge.  Throckmorton stated that he did not “believe
one word” of the bureau agent’s reports concerning the
criminal activity in the county.23
On the next day, Throckmorton reported to Major
General Griffin about cases involving crimes against white
Unionists and freedmen in Travis County.  He stated that “I
enclose you the response of the county [attorney] of Travis
County to inquiries made by me in reference to the
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freedmen, Edward Parsons & Mat Hewling, one of whom was
wounded & the other killed, and reported to you by Capt.
Porter from this place on the 18th December last.”  The
governor then defended the civil officials in the county. 
He stated that “you will observe, General, that the civil
authorities here done their duty in these cases.” 
Throckmorton informed Griffin what he believed to be the
true nature of the criminal activities in Travis County. 
He wrote “I am familiar with all the facts in regards to
the murder of Hewling. [The perpetrators of the crime] are
noted robbers & murders and through my exertions, aided by
the sheriff, Mr. Zimplerman of this county, in addition to
the offence already named, are also confined for
justification in the murder & robbery of Judge Doyle of
Hill County.”  Furthermore, the governor revealed that “it
was given out that Judge Doyle & his son were murdered &
robbed because they were Union men when nothing could be
further from the truth.  The band who murdered them . . .
are notorious scoundrels who have been fugitives from
justice for a year past.”24  
Despite his attempts to reestablish the credibility of
his administration, Throckmorton could not resist the
opportunity to make an impolitic jab at the Freedmen’s
Bureau.  The governor stated in his letter to Griffin that
     348
“I am not aware that Capt Porter’s fear of robbery of
freedmen during Christmas week were realized, but I am
aware of the facts that the robberies committed upon them
the previous Christmas were made by U. S. Soldiers, and
that the same class have repeated the offence frequently
since, not only upon the freedmen, but upon the white
persons also.”  Throckmorton then attempted to smooth over
his comments by stating that “I do not mean this as any
reflection upon the U.S. army, but I mention to show that
Capt. Porter would have more fairly discharged his duty if
he had stated that the soldiers were the parties who robbed
freedmen.”25  It seems certain that these types of comments
did little to improve relations between the civil and
military authorities.
When Throckmorton first learned of Reconstruction
Acts, he began to ponder the new circumstances confronting
his state.  In a letter to Ashbel Smith, the governor said
that “it is certain to my mind that Texas cannot long delay
action.  If we do 25-50 or 100 or more radical and negroes
will call a convention, adopt a constitution, elect
officers & c.”  He continued, “We must make up our minds to
this State of things, or we must act at once, and take the
initiative, and produced concert of action, and energy as
well, among our friends.  Action under this military bill
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is forced upon us, we do not adopt it as our action–we do
not accept it as the best thing we can get, or approve it.” 
Nevertheless, Throckmorton stated that “it is forced upon
us by a maddened and infuriated Congress, and put through
by the bayonet.  Therefore, as the house is burning, and
the soldiery are around with bayonets and will not let us
stop the fire, had we not better save what little they will
allow us, instead of . . . standing by doing nothing, and
permitting the flames to devour the women and children.” 
The governor concluded that “we must act, or the radicals
and negroes will act, and when they make a constitution
without hindrance, Tennessee and Missouri will be the
example.”26
Apparently, the governor believed it would serve the
state well if he continued his campaign to heal his
relationship with the military.  As a result, Throckmorton
redoubled his efforts to establish more cordial relations
with General Sheridan, now the Commander of the Fifth
Military District.  The governor sent a telegraph to the
general on March 27, which asked for a conference with him
to discuss how the civil authorities might cooperate more
fully with the military in executing the newly passed
Reconstruction Act.  Sheridan sent a straight-forward reply
that the civil authorities could assist in the
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reorganization of the state only by rigorously supporting
Charles Griffin and by advising the people of Texas to
participate fully in the work of reorganizing their state.27
The governor also believed that it might prove
beneficial to attempt to court black voters and attempt to
align them with the Democratic party and thereby disrupt
Radical Republicans’ efforts to organize the black voters
in Texas.  In April 1867, he called on Jacob Raney and
Anderson Scroggins, two black leaders in Texas, to meet
with him and discuss the political situation of freedmen. 
At the conference, Throckmorton attempted to persuade the
black leaders to move the freedmen into the conservative
camp.  The governor claimed that conservative Democrats
were the true friends of the freedmen and that they were
deeply concerned about the welfare of the state’s black
citizens.  Throckmorton proposed that the freedmen should
hold a rally and allow prominent conservative politicians,
such as Judge John Hancock and Colonel George W. Carter, to
speak to them.  Also, Throckmorton suggested that the
delegates at this rally should be given copies of his
inaugural address and the acts of the Eleventh Legislature,
so that they might see conservatives were sincerely
concerned about the well being of the freedmen.  Both Raney
and Scroggins saw through the governor’s ruse:  Instead of
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calling for a rally, they condemned the governor for his
opposition to the franchise bill introduced in the
Constitutional Convention of 1866, his approval of a school
bill that excluded freed children from its provisions, his
failure to prosecute outrages against Union men and blacks,
and his opposition to Congressional Reconstruction.28
While attempting to gain the favor of the military and
black leaders, problems continued to plague the
Throckmorton administration.  On April 26, General Griffin
notified the governor that sixty Unionists in Jack and
Parker counties had informed his office that the local
courts were prosecuting Unionists cases where they had
already been acquitted by the courts during Governor
Hamilton’s administration.  In addition, the general
charged that the courts failed to prosecute those
individuals who murdered and robbed honest Union men in
both counties.  Griffin concluded by saying “such grave
charges of maladministration if false should be disproved
without delay; if true the remedy must be swift and
effectual.”29  Throckmorton agreed with Griffin and wrote
back to him:
In this sentiment I beg to concur most heartily.
If the officers of the law are guilty, they should
not only suffer the penalty of such guilt, but
they should be removed from office as soon as
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their guilt can be established.  It is but simple
and unadorned justice that they should have an
opportunity to acquit themselves of the guilt
charged–they now have that opportunity–should they
fail to do so or should an investigation show the
truth of the statement, the law has clothed the
military with power and authority to make the
remedy swift and effectual.  I shall by no act of
mine seek to smother investigation, screen guilt,
or avert the blow where justice demands it should
fall.30
On April 29, 1867, Throckmorton wrote John J. Good,
judge of the Fifth Judicial District.  He called the state
official’s attention to the charges levied against the
courts in Parker and Jack counties and urged him to fully
investigate the matter to determine the validity of the
claims.  Throckmorton wrote, “Should your investigation
prove the truth of the dereliction of duty on the part of
the officers of the state or county you will have them
prosecuted to the full extent of the law.”  Then
Throckmorton revealed his desire to restore law and order
in the counties:
It is hardly necessary for me to impress upon you
the absolute necessity that exists that all good
law-abiding citizens of the country should unite
in allying excitement and prejudice and that no
ill feeling should be indulged in towards those of
our fellow citizens who adhere to the general
government during the war.  I am aware of the fact
from unquestioned information that there were
persons adhering to the Confederate cause in
Parker County who during the war committed many
serious violations of the law–doubtless the same
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has been true since the war–and while this is true
I know it from equally good authority that persons
in the same region who adhered to the general
government have committed the same character of
offences and it matters not who have been thus
guilty they should be punished by the law.31
On the same day, the governor made it a point to write
the county judge in Parker County.  Not only did he enclose
a copy of Griffin’s communication in his correspondence,
but Throckmorton also included a copy of the petition that
the Unionists had sent to the District of Texas
headquarters.  The governor’s intentions seemed clear: He
wanted the judge to know exactly who the Unionists were in
Parker County.  Throckmorton stated that “the charges
therein made against yourself and the county commissioners
and other officers of the county–as well as citizens
renders it but an act of justice that you should be made
fully acquainted with them–the laws must be enforced and
every person be prosecuted in person and property.  If this
cannot be done in your county, I shall deem it a duty to
call upon the military and see that it is so.”32  It seems
certain that Throckmorton endangered the lives of the
Parker County Unionists by sending their petition to the
county judge.  At best his actions represented poor
judgement.  At worst, the governor sent the information
knowing that the local officials would silence their
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accusers.
Throckmorton continued to monitor the situation in
Parker and Jack counties, and he eventually requested that
Griffin send a small force of twenty-five soldiers under
the command of an officer of discretion and good judgement
to Parker County.  The governor also continued to
correspond with officials in the county reaffirming the
sentiments that he had expressed in his letter to Judge
Good.33  As the events unfolded in Parker and Jack counties,
Throckmorton began to realize his efforts to work with the
military authorities was not producing any tangible result. 
Thus, the governor became less cooperative with Federal
authorities.
At the same time he was working to solve problems in
Parker and Jack counties, Throckmorton turned his
attentions once again to Prairie Lea, Caldwell County. 
Following the initial troubles in Caldwell County and
Throckmorton’s request that Federal troops be stationed
there to protect the freedmen, General Griffin sent First
Lieutenant S. C. Plummer to the scene with a small
contingent of men.  While stationed there, Plummer reported
to Griffin that the whites were orderly and that his only
opposition came from a disgruntled freedman, whom he gunned
down.34
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However, evidence suggest that conditions in Caldwell
County were not as calm as Plummer had reported to Griffin,
and the military had indeed run into conflict with whites. 
Throckmorton realized that events in Prairie Lea presented
him with an opportunity to embarrass the military.  He
wrote to John Ireland, a district judge whose region
included Caldwell County, that “yesterday I wrote to Genrl.
H. E. McCulloch and requested him to see you and confer
with you in regard to getting up all the facts in relation
to Lt. Plummer’s proceedings at Prairie Lea in ordering off
the citizens of that vicinity and as to the death and
killing of Burns [a freedman].”  Throckmorton continued to
inform Judge Ireland that he wanted “sworn statements as to
Hoppler’s [who had been ordered off his land] character–
also any facts that will go to prove the bad character or
good conduct of Plummer.  The sworn statement of any facts
that will show the true state of the case relating to the
death of Burns.”  Throckmorton concluded by stating that
“it strikes me that Plammer and his men who killed Burns
should be indicted for murder–if the facts warrant such a
conclusion, but as a matter of course this depends upon the
facts.”  Throckmorton made clear that he “would try and
expose all the villainy they [radicals and Federal troops]
commit, though it may cause my removal–therefore any
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information in regard to affairs at Prairie Lea, I
desire.”35
Additionally, the governor became engaged in more
disagreements with the military authorities.  Nowhere was
this more evident than in the Huntsville prison
controversy.  In early 1867, General William H. Sinclair
visited the state prison and reported to General Griffin
that nearly three-fourths of the black convicts were
unjustly imprisoned.  Sinclair revealed that one black
prisoner had received a two-year sentence for the theft of
a single dollar.  In all, the general reported 209 such
cases.  General Griffin requested that Governor
Throckmorton investigate the unjust imprisonment of African
Americans and when appropriate issue pardons.  The governor
flatly refused.  Although most of the prisoners in question
eventually received pardons or at least reduced sentences,
the prison controversy illustrated the conflict which
existed between the military and civil authorities.  The
military clearly was attempting to enact equitable social
reforms, which the civil government and the majority of
white Texans were not willing to accept.36
In late March, the military authorities began to carry
out the dictates of Congressional Reconstruction.  On March
28, General Griffin began the process of reorganizing the
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state government and registering voters.  He requested that
the governor supply his office with a list of the counties
and county seats.  Throckmorton complied with Griffin’s
request and offered to help aid the general in his task of
reorganizing the state.37
On April 3, the governor wrote to Griffin to inquire
if the new reconstruction law allowed him to appoint
individuals to vacancies in the state and county offices,
or whether he should call for elections to fill the
positions.  Unsure of how these vacancies should be filled,
Griffin forwarded Throckmorton’s inquiry to General
Sheridan, who in turn informed the governor that he could
neither make appoints nor call for elections.  Furthermore,
Sheridan revealed that Congress had taken the power of
calling for elections and making appointments away from the
civil authorities and placed those duties in the hands of
the military commanders.38
On April 4, Griffin continued his efforts to register
loyal voters in the state, requesting the governor to
furnish his office with a list of all men, irrespective of
color, who could qualify to act as voter registers.  These
men had to be able to pass the oath of office as prescribed
by Congress on July 2, 1862.39  Four days later,
Throckmorton issued a circular address to the county judges
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asking them to furnish him with a list that would fulfill
Griffin’s request.40  The judges apparently completed their
task in a timely fashion, and Throckmorton promptly
forwarded their reports to General Griffin.  The governor
took pride in the fact that the local judges had quickly
complied with his request, and he commented to the general
“I respectfully invite your attention to the promptitude of
this action of the county judges, and especially to the
spirit manifested to observe the law and aid in its
executions.”41
Despite the prompt actions of the governor and the
local judges, Griffin distrusted the true motives of Texas
officials.  On March 28, the Texas commander wrote to
Sheridan that none of the civil officers in the state were
trustworthy.  He pointed out that Throckmorton was
unwilling to punish individuals who committed crimes
against Union men and freedmen.  As a result of the
governor’s inability to carry out the laws of the state,
General Griffin recommended that Throckmorton, as well as
members of his administration, should be removed from
office and replaced with good Union men.  On April 2,
General Sheridan wrote to his superior General U. S. Grant
that he believed Griffin was correct in his assessment of
the Texas officials and that he agreed that many of the
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state officials should be removed from public office. 
Grant promptly replied to the commander of the Fifth
Military District that no elected officials should be
removed from office because there were still legal
questions about whether or not the military had the
authority to take such actions.42
On April 22 and 24, Throckmorton transmitted to
Griffin a list of people who qualified to serve as the
assessor and collector of taxes for Bastrop and Comanche
counties and also a list of citizens who had taken the
loyalty oath.  The general promptly returned the
applications to the governor with a message that stated
“daily applications are made to me by many, and you have
recommended so many persons as qualified to take the oath
as registrants that I am disinclined and have decided not
to appoint any to vacancies, who cannot take the oath of
July, 1862.”  Throckmorton replied to the commanding
general that he had made no recommendations and that his
intention was merely to aid the general in his task of
reorganizing the state.  This incident clearly illustrated
the growing divide between the Throckmorton’s
administration and the military authorities.43  
On April 27, the next controversy between the civil
and military officials centered upon General Griffin’s
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Circular Order No. 13, also known as the Jury Order.  It
stated that only those individuals who had taken the iron-
clad oath, which claimed that an individual had never borne
arms against the United States or supported the Confederacy
in any way, were allowed to serve as jurors in the civil
courts of Texas.  Additionally, the order reaffirmed that
loyal citizens should not be excluded from the jury box on
account of color.  Griffin instructed Governor Throckmorton
to distribute the copies of the order to the county judges
and to see that they were enforced.  The general hoped that
juries would soon be filled with loyal Union men and that
they would be able to protect radicals and freedmen in the
local courts.  It seems certain that Throckmorton did not
share Griffin’s enthusiasm for giving Radical Republicans
and freedmen the unrestricted right to serve on juries. 
More likely, the governor shared the same view as the
editor of the Galveston Daily News, who stated that it
“would be [better] to leave the active duties of the
government, political and judicial, in the hands of the
white race . . . [and] it would be much the better plan to
give the negroes, for the present, no more rights than they
now enjoy.”44
The governor complied with Griffin’s order but sent a
communication to President Johnson expressing concern over
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the matter.45  The state’s chief executive promised the
President that the jury order would be properly executed if
it was found to be constitutional.  Furthermore, he made
the case that “federal judges holding courts of the United
States for this state have ruled the petit jurors of their
court are not required to take the oath contained in the
order referred to.”  In addition, Throckmorton expressed
the belief that the execution of the order would result in
the confusion and demoralization of the state’s court
system.46  Perhaps hoping to intimidate Griffin into
rescinding his order, Throckmorton sent the general a copy
of his letter to the President.47  However, it is likely
that the governor’s letter only served to widen the rift
between his administration and the military commanders.
Just as Throckmorton predicted, the courts found it
difficult to function under Circular Order No. 13.  Judge
Good could not hold court in Parker County.  He succeeded
in getting one petit juror in Tarrant County and a few in
Dallas County.  Judge Harrison failed to organize a jury
for Coryell County.  In McLennan County, he was more
successful, compiling a jury of both black and white
citizens.  Reacting to citizen complaints, General Griffin
requested that Throckmorton send him a list of the judges
who could not organize their courts under the Jury Order:
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Throckmorton smugly replied that he had no accurate and
complete information concerning the matter, which
undoubtedly served to raise the ire and suspicions of the
general.48
Throckmorton was not oblivious to General Sheridan and
Griffin’s disdain for him and his government.  Since he had
written many unflattering letters to Sheridan and Griffin’s
superiors often referring to them as “military satraps,”
the governor clearly understood his position with the
commanders was tenuous at best.49  There is little doubt
that the governor’s comments as well as his obstructive
acts led the military commanders to renew their efforts to
remove the state’s chief executive.
Benjamin Epperson, who was in still in Washington,
D.C., wrote to Throckmorton warning him that he was in
political danger.  He informed his friend that Sheridan had
demonstrated his power to strike at top public officials by
removing Governor James M. Wells of Louisiana from office. 
Epperson felt that a lack of public outcry concerning
Sheridan’s removal of the Louisiana governor ensured that
Throckmorton would experience a similar fate.50  
Epperson’s fears proved well founded because on July
25, Sheridan wrote to Grant again, stating that the crime
rate in Texas was up and that Throckmorton was partly
     363
responsible for the atrocities committed against the
freedmen and their white allies.  Furthermore, the general
stated that the governor had obstructed the ability of the
military to maintain peace in the state and had remained an
obstacle to black suffrage.  As a result, Sheridan stated
that Throckmorton’s removal from office was absolutely
necessary if the freedmen’s political rights were to be
protected.51
With the passing of summer of 1867, it became evident
that Throckmorton would be removed from office.  On July
19, a second supplementary reconstruction act became law. 
The new law gave military commanders of the military
districts in the South full power to remove uncooperative
state and local officials from office.  The way was now
legally clear for the governor’s removal.  On July 30,
General Sheridan issued Special Order No. 105 ending
Governor Throckmorton’s term as governor after less than a
year in office.52  Sheridan sent the governor the following
message:
A careful consideration of the reports of Brevet
Major General Charles Griffin, United States army,
shows that J. W. Throckmorton, Governor of Texas,
is an impediment to the reconstruction of that
state under the law; he is thereby removed from
that office.  E. M. Pease is hereby appointed in
place of J. W. Throckmorton, removed.  He will be
obeyed and respected accordingly.53
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Thus, Throckmorton’s term as governor of the Lone Star
State came to an abrupt end.  The governor’s inability to
accept the freedmen as the equal of the white men, and his
repeated attempts to obstruct the military’s efforts to
carry out the Reconstruction Acts led to his political
downfall.  His views toward Reconstruction policy had
caused him to side against white Unionists who supported
the Radical Republicans’ agenda of providing civil rights
to American Americans.  The North Texan could not bring
himself to support even the moderate position of E. M.
Pease who called for limited suffrage rights for the
freedmen.  The ex-governor believed that the radical
Unionists’ position would eventually lead to equal rights
for blacks and would provide them the necessary mobility to
move in mass toward the northern region of Texas.
Throckmorton, however, did not go quietly into the
night:  As stated in a letter to Epperson, he announced his
intention “to fire a few shots that will place the military
in their true light, and show the condition of affairs in
Texas.”54  The deposed governor immediately prepared an
“Address to the People of Texas,” which reviewed his
relations with the military authorities and refuted the
charges that he was an impediment to Reconstruction.  The
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former governor wrote that he had exhibited every effort to
follow Federal laws, had aided General Sheridan and his
subordinates in Texas, and had maintained peace in the
state.  Furthermore, he declared that the military had
interfered with the civil courts and juries.  Throckmorton
claimed that the actions of the military had thrown civil
administration of the state into disorder and had aroused
bitterness and apprehension in the hearts of the people. 
Despite the vitriolic commentary toward the military,
Throckmorton concluded his address by advising the people
to abide by the laws, to be kind to the freedmen, to refute
by their conduct the Radical charges of disloyalty, to
register if allowed to do so, and to elect good
conservative men to office.55
Back in his Collin County home, the ex-governor could
take some comfort that his administration was unofficially
exonerated by President Johnson.  During an interview, a
reporter asked the president if he believed Throckmorton
“had attempted to thwart the General in a proper execution
of the law?”  Johnson answered, “No sir, the records prove
the reverse.  The Governor of Texas also placed the whole
machinery of his State at the disposal of the military
power, and aided in every way possible, except in the
manufacturing of a Radical majority of voters, and in
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securing negro supremacy.”56  If Johnson’s comments were not
enough to please Throckmorton, it is certain the ex-
governor took satisfaction that the President relieved
General Sheridan as commander of the Fifth Military
District in mid-August.57  
While the President’s comments reveal more about his
own bitterness toward the Radical Republicans in Congress
than the realities of the deposed governor’s political
actions in Texas, it does reveal an important aspect of the
ex-governor’s removal from office.  Like President Johnson,
Throckmorton’s racial biases toward the freedmen and his
unwillingness to accept Congressional Reconstruction
ultimately led to his removal from office.58
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CHAPTER IX
FUELING THE FIRES OF REDEMPTION: THE STRUGGLE 
TO BRING DOWN RADICAL RULE IN TEXAS, 1867-1873
Once he was removed from office, Throckmorton returned
home and resumed his law practice.  However, the ex-
governor soon found himself drawn back into the political
arena.  Believing that Sheridan with the aid of Radical
Republicans in Congress unjustly removed him from office,
the North Texas politician began to seek ways to oust the
radicals from state and local offices.  Because he was
barred from holding political office, Throckmorton now had
to work behind the scenes to achieve his political
objectives.  By the end of 1867, Throckmorton was committed
to aiding the Democratic party’s efforts to reclaim control
of the state.  In part, his motivation was fueled by
racism.  In a letter to Epperson concerning economic and
railroad development in Texas, Throckmorton stated that
“our political condition must be vastly mended before
capital will venture here, and if the State should be
turned over to the ignorance & insolence of the negro race
and radical hatred and vengeance it never will come.”1  The
ex-governor’s hurt pride and his disdain for African
Americans led him to oppose Radical Republicans in the
     373
state.  The North Texan’s opposition guided him to take an
active role in both local and state politics between 1867
and 1876. 
Throckmorton’s first opportunity to challenge radical
rule came in September 1867.  According to the
Reconstruction Act of March 23, 1867, the commanding
officers of the Fifth Military District had to carry out
two tasks:  First, they had to register all qualified
voters in their districts.  General Griffin had
successfully completed this chore in Texas during the
summer and early fall of 1867.  Second, once the
qualification and registration of voters was completed, the
military authorities and provisional state government had
to call for a statewide election to decide whether or not
the state should convene a constitutional convention to
write a new state constitution which conformed to the
dictates of Congressional Reconstruction.  This element of
the Reconstruction Act was not yet fulfilled in Texas.  The
delay in calling for the county elections resulted from the
changes in command that occurred in the Fifth Military
District during August and September 1867.  President
Johnson replaced General Philip Sheridan with General W. S.
Hancock on August 27, and General Griffin, who died of
yellow fever on September 15, was replaced with General
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Joseph J. Reynolds.  The reorganization of military command
took several weeks to complete and presented conservative
Democrats, including Throckmorton, with the opportunity to
defeat the call for a new constitutional convention.  If
they could successfully defeat the call for a convention,
the Constitution of 1866 would remain in place.2
Throckmorton led the conservative charge.  His
personal political misfortune and his belief in white
superiority motivated him to assume a leadership role in
the effort to thwart radical attempts to reorganize the
state government.  The ex-governor claimed that Radical
Republicans had perpetrated a great injustice to Texas by
removing elected officials from statewide offices and by
replacing them with loyal Union men.  Also, Throckmorton
was disturbed with the methods that Federal authorities
used in registering voters.  The New York Times reported
that “Throckmorton . . . opposes the holding of a
Convention under the terms of the military reconstruction
bills.  He expresses regret at the apathy and indifference
of the people, saying that they have scarcely heeded the
last act of Congress, and the arbitrary manner of the
Administration of the recent acts by the military
authorities.”  The Times quoted Throckmorton as saying “the
impertinence and outrages of the county Boards of
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Registration pass by unheeded; with scarcely a remark made
concerning them, they are sunk into insignificance in
consequence of the highhanded outrages of Sheridan and
Griffin.”  Throckmorton continued, “the recent instructions
of the latter, which ought to have filled the whole State
with a howl of indignation, have scarcely received a
comment or passing notice.”3  
Because the Reconstruction Act of March 23 stipulated
that individuals who had held executive or judicial offices
in the state during the war were no longer qualified to
vote, the North Texan claimed that many of the state’s most
able politicians were unfairly barred from holding office
or voting in elections.  Throckmorton was also irritated
because the radicals supported unrestricted suffrage rights
for African Americans.  Thus, the former governor believed
that a constitutional convention would result in a state
constitution which would elevate the freedmen to an equal
status with white men.  In addition, Throckmorton believed
that disenfranchised ex-Confederates might never regain the
right to vote or hold state office.  As a result, he began
a relentless assault against the radicals’ efforts to call
a constitutional convention.4
Despite the advice of friends to remain aloof from
public life, Throckmorton could not refrain from entering
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the political fray.  He engaged in a letter writing
campaign to editors of leading state newspapers expressing
his opposition to a constitutional convention.  Generally
speaking, his letters expressed the same sentiments that he
had conveyed before:  He called on conservative voters to
defeat the convention by staying away from the polls.  If
voters refused to abstain from voting, the ex-governor
believed that they should at least vote against any
constitution that provided suffrage rights to the freedmen. 
On December 18, General Hancock, now in command of the
Fifth Military District, issued the order for county
elections to be held in February 1868 to vote on the
proposed constitutional convention.  Hancock also
instructed the election officials in the counties to elect
delegates to the constitutional convention in case it was
approved by a majority of the voters statewide.  In
addition, the general stipulated that the registry lists of
voters should be reopened and revised during the first five
days of January.  The order to register new voters made
conservative politicians panic as they feared most of the
added voters would favor the radical agenda.5
Many conservatives believed Throckmorton’s plan of
defeating the convention by staying away from the polls was
risky.  The North Texan’s plan assumed that conservative
     377
voters represented a majority of registered voters in
Texas.  Thus, if the county elections did not have a
plurality of registered voters casting ballots, the
convention could not be legally convened.  As long as the
conservatives represented a majority of the registered
voters in Texas, Throckmorton’s plan could effectively
block a call for a constitutional convention.  However, 
conservative leaders became increasingly alarmed that the
absence of Democrats from the election would ensure a
radical victory.  As a result, the leading conservatives
called for a conference to meet at Houston on January 20,
1868, to discuss new strategies for thwarting the radicals’
plan to write a new state constitution.  Throckmorton did
not attend the conference and disagreed with the actions of
his political colleagues.  He deemed that there was not
enough time to enact any new plan to defeat the
constitutional convention.  When the conservative
conference convened in Houston, only twenty counties were
represented.  The conference adjourned after a relatively
brief session, but its members issued a lengthy resolution
that called on white conservatives to cast ballots in the
upcoming elections.  Because the county voters were
required to vote for delegates to the constitutional
convention during the same election, the Houston conferees
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suggested electing delegates who would support creating a
new constitution that would obstruct radicals’ attempt to
give freedmen suffrage rights.  The Houston plan proved to
be an ultimate failure.  In fact, the strategy influenced
enough conservatives to go to the polls to give the
election a plurality which ensured that the state would
hold a constitutional convention.6
The election was held in February, and radicals were
overwhelmingly victorious:  The results indicated that
44,689 voters approved the constitutional convention and
11,440 opposed it.  Ironically, if the conservatives had
followed Throckmorton’s advice, it is likely that the call
of a convention would not have passed.  The total number of
registered voters casting ballot in the election numbered
56,129.  The number of register voters who did not cast
ballots in the election was 52,964.  Thus, 51.5% of the
registered electorate participated in the election.  If
1,583 of the voters against the convention had remained at
home, the election would not have had a plurality and the
call for a constitutional convention would have failed.7
The constitutional convention convened on June 1,
1868, and quickly organized.  Delegates elected Edmund J.
Davis, a noted Texas radical who fought in the Union army
during the war, as president of the convention.  While most
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of the delegates were members of the Republican party, they
were divided along ideological and sectional lines. 
Generally speaking, delegates were divided into four
groups:  Provisional Governor Pease and Andrew Jackson
Hamilton led one group which was closely identified with
the interest of conservative Republicans.  Another
contingent of delegates was led by A. J. Hamilton’s
brother, Morgan Hamilton, and E. J. Davis and represented
the interest of the counties in the central and southern
regions of the state.  Another faction of Republicans was
headed by J. W. Flanagan and represented the interest of
East Texas.  Finally, George T. Ruby led a group of
delegates who supported the rights of African Americans. 
Throughout the convention, these various factions formed
shifting alliances which changed as the convention debated
specific issues.  However, the Republican contingents
tended to remain loyal to their sectional interest.8
The first issues addressed by the convention did not
concern the creation of a new constitution; rather, the
delegates debated the ab initio question, civil rights for
freedmen, the viability of dividing the state into three
new states, and the permanent disfranchisement of ex-
Confederates.  The ab initio issue was the first major
issue before the convention.  The issue was supported by
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Morgan Hamilton and George Ruby’s factions but was opposed
by Pease and Flanagan’s supporters.  The primary concern
about the question for Hamilton and Ruby was the fact that
the Texas legislature during the last year of the war had
allowed the railroad companies to use worthless Confederate
notes to pay part of the one million dollars in interest
they owed on the two million they had borrowed from the
state’s school fund between 1858 and 1861.  Hamilton argued
that the debt should be paid back in full with U. S.
currency.  Though he based his argument on the need to
replenish the school fund, Hamilton also hoped to use the
money for future railroad development in West Texas. 
Ruby’s support seemed more noble:  He was more concerned
with strengthening the school fund which could be used to
educate African American children.  Likewise, the Pease and
Flanagan’s factions differed on the ab initio question. 
Pease supporters claimed that the motives of ab initio
adherents were based on selfish interests and did not
represent the interest of the state.  Flanagan’s bloc
sought to protect the major railroads built in East Texas,
including those that had made interest payments during the
war.  In the end, the divisions in the Republican
convention prevented the passage of ab initio, and the
issue was finally tabled so the members could address other
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matters.  However, the delegates found it just as difficult
to work together on other questions:  In regards to
providing social equality to the freedmen, the members of
the convention only agreed to recognize the equality of all
persons under the law, which offered the freedmen no more
protection than they had prior to the convention. 
Likewise, the delegates were divided over the
disenfranchisement of white voters who could not pass the
loyalty oath.9
For three months, the members of the convention
diligently worked on several critical issues, but made
little notable progress.  By mid-August, they had yet to
draft a new constitution, and with the passing of each
month, the political conditions in the state continued to
deteriorate.  As a result, several of the delegates called
on their colleagues to adjourn the convention until after
the 1868 Federal election and the newly elected Congress
had convened.  Republicans primarily wanted to adjourn the
convention because ex-Confederates were engaged in
widespread violence against white Republicans and freedmen,
a development that illustrated the need for congressional
intervention to sustain their efforts in reorganizing the
state government.  Therefore, the delegates adjourned,
agreeing to reconvene on December 7.10  
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When the convention met in December, it soon became
evident that the divisions of the previous session were
even more entrenched, and the delegates once again found
themselves bogged down over the issue of permanently
disenfranchising the ex-Confederates.  Also, the attendees
reached a stalemate over a proposed plan to divide Texas
into three additional states.  After reaching an impasse on
the issue of dividing the state, the delegates deferred the
matter to Congress.  On the issue of white
disenfranchisement, conservative Republicans banded
together and passed a resolution which granted all men in
the state the right to vote except those specifically
disqualified by the United States Constitution.  While both
of these issues created a wider rift among Republican
leaders, delegates were able to draft a new state
constitution and call for a referendum to be held on the
first Monday in July 1869.  Texas voters would vote on the
adoption of the Republican constitution and would elect a
new slate of state officers.11  
Following the adjournment of the convention, the
Republican party became divided into two well-defined
camps.  Provisional governor Pease and his close ally A. J.
Hamilton were the leaders of the conservative element of
their party.  This faction lost the support of black
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members during the course of the convention because African
Americans believed that the conservative leaders had taken
positions which failed to guarantee black equality.  Thus,
the conservative Republicans were forced to explore
alternative sources of political support in order to
maintain a position of influence in state politics.  As a
result, conservative Republicans became more open to the
idea of working with conservative Democrats.  In contrast
to the conservative element, Radical Republicans consisted
of a coalition of black and West Texans.  To achieve their
objectives, West Texas radicals were willing to support
social equality for the freedmen.  However, black support
proved to be a double-edged sword:  Racial biases made it
difficult for radicals to attract white voters to their
causes.  Finally, Republicans from East Texas, including 
J. W. Flanagan, remained uncommitted to either the
conservative or radical factions of their party.  This
element of the Republican party had differences with the
conservatives over internal improvements in the state,
especially railroad development, and their racial prejudice
made it unlikely that they would support the radical’s
agenda.  They decided to remain in the shadows, waiting to
see how events developed after the upcoming election before
aligning themselves with either faction in their party.12 
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Immediately following the convention, a controversy
ensued over the date of the forthcoming state election. 
Radicals were enraged because the elections were scheduled
to be held in July, rather than in November when Texas
elections had normally occurred.  Apparently, radicals were
not satisfied with the results of the constitutional
convention and were afraid it would be adopted.  One of
their primary concerns was that radicals would be deprived
of state offices in future elections, especially since the
proposed constitution prevented the widespread
disenfranchisement of ex-Confederates.  The radicals were
relieved when President Grant, who had won the Presidential
election of 1868, ordered the postponement of the election
until November 30, 1869.13
While the Republicans worked through their differences
in the constitutional convention, Texas Democrats prepared
for the Federal elections of 1868 and the state elections
which they assumed would follow the adjournment of the
constitutional convention.  On May 18, 1868, they met in
the Democratic State Executive Committee at Austin.  The
following day, committee members announced the names of the
delegates who were appointed to represent the Texas
Democratic party at the National Democratic Convention in
New York on July 4, 1868.  The delegates included Benjamin
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Epperson, Ashbel Smith, S. Powers, and Gustave Schleicher.  
The committee members also named Throckmorton as one of
four alternate delegates.  Furthermore, the committee
called on conservatives from both political parties to meet
in Bryan, Brazos County, on July 7.14
Conservative Democrats and Republicans attended the
called meeting in Bryan, and they chose Throckmorton to
preside over the gathering.  After attending to issues
related to the upcoming national election, the attendees
turned their attention to state affairs.  Since many of the
ex-Confederate Democrats remained disenfranchised, the
delegates conceded that it would be impossible for a
Democratic candidate to win a major state office.  Thus,
they agreed not to field any candidates in the upcoming
state elections.  Instead, the delegates decided to support
a representative of the conservative faction of the
Republican party.  However, the Bryan convention did
produce a conservative platform which was created by a
committee of both moderate Republicans and Democrats.  The
platform called for more effective cooperation between the
state and national Democratic parties in order to escape
disfranchisement, black supremacy, degradation and ruin
threatened by Radical Republicans.  It also declared
slavery and secession dead issues and pledged the
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allegiance of Texas to the Federal government and the
United States Constitution.  At the close of the
convention, Throckmorton addressed the delegates, denounced
the radicals, and urged the conservatives to mount a united
front against them.15  One of the primary concerns for
Throckmorton seemed to be the radicals’ willingness to
allow African Americans the right to vote and participate
in state politics.
After the Bryan convention, Throckmorton and Epperson
returned to their homes in North Texas.  The duo arrived in
Dallas on the evening of July 18 and addressed a crowd that
had gathered to hear the latest news regarding the outcome
of the conservative meeting.  The ex-governor once again
denounced the military authorities and urged conservatives
to band together against the radical leadership of the
Republican party.16  In the days that followed, Throckmorton
made numerous stump speeches against radicals.  His
speeches consistently criticized the new constitution, but
he also argued that conservatives should vote to approve
it.  The North Texan clarified his position by stating that
conservatives should support the constitution because the
radicals were opposed to it.  Furthermore, he believed the
adoption of the constitution would ultimately be a victory
against radicals in Washington, who supported the
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postponement of the upcoming election.  During an interview
with a reporter of the New York Herald, Throckmorton said
that “the extreme Radicals do not want an election at all. 
The constitution is not to their liking, although there
were only eight democrats in the convention which framed
it.  What might suit the radicals would be a constitution
framed in Washington and conferred by Congress on the
state.”17  Thus was the state of affairs in Texas politics
leading into the state elections of 1869.
The elections of 1869 proved to be a bitter contest
between the radical and conservative factions of the
Republican party.  The radicals had earlier nominated
Edmund J. Davis as their candidate, and conservative had
put forth Andrew J. Hamilton.  Conservative Democrats,
included Throckmorton, called on their followers to support
Hamilton.  The editor of the Dallas News claimed that the
Collin County politician “expressed a decided conviction
that the best interests of the State would be promoted by
the election of Hon. A. J. Hamilton.”  Furthermore, he
stated that Hamilton “had a very just and proper
appreciation of the condition of the country, and would
labor to restore good feelings among all classes of our
people.”18  While they did not completely dismiss
conservative support of Hamilton, radicals believed that
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African American voters would assure their candidate’s
victory.  After the four-day election ended, voters
approved the new state constitution by a count of 72,466 to
4,928, and E. J. Davis defeated Hamilton by a vote of
39,901 to 39,092.19  
In part, the Federal government’s actions helped Davis
win the governorship.  During the 1869 campaign, General
Joseph Reynolds convinced President Grant that Hamilton and
his supporters had aligned themselves with ex-Confederate
Democrats.  As a result, the president looked the other way
while Reynolds directly aided the Davis campaign.  The
general made sure Davis supporters controlled the polling
places and that the election was supervised by the
military.  Unfortunately under these conditions, voter
fraud was widespread.  The commanding officer’s actions
were evidently so blatant that Provisional Governor Pease
felt compelled to resign his office, believing that
Reynolds had thwarted the democratic process.  General
Reynolds did not appoint a replacement for Pease, but
instead chose to assumed the duties of the office himself
until after the 1869 elections.  On January 8, 1870,
Reynolds appointed Davis to the office of provisional
governor pending his formal inauguration.  Additionally,
Reynolds called for a provisional session of the Twelfth
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Legislature to ratify the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution and to elect
United States senators.  The legislators met briefly in
February and followed the general’s orders, ratifying the
amendments and electing James Flanagan and Morgan Hamilton
to the Senate.  Congress passed a bill that President Grant
signed on March 30, bringing an end to Military
Reconstruction in the state.  Despite A. J. Hamilton and
his supporters’ protest to Washington officials over the
gubernatorial election of 1869, Davis was officially
inaugurated on April 28, 1870.20  The controversy sparked
over the governor’s election became a roaring fire during
the course of the next three years as conservatives
unfairly blamed all the state’s problems on the Davis
administration.  Throckmorton proved to be one of Davis’s
most vociferous critics.  Apparently, the North Texan did
not approve of the governor’s willingness to give freedmen
full civil rights.  Also, Throckmorton disagreed with the
governor’s plan for economic development in the state and
his taxation policies.
The Twelfth Legislature soon proved as unpopular as
the newly elected governor.  Radicals who dominated it
passed several laws that raised the ire of conservative
Democrats and Republicans.  The most hated of these new
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laws were the Militia Act, the State Police Act, the
Enabling Act, and the Public Printing Act.  Of these
measures, conservatives and moderates found the Militia Act
and State Police Act the most vexing.  The former provided
that all able-bodied men were liable for military service
if called to duty by the governor, the commander-in-chief
of the state militia.  The law also allowed the governor to
declare martial law at his own discretion.  In addition,
white supremacists hated the State Police Act because many
of the policemen were African Americans.  Racist Texans did
not like the fact that the state police was a biracial
force, approximately forty percent of the officers were
African Americans.  One of the clearest signs that whites
were hostile to the state police primarily because it was a
biracial force is the case of Captain L. H. McNelly.  As an
officer of the state police, McNelly was widely considered
a disgrace, but later, when he joined the Texas Rangers, an
all-white organization, he was heralded a hero.21 
Conservatives also unfairly claimed that the state police
committed more crimes than they solved.  However, this
claim seemed to be politically motivated, because the
historical record suggest that the state police was an
effective law enforcement agency.  In a period of
fourteenth months, the state police arrested almost 3,500
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persons and jailed 638 persons on charges of murder or
attempted murder.  Furthermore, the force recovered
approximately $200,000 in stolen property.  While carrying
out their duties, eight policemen were killed and four
wounded in the line of duty.  Overall, the rancor caused by
the Twelfth Legislature was one of the major factors which
eventually led to Democrats regaining control of the
legislature in the 1872 elections.
Conservatives were unsuccessful in defeating Davis in
the gubernatorial election, but they continued to fight the
radicals on other political fronts.  On July 9, 1870, a
conservative Democratic meeting was held at Austin in the
office of Major John A. Green.  The leaders at the meeting
chose Benjamin Epperson to chair the conclave.  After
calling the meeting to order, several men made
presentations that called for greater organization of the
Democratic party in the state.  Following their brief
presentations, Throckmorton introduced a resolution which
eventually led to the creation of a list of grievances that
served as the Democrats’ mantra against Governor Davis
until he was voted out of office in 1873.  Throckmorton
stated that the attendees should call for a state
Democratic convention.  In addition, the ex-governor
suggested that the members should make a list of charges
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against the Davis administration.  The members followed the
North Texan’s suggestion and adjourned their meeting giving
the committee time to complete its task.22 
On July 21, the political leaders reconvened to hear
the committee reports.  The grievances outlined against the
Davis administration were numerous and undoubtedly
reflected the views of Throckmorton as well as most
conservative Democrats in the state.  The list of charges
claimed that Davis and his supporters expelled duly elected
members from the legislature and seated in their places men
who were not elected by majorities; delayed economic
recovery in the state by deterring immigration; created a
multitude of new offices and appointed radicals to them;
delayed legislation favorable to the people of Texas and
ensured the passage of laws deemed favorable to radicals;
authorized the creation of the state police which preyed on
honest citizens; aided in organization of secret political
parties representing primarily African Americans;
centralized the control of government by giving the
governor tyrannical power; established newspapers to
expedite the radicals’ political heresies; planned to
extend Davis’s term in office beyond constitutional limits;
arbitrarily arrested members of the legislature, thus
depriving them a voice in pending legislation; and amassed
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an enormous state debt.  Accompanying the list of charges,
the committee presented a draft of an address to the people
of Texas which called on them to hold public meetings to
protest against radical rule in Texas.23
Following the meetings in Austin, Throckmorton
departed the state on a business trip in the interest of
the Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific Railroad.24  He did not
return to the state until the latter part of 1870.  In his
absence, conservative Democrats accomplished little, and
the call for a Democratic convention did not materialize. 
On August 5, 1871, conservatives held another political
meeting in Austin.  The members of this conclave called on
leading Democrats to hold local meeting for the purpose of
protesting the usurious expenditures of the state and
electing delegates to represent the state’s counties in a
convention at Austin on September 22, 1871.  The purpose of
the popularly called state convention was to protest the
Davis administration’s fiscal and tax policies.25
Ninety-five counties sent delegates to the convention,
commonly referred to as the Taxpayers Convention.  Collin
County voters elected Throckmorton as their representative. 
The delegates began to arrive in the state’s capital in
mid-September and immediately aroused the criticism of the
Davis administration.  The State Journal, a radical
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newspaper, noted that “the tax-howlers are gathering much
to the delectation of whiskey sellers.  These fellows can’t
pay their taxes, but have enough [money] to travel hundreds
of miles and pay heavy bar room bills in order to add a
little fuel to the Ku-Klux disaffection and hostility that
disfigures and disgraces the state.”26  The next day, the
editor claimed that no good would come from “any movement
supported by Throckmorton, Pease, Hamilton, and others of
the unreconstructed rebel type.”27  
State officials allowed the members of the convention
to use the House of Representative chambers for their
sessions, but stipulated that the delegates had to hold
their meetings during the afternoon and night.  The first
meeting of the Taxpayers’ Convention convened at two
o’clock Friday afternoon on September 22, 1871.  After
being called to order, the delegates elected E. M. Pease as
the permanent chairman.  While Pease’s election suggested
the convention was bi-partisan, most of the two hundred and
seventeen delegates were members of the Democratic party. 
Besides preliminary organization, little else was
accomplished on the first night of the convention.  Judge
John Ireland made a motion to create a committee of twenty-
one to consider and report the business of the convention. 
The motion was seconded, and approved by a majority vote,
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but no one was immediately appointed to serve on the
committee.  Realizing that the convention would have to
work with the Davis Administration as well as the state
legislature to produce any real reforms, Throckmorton
introduced a resolution calling for a “committee of seven
to be appointed to confer with his excellency E. J. Davis
upon the subject of the reduction of expenditures of the
state government . . . and that the same committee also
confer with . . . the legislature.”28  The resolution was
adopted, and shortly afterwards, the convention adjourned
until later in the evening.  During the next few hours,
officers of the meeting selected leading conservatives to
serve on the newly created committees.
The convention reconvened at seven o’clock, and Pease
announced the names of those men selected to serve on the
committees.  Among the individuals chosen to serve on the
Committee of Twenty-one were A. J. Hamilton, the chairman
of the committee; Morgan C. Hamilton; William M. Walton;
Ireland; Thomas J. Chambers; and Throckmorton.  Members of
the Committee of Seven included Throckmorton, chairman;  
W. M. Walton; John Ireland; J. T. Harcourt; M. C. Hamilton;
A. J. Hamilton; and C. S. West.  In addition to announcing
the members of the two committees, Pease appointed a third
committee on statistics with Judge Upton as its chairman. 
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At this point, the convention was adjourned until two
o’clock the next day.  When the convention reconvened, the
committees reported that they had not completed their task
and asked the convention for a two-day delay.  Pease and
the other delegates agreed and rescheduled their next
session for seven o’clock in the evening on September 25.29 
Following the adjournment of the convention, an
incident took place which tainted future relations between
the Davis administration and conservatives in the state.  A
crowd collected at Buass Hall on Congress Avenue and
proceeded to the capitol grounds.  It was reported that
among their ranks were about one hundred African Americans. 
After reaching the state capitol, Governor Davis addressed
the crowd and made reference to the purification of the
capitol after the adjournment of the convention.  The
Democratic Statesman, a conservative newspaper, quoted
Davis as saying “fellow citizens . . . in ancient times it
was the custom of the people to purify their temples when
defiled, by burning and sprinkling incense round about the
same.  This temple, our Capital, has been polluted by the
presence of the tax payers of the state.”  Davis allegedly
continued, “therefore it devolves upon you, my colored
brethren, to purify the place.  As we have no incense, I
would suggest that you form in double ranks and march
     397
around the capitol singing those glorious hymns of freedom
with which you are so familiar.”  According to the editor,
the freedmen followed Davis’s suggestions and marched
around the state capitol singing, “John Brown’s Soul Is
Marching On” and “Rally Round the Flag, Boys.”30
When the convention reconvened on Monday, C. W. West
resigned his position on the Committee of Seven, stating
that he considered Davis’s actions on Saturday night an
“insult to the memory of the able men who [held] that
office before him.”  West further stated that “I feel that
personal respect and the duty I owe my constituents demand
that I resign from [this] committee, and I trust the first
act of this convention will be to rescind the appointment
of the committee of conference with the Governor.”31 
Throckmorton agreed with West and offered a resolution
which called for the release of the Committee on Conference
with the Governor “in view of the flagrant indignity
offered the convention by Governor Davis on Saturday
evening last, in [regard to the] remarks made by him as to
the purification of the capitol after the sitting of the
convention, and [in light of] his conduct in connection
therewith.”  The resolution was tabled by a vote of 71 to
56.32
The remainder of the session was dedicated to hearing
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the committees’ reports.  The Committee of Twenty-one had
compiled a list of grievances which were identical to those
compiled at the meeting in Major Green’s office the
previous year.  In connection with the charges,
Throckmorton read a series of recommendations and asked the
convention to adopt them.  The proposed recommendations
called on the taxpayers to refuse to pay the state’s new
school tax and to pay only the one eighth of one per cent
tax levied by the legislature.  Additionally, the
committees suggested that the convention should prepare an
address to the people advising them how to resist paying
certain state taxes that the convention defined as illegal,
and stated that if the governor or legislature disregarded
the convention’s recommendations, the committee should
prepare a memorial to the Congress of the United States
asking for federal intervention on behalf of the state’s
citizens.33
The resolution calling for congressional intervention
caused great debate among the delegates.  There was
considerable disagreement concerning what mode of redress
should be taken in case the governor and the legislature
refused to comply with the demands of the taxpayers.  Judge
Upton opposed the resolution because he could not bring
himself to recognize the right of Congress to interfere in
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the affairs of the state.  He favored the election of
delegates by the sovereign people of the state to a
convention to form yet another state constitution.  Upton
firmly believed that a direct appeal to Congress forfeited
the rights of sovereign people to act in such a crisis;
however, he conceded that conservatives could call on the
Federal government to intervene in the state’s affairs if
radicals refused to allow a new constitutional convention
to convene.  Throckmorton disagreed with Upton and
considered his stance as impractical.  He stated that a
constitutional convention would not be allowed to meet and
that Congress would consider such an act open rebellion and
would help the radicals remain in power.  Throckmorton
clarified his position by stating that he did not question
the people’s right to handle the affairs of their state but
that he did not feel it was the right policy to pursue at
that time.  The resolution to appeal to Congress was
adopted.34  
The convention then directed the Committee of Seven to
write an address to the people of Texas and a memorial to
the state legislature.  Before adjourning, E. M. Pease was
added to the Committee of Seven upon the request of
Throckmorton.  The members were also instructed to confer
with the governor.  Following these last minute changes,
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the convention adjourned on September 25.  The committee
quickly finished their task and issued an address to the
people and a memorial to the legislature on September 30. 
The address to the people stated that the one per cent tax
was illegal and could not be collected; that the tax law
was defective because it failed to name the property on
which the tax was to be levied; that there was a conflict
in the tax laws because one part of the tax code levying a
one per cent tax and the other a one-eighth of one per cent
tax on for the same purpose; and that the committee advised
an injunction which would set forth the objections to the
tax if any attempt were made to collect it.  The injunction
was designed to enjoin the sheriff from the execution of a
law which was no longer valid.35
On October 2, 1871, the Committee of Seven completed
its memorial to the legislature.  The petition called on
the solons to reduce the state tax to one-third of one per
cent, to reduce the county tax to one half that amount, and
to repeal the school house tax.  In addition, the memorial
requested that the legislators repeal the police bill, the
registration law, and the enabling act.  With this, the
Taxpayers’ Convention was officially over.36
While confronting radicals at the state level between
1869 and 1871, Throckmorton was also actively involved in
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local politics.  In part, the North Texan’s interest in
local politics resulted from his desire to win election to
the U. S. Congress. Collin County’s favorite son became a
central figure in the 1869 Second Congressional District
race, where J. C. Conner was running on the Democratic
ticket.  Despite Conner’s affiliation with the Democratic
party, many North Texans considered him a carpetbagger. 
The candidate was born in Noblesville, Indiana and was a
former Union military officer during the Civil War. 
Following the war, Conner had returned to Indiana and
unsuccessfully made a bid for the state legislature on the
National Union ticket in 1866.  When the Union army was
reorganized as an occupation force in the fall of 1866, he
applied for and received a captain’s commission of the
Forty-first colored infantry.  Conner served with the unit
until General Reynolds transferred him to civil service,
appointing the captain county clerk of Grayson County.37  
Because Conner was a northerner and an appointee of
the military authorities, Throckmorton considered him unfit
to represent the people of the Second District.  As a
result, the former governor supported Joshua Johnson for
the congressional nomination.  However, once the Democratic
party endorsed Conner, Throckmorton ceased all open
opposition to him but did not actively campaign for the
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candidate.  When Reynolds reported the election returns on
January 11, 1870, Conner was declared the winner.  On March
20, 1870, Congress passed an act which readmitted Texas to
the Union, and consequently, the state’s senators and
representatives took their seats in Washington.  However,
this did not produce political calm in the state.  During
the fall of 1870, the Davis administration extended the
term of office for radicals elected in 1869 by postponing
the 1870 congressional elections until 1871.  This move
caused a stir among the Texas Democrats and led to
continued controversy in the Second District.38
Given the political divisions within the Republican
party and the Democrats’ attempt to regain control of the
state, the congressional race in North Texas gained
statewide attention.  As A. J. Hamilton and E. M. Pease
sought political alliances between conservative Republicans
and Democrats, Throckmorton began to calculate his return
to political office.  It was natural that he set his eyes
on winning the congressional seat in his home district.  On
October 14, 1870, the editor of the Houston Union, a
radical Republican newspaper, surveyed the political
environment of North Texas:
North Texas opposes Conner.  Dissatisfaction is
being spread.  Collin County, the Enquirer, and
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the McKinney Messenger are all against him. This
means Throckmorton wants to go to Congress
himself. But there is something deeper than all
this. Conner is straight out Democratic and down
on Fusion and so is all North Texas. Hamilton,
Walton, Pease, Webb, and the coalitionists
generally are seeking to get Conner out of the way
to give North Texas to the Fusion. The Fusion is
much the weakest party in that region, but it has
all the old strong politicians with them, and
then, too, the straight Democracy are at a
disadvantage in having committed themselves to a
little adventurer like Conner.39
On November 9, 1870, the editor of the Union again
commented on the political environment of North Texas and
suggested that Throckmorton might run against Conner in the
upcoming congressional race.  The editor commented:
We sometime ago intimated that the little
political monstrosity, Captain Conner, Yankee
adventurer, Federal soldier, nigger Captain, state
rights, secession, rebel, anti-reconstruction,
southern chivalry candidate for Congress was going
to have opposition.  We understand that ex-
Governor Throckmorton has determined to be a
candidate to represent the Second Congressional
District.40
The editor suggested that Throckmorton might be eligible to
hold political office once again and that he would be
easily elected to office, especially considering that the
Democratic party had only chosen Conner as their candidate
in 1869 because he opposed the reconstruction policies of
the military.  The political circumstances in North Texas
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would have suggested an easy victory for Throckmorton,
except for one major obstacle:  The Democrats and
Fusionists in the district pledged their loyalty to
Conner’s reelection.  Conner had worked hard to gain the
favor of his constituents.  Throughout September and
October, he had canvassed his district, denouncing the
Davis administration, Congressional Reconstruction, and the
Republican party.  Ironically, he had even wrapped himself
in the Confederate flag by praising the South’s lost cause
and the veterans of the Confederate army.  Despite their
attachment to the Union prior to the war, many North Texas
voters gravitated toward their congressman and gathered in
large crowds to hear him speak.41
Given Conner’s popularity with the people of the
Second District, Throckmorton moved cautiously in putting
his name before the voters.  The ex-governor might have
acted more definitively, but he still had not received a
Federal pardon which would allow him to hold political
office once again.  As a result, Throckmorton did not
initiate plans to enter the race until February 1871.  On
February 1, Throckmorton wrote to Epperson:
I have been studying some way to get the
[Galveston] News and [Houston] Telegraph to
occasionally urge the necessity of sending me from
this district, but I have not clearly seen the
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way. They are friendly. How would it do for you to
write Ashbel Smith and make known Conner’s calibre
and suggest my disinclination and the propriety of
the News and Telegraph speaking out.42
Five days later, Throckmorton wrote to his friend once
again and presented a more clear plan for challenging
Conner.  He stated:
Our friends—yours and mine—should be active in
making me the candidate—this will tend to break
Conner down—already the talk of my candidacy has
greatly weakened him—should my disabilities be
removed and he vote against it, it will settle his
hash. The moment my disabilities are removed I
should be nominated by county meetings where it
can be done. This would give a start at least. A
convention would help. If you can manage to have
the friends in Jefferson and the lower counties to
take such steps it would help.43
Unfortunately for his political ambition,
Throckmorton’s bid for Congress ended abruptly when
Congress did not approve his pardon.  Members of the
Republican party attempted to use the ex-governor’s
political misfortune to their own gain.  In an effort to
gain Throckmorton’s political support, Republicans blamed
Conner for obstructing the North Texans pardon.  According
to the Houston Union, the bill for Throckmorton’s pardon
which came before Congress on March 12, 1871, “was never
read but passed the House very late in the session without
reading through the efforts of General Clark.”  The editor
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of the paper continued, “Conner clamored for the reading of
the bill which would consume time.  Foiled in this Conner
took the bill from the clerk to delay engrossment. 
Defeated in this, he resorted to the Senate saying that the
Amnesty bill with Jim Throckmorton’s name on it should not
pass and prevented its being called up in the Senate.”44 
Conner denied the charges in a letter to the Bonham News, a
Fannin County newspaper.  He stated, “I see the Houston
Union, Austin Journal, McKinney Enquirer, etc., charge that
I voted against the removal of the disabilities of certain
gentlemen.  The charge is untrue.  Please correct the
error.”45  Conner’s denial spurred the Republicans to
redouble their efforts to bring Throckmorton into their
camp.  The Houston Union wrote that “Governor Throckmorton
has long been considered the leading public man in North
Texas.  Now the Democracy has suddenly thrown him overboard
for a carpet bag adventurer and Union Renegade.”  The
newspaper further stated, “North Texas has disgraced
herself, and Throckmorton is not the man we thought him if
he submits to this open insult in favor of his pigmy enemy,
Conner.”46
While Conner and the Republican newspapers were
embroiled in a political battle, Throckmorton conceded the
fact that he would not become a candidate in the 1871
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congressional race.  As a result, he became actively
involved in searching for a suitable challenger to Conner. 
While seeking a worthy opponent, the ex-governor made
numerous stump speeches against the incumbent and called
for a congressional convention to meet in Dallas to
nominate a new candidate.  Apparently, the call for a
convention was successful because a meeting was held in
Denton County for the purpose of electing precinct
delegates to the proposed Dallas convention.  The people of
Precinct No. 2 elected Hugh J. Throckmorton, the ex-
governor’s eldest son, as their representative.47 
Countering his opposition’s actions, Conner took to the
stump and began circulating the story that the former
governor was hatching a plan to secure the nomination of
his son when the convention met in Dallas.  This prompted
the Collin County politician to respond that “these dirty
scamps, with Conner at their head, are the most damnable
set of liars out of Hell.”48  The stage was set for a bitter
campaign battle.  
Early in July 1871, the Democrats held the Dallas
convention and nominated Conner without serious opposition. 
With the added prestige of a convention nomination, the
incumbent was virtually assured reelection.  Throckmorton
continued on the stump, making pro-Democratic speeches, but
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as he had done in 1869, the former governor refused to
endorse Conner.  When the election took place in early
October, the Democratic nominee easily defeated his
Republican challenger by a vote of 18,285 to 5,948.49
When the election concluded, Throckmorton supporters
began to make preparations to nominate him as the
Congressman-at-large in 1872.  Because the Texas population
increased, the state was granted two additional
congressional seats.  The state now had six congressional
seats, but still only had four congressional districts. 
Thus, the new seats were designated as congressman-at-
large.  In addition to reapportionment, Congress indirectly
aided the North Texan’s bid for the nomination by passing
the Amnesty Act of 1872 which removed Throckmorton’s
political disabilities.  In January 1872, the Dallas Herald
was already calling for the ex-governor’s nomination, but
the editors of the Sherman Patriot and the Denton Monitor
questioned the political viability of the Collin County
politician:  Undoubtedly, the editors were aligned against
Throckmorton because he had opposed Conner in 1869 and
1871.  The editor of the Dallas Times quickly pointed out
that following Conner’s nomination at the Dallas convention
that Throckmorton had supported the Democratic candidate,
even if his support was unenthusiastic.50
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While the editors penned their differences, plans for
the state elections proceeded.  In early 1872, Texas
Democrats called for a state convention to convene at
Corsicana on June 17, and held preliminary district
meetings to select delegates to the meeting.  At these
local gatherings, the citizens also decided on whom they
would support in the upcoming congressional race.  At the
Dallas meeting on May 6, locals passed a resolution which
recommended Throckmorton as one of the congressional
candidates-at-large.  Later the same month, a similar
meeting was held in McKinney.  After a few hours of
deliberation, Throckmorton read a draft of a resolution
compiled by members of the meeting:  It called for the
redemption of the state from misrule, oppression, and
bankruptcy of the Davis Administration; invited the
citizens of the state, regardless of political affiliation,
to join in their cause; and endorsed the state convention
at Corsicana.  Another member of the committee then
presented a resolution calling for Throckmorton’s
nomination as Congressman-at-large.  The resolutions were
enthusiastically endorsed by those present at the
assembly.51
The Corsicana convention met on June 17, and early
balloting seemed to suggest that Throckmorton was a leading
     410
favorite for the congressional nomination.  On the first
ballot he garnered more votes than Asa Willie and Roger Q.
Mills, his two leading opponents.  After six ballots, the
North Texas politician was still in the lead.  However, on
the seventh ballot his opponents’ supporters struck a deal
which allowed Willie and Mills to secure both of the
congressional nominations.  Many delegates were
dissatisfied with the chosen candidates, because both came
from the Third District, a voting district containing a
small Democratic majority.  Nevertheless, when the
balloting was concluded, Throckmorton graciously
congratulated nominees and made a motion to make the
nominations unanimous.  The Dallas Herald commented on
Throckmorton’s defeat, stating that “we are free to express
our surprise of the defeat of Gov. Throckmorton, the
stronger man in the State as the voting at first plainly
showed.  The adoption of the two thirds rule, the number of
candidates, and the various combinations formed, explain
the matter.”  The Herald continued, “It was the natural
consequence of the union of the weaker to defeat the
stronger.  We have not a word to say against the gentleman
selected–they are both worthy men.”  However the editor did
express his concern that “the two candidates for the State
at large should have been taken from the 3d District, which
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cast the smallest democratic majority of all.  It would
look as if a combination of delegates was made to defeat
the favorite candidate [Throckmorton] of the 2d District,
which can give a majority more than all the others
together.”  The Herald concluded, “This would not seem to
be sound policy, and the people of the 3d District are
talking a great deal about policy at this time.  But
complaint is useless.”52
Even though the Corsicana convention proved to be a
disappointment, Throckmorton’s supporters wasted no time in
placing him before the people for the governorship in the
next election.  The Sherman Courier expressed the belief
that many votes had been withheld from him at the Corsicana
convention because leading politicians hoped to make him
governor when the opportunity arrived.53  They would not
have to wait long.  The Thirteenth Legislature convened in
January 1873, and called for the next gubernatorial
election to be held on the first Tuesday in December.  As a
result, the editor of the Dallas Herald, J. W. Swindells,
wrote to Throckmorton and urged him to run for office. 
Throckmorton, however, declined to become a candidate.  He
replied to the editor stating “you, as well as other
friends, know that the support of my family depends upon my
daily labor.  For twenty years and more I have in one
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capacity or another, been in public harness.”  Throckmorton
continued, “Whilst I have been devoted to the public
interests, and particularly to those of my immediate
section of the state, my public affairs have well nigh gone
to ruin.”54  Despite his desire to take care of his personal
financial situation, it also seems likely that Throckmorton
desired to become a United States senator, rather than
recapturing the governor’s office.
Regardless of his motivations, the ex-governor’s
refusal to seek the governorship did not deter his
supporters, nor did it stop his opponents from attacking
him in the newspapers.  During the first week of September,
the Democratic nominating convention met in Austin.  The
people of Collin County elected Throckmorton as their
delegate to the convention.  At the convention, many
politicians throughout the state believed that the North
Texan would receive the party’s nomination for governor
even if he did not seek the office.  However, he brought an
end to such rumors.  In a letter to the Democratic
Statesman, the North Texan stated “that there may be no
misunderstanding in regard to my position I desire to say,
through your paper, that I am not a candidate for
governor—that under no combination of circumstances will I
be before either the Democratic State Convention or the
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people.”  Throckmorton continued, “I came to Austin as a
delegate to the convention from my county, with no other
view than to work in the ranks and to promote democratic
success.”55
With Throckmorton refusing to run in the upcoming
race, the convention nominated Richard Coke as their
candidate for governor.  In the December election, Coke
overwhelmingly defeated the unpopular Republican incumbent,
E. J. Davis.  Coke’s victory was the beginning of the end
of the Republican party’s influence in the state.  Texas
voters not only ushered in a new executive in Austin in
1873, but they brought forth a new era of Democratic
dominance in the state:  According to the Democrats, the
state was on its way to becoming officially redeemed.  
Once the Democrats had removed Republicans from
office, conservative Democrats solidified their rule of the
state by replacing the Constitution of 1869 with one more
favorable to their political agenda.  Voters approved a
constitutional convention in early August 1875 and elected
ninety delegates to frame a new governing document for the
state.  The conservative Constitution of 1876 effectively
swept away the last vestiges of congressional directives,
military rule, and Republican leadership from the state
government.  Even though the new government did not
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completely disenfranchise the freedmen, it allowed
Democrats to dominate statewide politics and to relegate
African Americans to second class citizenship.  Also
between 1874 and 1875, the United States army successfully
put down the last major Indian resistance in Texas,
defeating the Comanches, Kiowas, and Southern Cheyenne in a
series of battles, collectively known as the Red River War. 
The Plains Indians would never threaten the Texas frontier
again.  Thus, two of Throckmorton’s goals were achieved: 
The freedmen and Native Americans would no longer threaten
white supremacy on the frontier.  As a result, ex-
governor’s future political endeavors concentrated less on
racial issues and more on the economic development of North
Texas.56  In the end, conservatives won the war of
Reconstruction.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
At first glance, James Webb Throckmorton appears to be
something of an enigma in nineteenth-century Texas
political history.  Between 1861 and 1867, his political
positions seemed contradictory, self-serving, and
irrational.  In part, this assessment holds some validity: 
Like most politicians of his times, Throckmorton pursued
policies which benefitted him personally, especially the
development of railroads in the North Texas region. 
However, a detailed examination of Throckmorton’s public
life reveals that his political views exhibited a high
degree of consistency.  Generally speaking, four primary
factors influenced Throckmorton’s political development: 
his experiences on the frontier, his desire to preserve the
whiteness of north-central Texas, his adherence to
political conservatism, and his commitment to the economic
development of North Texas.  These influencing factors
shaped Throckmorton’s character throughout five decades of
political change in the Lone Star State.  
There is no doubt that Throckmorton’s frontier
experiences played a critical role in defining his
political ideology and his racial views.  Having lived on
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the southern frontier most of his life, he witnessed first
hand many of the hardships confronting pioneer families,
especially the devastating impact that Indian raids had on
their settlements in the northern counties of the state
between 1845 and 1870.  Like many white settlers living in
north-central Texas, Throckmorton arrived at the conclusion
that the Native Americans were one of the greatest
obstacles confronting the development of the Texas
frontier.  As a result, he consistently supported the
removal of the Native Americans to reservations and sought
ways to protect the settlers of the North Texas region. 
Throckmorton’s concern for the welfare of white
frontiersmen eventually led him to develop a racial hatred
for Native American peoples.  Evidence suggests that
Throckmorton devoted much of his life trying to push the
Indians off of their lands, consequently securing the
territory for white men.  According to men of
Throckmorton’s stripe, the frontier represented a refuge
for whites, and they did everything they could to protect
the whiteness of the region. 
While Throckmorton’s desire to preserve the whiteness
of the frontier against Native Americans, it also led to
his racial hatred of other non-whites, especially African
Americans.  Consistent with views of most nineteenth-
     421
century white southerners, he believed that African
Americans were inferior to whites, and he attempted to
prevent black migration into the northern counties
following the Civil War, believing that the freedmen would
somehow taint the blood of Anglos through the process
miscegenation.  As a result, Throckmorton supported
policies designed to prevent blacks from receiving full
civil rights and supported laws, such as the black codes,
in an effort to keep African Americans tied to East Texas
lands where they had lived in bondage.  
In part, Throckmorton’s racial animosity toward
African Americans initially rested with his antebellum
disdain for the southern planter class.  Throughout the
1850s, Throckmorton sought to protect the social,
political, and economic institutions of the settlers of the
North Texas region.  After proving his loyalty to the early
settlers by helping them retain title to their lands during
the Peters Colony fiasco, Throckmorton tirelessly worked
throughout the 1850s to prevent slaveholding planters from
encroaching upon the northern frontier.  In part, his plan
to fend off the planters included measures designed to
advance the economic development of Red River counties.  He
was especially concerned with the building of railroads in
the region.  Railroads were critical to the continued
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prosperity of North Texas wheat farmers.  Without the
railroads, these farmers lacked adequate access to distant
markets and suffered continued economic hardships.  The
consequences of frontier poverty was self-evident:  Small
farmers would eventually be forced to sell their
landholdings to migrating planters from the east.  Such
circumstances would ultimately give large slaveholders
complete control over the social, political, and economic
institutions of North Texas.  In this environment,
Throckmorton’s racial hatred of the black slaves partly
resulted from his disdain of the planter class itself.  
Throughout the antebellum era, the slaves were the
most visible representation of the planters’ wealth and
social dominance in southern society.  In Throckmorton’s
mind, the slaves were the mechanism which allowed large
planters to take advantage of small farmers.  Aside from
his own belief in white superiority, Throckmorton believed
that the economic advantage that blacks provided to the
planters was a compelling enough reason to hate the
bondsmen.  Even after the slaves were emancipated,
Throckmorton’s viewed blacks with disdain and engaged in
politics designed to preserve the whiteness of north-
central Texas.  As governor of the state, he nearly ended
his political career by supporting policies that tried to
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prevent the freedmen from gaining full equality with whites
under the law.  If it had not been for the failures of
Reconstruction, it is likely that his public career would
have ended in 1867 when military authorities removed him
from the governorship.
Even though the whiteness of the frontier needs
further scholarly examination to define its significance in
Texas as well as the other southern states, the concept
serves to give meaning to one of the state’s more turbulent
periods of history.  One cannot begin to understand
Throckmorton, or others like him, unless they first come
realize the differences which existed between the various
regions of the South.  In many ways, the frontier served as
an escape valve for settler who wanted to avoid a society
dominated by large slaveholders.  These settlers moved to
North Texas from the Upper South and attempted to forge a
new white society.  As a result, they developed an
intolerance for non-whites and sought to protect their
region from what they deemed an infiltration of inferior
humans.  In the Red River counties, Throckmorton became one
of the most prominent advocates of this form of racism.
In addition to his frontier experiences and the desire
to preserve the whiteness of his region, Throckmorton
adhered to conservative brand of politics.  Evidence
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suggests that his political conservatism stemmed from his
early political affiliation with the Whig party.  During
the 1840s and early 1850s, Whigs in the Upper South adhered
to three basic party principles:  They favored economic
development through internal improvements; they expressed a
certain disdain for political extremists, such as the
northern abolitionists and southern secessionists, and they
remained faithful to the Union.  After being introduced to
the party’s ideology at an early age, Throckmorton never
abandoned the party’s principles even after he left the
Whig party to become a member of the Democratic party in
the mid-1850s. 
Scholars have labeled Throckmorton’s reaction to
change in Texas politics as contradictory and ironic. 
Academicians are puzzled by the fact that the North Texan
voted against secession in 1861 only later to join the
Confederacy and oppose Radical Reconstruction.  However,
his positions were more consistent than contradictory. 
Throckmorton’s support of the Union during the secession
crisis stemmed from his opposition of extremists in both
northern and southern states.  Like Sam Houston, he
realized that secession would bring economic ruin to Texas. 
It also would prevent northern capitalists from investing
in southern railroads, which were vital to the North Texas
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economy.  In addition, he understood that slaveholding
planters would likely hold key positions in the Confederate
government, and thereby would continue to dominate the
political, economic, and social institutions of the South. 
As previously mentioned, this was a proposition that he and
other Texas Unionists were unwilling to accept.  
However, once the majority of Texas voters approved
secession, Throckmorton realized that the people on the
frontier were exposed to two potential dangers.  With the
U. S. Army abandoning their western forts, the people of
his home region were once again left unprotected from
potential Indian raids.  Additionally, Unionists in the
North Texas were venerable to the charge of being traitors
to the Confederacy, a circumstance that could have led to
the eruption of a civil war within the state.  While he was 
attempting to reconcile these differences, the Confederate
military attacked Fort Sumter, prompting President Lincoln
to issue a call for 75,000 volunteers to put down the
rebellion in the southern states.  The president’s actions
led Throckmorton to join the Confederacy:  He did not
believe that the Federal government had the right to coerce
the southern states back into the Union.  For Throckmorton,
coercion was a form of political extremism.  Thus, the
North Texan reluctantly joined the Confederate cause. 
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However, his experience in the Confederate military was
mostly limited to fighting Native Americans in the Indian
Territory and on the Texas frontier, thereby allowing him
to fulfill his self-proclaimed title as defender of the
northern frontier.
After the war, Throckmorton became the first
democratically elected governor in Texas.  During his brief
term as governor, he continued to act as a guardian of the
frontier.  In fact, his confrontations with the military
authorities were the result of his pursuance of policies
that were designed to shield the frontier settlers from
continued Indian raids and to prevent the migration of
freedmen to the North Texas region.  These policies,
coupled with Throckmorton’s lack of concern for the
freedmen’s general welfare, eventually led General Philip
Sheridan to remove the governor from office, charging that
he was an impediment to Reconstruction.
Throckmorton’s racism proved detrimental to the black
Texans’ struggle for equal rights during the Reconstruction
era.  While he did not kill African Americans with his own
hands, Governor Throckmorton did not actively prosecute
whites who committed crimes against blacks in the state. 
Though he was willing to accept emancipation of the slaves,
the governor could not consent to granting freedmen
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suffrage.  As a conservative Democrat, Throckmorton
understood that the disenfranchisement of ex-Confederate
voters and the enfranchisement of African American would
swing the balance of political power in the state in favor
of Radical Republican candidates and their Reconstruction
policies.  Given that the governor believed Radical
Republicans were extremists who subverted the
Constitutional powers guaranteed to the states, he refused
to accept Republican control of the state and did his best
to sabotage Governor E. J. Davis’s administration.    
Throckmorton seemingly condoned the crimes committed
against the freedmen for two reasons:  First, white
oppression of blacks forced the freedmen to accept second-
class citizenship, thereby allowing East Texas landowners
to effectively force the freedmen to sign unfair labor
contracts which prevented them from escaping the cotton
fields that they had worked as slaves.  In effect this
fulfilled Throckmorton’s plan to prevent blacks from
migrating to other regions in the state, especially North
Texas.  Second, the violence eventually stifled the
freedmen’s participation in the political process.  Without
the support of black voters, Republicans were weakened. 
When the federal government lifted its voting restrictions
on the majority of ex-Confederates with the passage of the
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Amnesty Act in 1872, Radical Republicans lost their grip on
the state, and Democratic redeemers regained political
prominence once again. 
Following the Democrats triumph, James Webb
Throckmorton continued to pursue a political career.  In
1874 the people of Texas’s Third Congressional District
elected him to the United States Congress and reelected him
in 1876.  During this early tenure as a congressman,
Throckmorton worked on educational issues and supported
federal funding for railroad expansion.  Throckmorton’s
support for the railroads was no surprise to his
contemporaries, especially after the Texas and Pacific
Railway Company retained him as one of their attorneys.  In
1878 he left Congress and returned to Texas, where he
attempted to win the Democratic nomination for governor. 
Because many Texans believed that the military had unjustly
removed Throckmorton from office during Reconstruction, a
small group of Democratic leaders supported his nomination
for a second term as the state’s chief executive.  However,
the ex-governor’s support was not enough to sustain him in
the Democratic party’s state convention, and he lost the
nomination to Judge Oran M. Roberts who subsequently went
on to win the gubernatorial race.  One factor that led to
Throckmorton’s failed attempt to capture his party’s
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nomination was his association with railroad magnates.  As
the agrarian protest movement against railroad companies
began to gain ground in Texas, the North Texan’s
affiliation with the Texas and Pacific Railway Company had
a negative affect on his candidacy.1 
After his defeat, Throckmorton continued to practice
law and participated in several public speaking
engagements.  In 1882, he was elected once again to the
House of Representatives, and he was reelected in 1884 and
1886.  Toward the end of his fifth term in Congress, poor
health forced him into retirement.  Apparently, he
continued to suffer from the same kidney problems that had
plagued him throughout his life.  Again, in 1892, he was
persuaded to run for governor, but he was not physically
strong enough to effectively campaign for office. 
Additionally, his long-time ties with the railroad
continued to prove a political liability.  Following a few
brief weeks of campaigning, the aging North Texan retired
from the race.  With Throckmorton out of the race, the
younger and more energetic Jim Hogg received the Democratic
nomination and later won the general election.2
Throckmorton returned to his home in McKinney, where
he became a receiver for the Choctaw Coal and Railroad
Company.  Apparently, he was enthusiastic about his new
     430
position, because the main office of the Choctaw company 
was located in McAllister, Oklahoma, which was a near his
home.  For the first time in his life, the old politician
envisioned spending his latter days near his family. 
Throckmorton assumed his duties at McAllister in the summer
of 1893, and all seemed well.  The North Texan ran his
office smoothly and efficiently, and there were even rumors
that he might soon be made president of the company. 
However, tragedy struck before these plans materialized.  
In April 1894, Throckmorton was playing cards with
friends when he excused himself momentarily, explaining
that he needed to go to his office to send a telegram.  He
completed his task and left his office to rejoin the card
game.  As he made his way down the street, the elderly
statesman lost his footing and fell to the ground.  The
fall left Throckmorton unconscious and broke two of his
ribs.  After a reasonable time passed, his friends became
worried and headed toward the Choctaw office.  Near there, 
they found the ex-governor lying on the ground.  After he
regained consciousness, Throckmorton returned to his home
in McKinney, where he remained a few days before going back
to McAllister to reassume his duties.  He soon became sick
and once again had to return to McKinney.  Upon his return
home, he was confined to his death bed.3  Throckmorton’s
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last hours were recorded in the following newspaper
account:
Early last night Gov. Throckmorton was asked how
he felt.  He had been in a stupor for two days
with only temporary periods of consciousness and
it was during one of these the question was put. 
He replied: ‘Very well,’ and nodded his head. 
Immediately after that he went to sleep as quietly
and peacefully as a child.  The men of medicine
who had been in attendance day and night for many
days dozed off, leaving a few watchers to await
developments with sleepless eyes.  The clock
ticked off the minutes with depressing monotony
and the hours crept on leaden heels.  The sick man
slept on.  So did the doctors.  The clock struck
12.  The dying man turned over, opened his eyes
once or twice, gasped a little and then went back
to rest.  The minutes crept along and the watchers
by the bedside conversed in low whispers.  Just as
the clock struck 1 the sleeper awoke with a gasp. 
His face was drawn and wrinkled with pain and his
body was writhing in agony.  The physicians were
at once aroused and went to work.  A crisis was at
hand.  The slender thread of life vibrated, the
convulsion passed, the patient rallied.  But there
was no more sleep.  It was evident that the
strength which had withstood death nigh a hundred
times was exhausted and the beginning of the end
was at hand.  From 1 o’clock till daylight stole
over the hills the departing spirit tarried awhile
in peace.  But about 6 o’clock another convulsion
as violent as the first shook the weakened frame. 
He never rallied.  At 8:30 he died without having
spoken for hours and hours, perfectly unconscious
alike the pangs of suffering and the farewells of
those whom he had loved so well and who had so
well loved him.4
By examining Throckmorton’s life, scholars are
provided with a glimpse into five decades of Texas history.
This North Texan’s life-experiences reveal much about
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southern society as it existed during the latter half of
the nineteenth century.  Most important, Throckmorton’s 
biography reveals that the South was never a homogeneous
society.  For example, during the antebellum and Civil War
years, whites in the southern states were not united in a
defense of slavery.  The frontier settlers clearly
represented a challenge to the South’s slaveocracy.  On
numerous occasions, Throckmorton challenged the authority
of the planters in Texas.  However, this is not to say that
the Texas frontier was not an viable part of the South.  On
the contrary, North Texas represented a clear extension of
the cultures and customs of the Upper South, while East
Texas represented an extension of the Lower South.  In
fact, while this study only alludes to the fact, Texas
represents an excellent case study on the social,
political, and economic differences between the states of
the Upper and Lower South.
Next, the North Texas politician’s disdain for African
Americans during the Reconstruction era illustrates that
southern racism was multifaceted.  During this period of
racial strife, Throckmorton, unlike the former planter
class, did not attempt to oppress black Texans out of a
desire to revive the institution of slavery. 
Throckmorton’s oppressive views toward the freedmen was
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directly related to his quest to ensure that conservative
Democrats retained political, economic, and social control
of the state.  While Throckmorton’s racist views and his
desire to protect white rule in Texas eventually led him to
work hand in hand with his former antebellum political
foes, such as Oran Roberts, he was not a proponent of the
South’s “Lost Cause.”  In fact, it seems certain that he
viewed the destruction of the planter class following the
Civil War as a positive good for small farmers in the North
Texas region.  Settlers no longer had to worry about
falling under the political, social, or economic dominance
of elite slaveholders in the eastern part of the state.
Finally, Throckmorton’s career exposes the complexity
of southern society.  Scholars cannot fully appreciate the
historical significance of this nineteenth-century
politician by examining his racial views alone.  While his
racism influenced his political decisions, one cannot over
look his personal political ambitions, his commitment to
the economic development of Texas, and his conservative
political ideology.  This study has attempted to examine
the experiences of one southern frontier politician and to
explain how these experiences influenced his public life,
thereby making him less of an enigma in nineteenth-century
Texas politics.
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